Warship stealth

.
Galrahn at the USNI blog and Burleson at the New Wars blog have questioned the 'stealth' approach to naval surface combatants that has shaped the look of new warships since the early 90's. The polygonal look with much less railings and antennas as well as weapons mostly hidden is a very different look in comparison to 60's, 70's and most 80's designs.

Stealth for naval surface combatants is mostly an affair in the realms of electromagnetic waves (radar), acoustics (against passive sonar) and as I understand it usually also magnetism (to counter magnetic mine and possibly even torpedo fuzes).

Infrared camouflage efforts are almost pointless - published thermal photos of warships at sea show such a stark contrast between the ship and the surroundings that only the use of the (decontamination) shower system seems to be promising (afaik). Such a water spray system has even been used on a CV90-based demonstrator tank as active infra-red camouflage system for a tank, but it's certainly only a temporary camouflage (requiring a timely alert, something that was often missing in past missile vs. ship actions).

The East African pirates are more 'stealthy' than all those easily identified 'stealth' warships which are low-observable at best. They use disguise for stealth instead of low reflexivity. You see them, but you cannot identify them as what they are unless you search their ship. The same principle as used by intelligence services, ninjas, criminals, and most insurgents.

Stealth warships aren't invisible to radar, and could never be invisible to good airborne radars if the latter were looking down at a good angle.
Let's assume that the ship reflects no more electromagnetic energy than the water surface (and even so to all directions), a generous assumption in my opinion.
The ship couldn't move much faster than 5 knots unless it's one of the prototypes for minimum wave effects. Radars can 'see' bow waves easily at long distances - and a bow wave without a ship would be a dead give-away even if the warship is trying to hide among hundreds of civilian ships. 5 knots is often unacceptable (but at least usually very silent).
The next problem is the ability of radars (with high frequencies) to create 3D images of objects. An uninteresting ship like a freighter could easily be pictured like that, but a stealth warship would either prevent it (very suspicious) or be easily recognized as warship on the screen.

I am convinced (for the time being ) that stealth is impossible for naval surface combatants against good aerial radars at good angles. Low observable characteristics are credible, though. A mix of reduced signature, decoys and jamming is useful against the tiny radars in anti-ship missiles, and low observable characteristics make the initial detection tougher at long ranges. LO adds to the challenges for the opposing force, but it's farther away from an invisibility cloak than an infantryman's camouflage clothing.

By the way; 'radar stealth' isn't really that new for navies. Radar absorbing materials (RAM) have been used since the 70's or maybe 60's on masts to reduce problems with the radars mounted on the masts.
Some German submarine snorkels of WW2 were already fitted with radar-absorbing mats and experiments for RAM date back to 1942 at least.


Galrahn pointed out that the shape is too distinctive, supposedly 'stealthy' (surface) warships cannot really avoid identification once they've been detected.
He sees a significant difference between blue water (high seas) and brown water (coastal waters) requirements for stealth. In the littorals you need to look like other ships, the supposed ability to fool radars is only useful against enemy munitions, not so against enemy reconnaissance.


Let's look at modern naval military history for inspiration:

We had stealth warships before.

Pirates, Q ships (anti-submarine traps) and merchant raiders (Germans both WW) disguised themselves as unarmed or marginally armed civilian ships just to drop the disguise when they demanded immediate surrender of their victim or began to sink it right away (if the victim is a capable opponent, as in the case of Q ships and Kormoran vs. HMAS Sydney).

The merchant raiders (Hilfskreuzer, auxiliary cruisers) offered huge internal volume and the ability to morph their outer appearance to many different ships. Some changes to the superstructure, hidden weapons, new paint job and changed name were enough to confuse and make identification very difficult.
The German merchant raider Kormoran was able to fool the Australian light cruiser HMAS Sydney by pretending it's the Dutch merchantman Straat Malakka till a distance of 1500 m - close enough to make the firefight deadly for both.
A stealth warship would have been identified at 10,000+ m without binoculars.

The shapes of merchantmen could easily be copied by modern warships - it's just a matter of intent or not.
Another possibility would be to have a close look at the container and MEKO technology - and possibly turn merchantmen into warships. Such ships wouldn't be milspec and would fare poorly once hit. Nevertheless, such auxiliary cruisers might still have their niches.

S O

edit :
I'd like to add that we could also take 19th century monitor designs and WW2 German submarine attacks for inspiration and delete most of the freeboard. Such a semi-submersible ship could disguise its turret/superstructure as a very small ship and keep its real size invisible.

Armoured reconnaissance

.
First, I'd like to admit that I'm not really an expert on modern armoured reconnaissance . My expertise is rather on reconnaissance technology, theory and history.

A modern trend in the Bundeswehr (and in some other places) irritates me nevertheless; armoured reconnaissance seems to shift from versatile reconnaissance to observation.
We had some reconnaissance concepts in the past that looked quite a lot like advance guards (WW2 Wehrmacht armoured reconnaissance battalion, U.S. armoured cavalry regiment) - today, it seems to be less about fighting for information than ever before.

The own actions aren't the only ones that count. You need not only to establish a good reconnaissance on your own, but also to counteract the enemy's reconnaissance. This counter-reconnaissance requirement leads to combat-capable recon forces, most notably well-armed recon vehicles. You can't just observe enemy recon vehicles for a few seconds and delegate them to attack helicopters or other forces - you need to ambush them or hunt them down. Experiences from mock battles at the U.S. National Training Center emphasize the need for counter-reconnaissance very much.
You don't simply need reconnaissance information; you need better such info than the opposing force.

Technological trends might be the reasons; especially sensor technology advances and proliferation. Main battle tanks have thermal sights that turn them into good reconnaissance tools - and the fight for information is easily possible for armour.
Long-range aerial radars and other sensor range improvements entice force planners to emphasis observation more than ever before - rightly so.

Observation from a hideout promises also less casualties than daring armoured reconnaissance far ahead of combat units (and even recon battalions fighting small battles to get results).
On the other hand , we're expecting less force density in future conflicts than expected during the Cold War in the Central European area. The sensor capabilities of opposing forces have improved, but the opportunities for infiltration have improved even more due to the reduced force density. We face a greater need to not only observe gaps, but also to keep the gaps clean of enemy reconnaissance assets.

We might have swung the pendulum too much towards observation.

The German 'doctrine' for armoured reconnaissance units doesn't include the fight for information and the counter-reconnaissance fight as core responsibilities at all - such activities are only meant to be the job if reinforcements (like a tank platoon) are attached.
The radar reconnaissance is an important mission (2nd behind Spähaufklärung = recce with stealth emphasis) for such battalions and companies - apparently the single most relevant addition to armoured recon theory in Germany since the 50's.
The 'doctrine' for the armoured company advocates a quite defensive, careful style of short-range recce, without emphasis on the counter-reconnaissance fight.

40's and 50's armoured reconnaissance 'doctrine' was quite the same as today, just without radar sub-units and thermal sights, but with a greater intent and ability to fight for information, to act as a kind of advance guard at times. Weak opposition - like a reduced infantry company defending a valuable hilltop or traffic bottleneck - was to be defeated by concentration of combat power and the use of the armored reconnaissance battalion's own infantry.


Let's have a look at the new German armoured observation (not really scouting) vehicle, the Fennek - and its predecessor Luchs (still in service).
I criticized the weak armament of the Fennek - not satisfying for combat even against outdated reconnaissance AFVs - earlier.

The Fennek concept is optimal for
- hiding
- using the sensor mast while hidden
- using remote sensors (and mini drones) for the observation
- self-defence at close distance
and for scouting along roads it's equipped with a backward-driving camera to escape in dangerous situations.

The Luchs is optimal for
- scouting mostly along roads (and evade backwards at max speed with 2nd driver if in trouble)
- combat with a 20 mm autocannon that defeated all Warsaw Pact light AFV armor
and it offers a good visibility for its crew of four because it's quite high.

The Fennek could be turned into a vehicle that can take on enemy light AFVs at useful distances; that would require a new weapon like the 12.7mm machine gun of the Dutch version.

Modern IFVs are quite capable in the reconnaissance+combat role - the U.S.Army even uses a variant of its IFV for the job. The disadvantages are the treacherous traces and noises of the tracks, but that's a rather modest price for the benefits - less development costs, better equipment standardization and off-road agility.
Yet, to divert IFVs (and/or MBTs) to the recce role weakens the combat battalions - the IFV dismount strength of a modern armour division isn't good anyway, reductions like diversions of IFVs to reconnaissance would hurt the division's ability to take closed terrain very much.


I would propose three-piece ground reconnaissance
1) area and object observation; radar, ElInt (!) and camera surveillance with vehicles like Fennek, but with an armament that's better suited for self-defence against light AFVs (12.7-14.5mm minimum, 20-30mm optimum).
2) combat reconnaissance that inspect/take objects and engage enemy ground recce; on IFVs platoons or mixed MBT/APC platoons. This should not be improvised, but the main mission, with appropriate training and organization.
3) classic road (and limited off-road) reconnaissance along the lines of Luchs (a smaller vehicle, though) and Panhard EBR.

The omission of the reconnaissance fight looks like a capability gap to me. It should be an organic capability and a high priority in the armoured reconnaissance battalions. Neither drones nor new sensor technologies or attack helicopters have replaced the need for ground forces counter-reconnaissance.

S O

The Luftwaffe's major equipment procurement

.
Let's have a look at the German Luftwaffe (air force).

The procurement of major systems by the Luftwaffe is a long story of mediocre decisions in my opinion. "Mediocre" was unusually polite. Let's say "often crappy".

It began with a couple of outdated air defence and aircraft systems in the 50's, as first jump-start equipment. The Luftwaffe was no effective fighting fore in the 50's due to the rapid expansion and lack of experience - the quality of the equipment was less important than the cost, and that was very low.

Let's look at the later decisions:

G.91Y - light fighter bomber, 1960's
This was a useful light fighter-bomber, but clearly inferior to the Skyhawk.
Poor decision, the Luftwaffe missed the opportunity to get one of the greatest fighter-bombers of all time.


F-104G Starfighter - interceptor and fighter-bomber - 1960's
This caused a long-lasting scandal in Germany because hundreds of the Starfighters crashed.
It would have been an excessively poor choice even without a single crash, though. Range, useful payload, short runway capability and agility (except roll rate) were (almost) non-existing. It was a Mach 2 sports plane for test pilots, but crap as military front-line aircraft.
Several superior alternatives were known at the time, among them the Mirage III.
The Mirage III was a good fighter and a capable fighter-bomber well beyond its prime as a fighter.
(It should be noted that our SecDef Strauß considered the Starfighter also as a low level supersonic dash speed nuclear bomber - a role in which over shortest distances it had indeed no equal.)


Noratlas - tactical air transport - 1950's

This (in German service rather short-lived) transport aircraft was no major mishap, but it was no great choice either. The very successful (but larger) C-130 was already available at that time.


Transall C-160 - tactical air transport - 1960's

This was the successor of the Noratlas, again we chose not to buy the (still larger) C-130 Hercules. Again probably not the best choice, but likely OK because domestic aircraft production means a flow of about 40-60% of the funds back to the government's budget by taxes.


HAWK and I-HAWK - surface-to-air missiles - 1960's and 1970's

This is a quite successful and adequate SAM, not perfect but adequate. It was certainly the right choice.


VTOL projects - fighter, fighter-bomber and tactical transport aircraft - 1960's and 1970's

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EWR_VJ_101
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VFW_VAK_191B
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dornier_Do_31
These were very expensive concepts, but probably wrong only in hindsight. We didn't buy any for the Luftwaffe. The fear that our airfields and probably even improvised/reserve airfields on roads might be neutralized by bomb attacks motivated VTOL research. VTOL can add to the aircraft's agility and the designs keep some of their fascination even today - but it was obvious that their internal fuel capacity would be very small. More investment into STOL technologies like RATO, arresting hooks and grass airfield undercarriages & air inlets was probably a better choice even without hindsight.
Maybe the VTOL projects were overengineered.


F-4 Phantom II - fighter, reconnaissance aircraft, heavy fighter-bomber - 1970's

The Luftwaffe sucks at fighter procurement. These were again in part bought to please the U.S. government.
The F-4 Phantom failed pretty much over Vietnam even against outdated subsonic fighters. Both the Sidewinder and even more so the Sparrow missile of the 60's were quite disappointing (the Soviet counterparts were even worse). The dominant form of air combat at that time was the dogfight, which required much better agility - and favored numerical superiority. The F-4 wasn't agile enough to be a good fighter for Central Europe and it required twice the price, fuel, maintenance hours and crew in comparison to single-engine, single-seat fighters.
It was a good fleet defense interceptor and night fighter, acceptable heavy fighter-bomber and debatable reconnaissance aircraft.
The worst: We didn't even buy the Sparrow missile for the Phantom II and initially tried to get a one-seater version, trying to (and in part succeeding in) deleting the two only (mediocre) strengths of the design.
Two alternatives come to my mind; first, the Mirage F.1 was available years before we bought the Phantom II and was a significant dogfight and take-off improvement over the Mirage III.
The other alternative - only for the fighter role and a bit later available - was the heavy high-end fighter Eagle, which was clearly superior.


Alpha Jet - jet trainer and very light fighter-bomber - 1970's

The Hawk is widely acknowledged to be a superior alternative.
The difference wasn't great, though.


Tornado IDS - low altitude interdiction fighter-bomber - 1970's and 1980's

Luckily, we didn't buy the Tornado ADV (fighter), but only the IDS and later the ECR. The ADV wasn't the right choice even for the British (F-14 and F-15 would have been superior), and it would have been a poor fighter over Central Europe.
The IDS version was an OK fighter-bomber with good low level flight characteristics.
It should have been a bit more elaborate, though. An anti-radar missile like Shrike/Alarm/HARM should have been available from day one. The AGM-65 Maverick should have been available as well. A guided bomb like Hobos might have helped as well. The fixation on very low level terrain-following flight seems to have blinded the Luftwaffe in regard to such guided ground attack munitions during the 80's.
We could have bought A-7 Corsair II and A-10 Thunderbolt II instead of Tornado IDS - but that would have been a different concept with a similar cost/benefit ratio.


MIM-104 Patriot - surface-to-air missiles - 1980's

A major improvement over I-Hawk, but with a dangerous weak spot; inferior azimuth coverage. The old Cold War doctrine called for a line of SAM batteries to back up our fighters along Western Germany from south to north, and Patriot was adequate for this job. An expensive domestic development project and the adaption of naval systems (Sea Dart, SM-2MR) were the only alternatives.


Tornado ECR - SEAD and reconnaissance aircraft - 1990's

The Tornado ECR was a decent program as well, although it was a small scandal that crucial equipment was missing during the first years. Again, its guided weapons arsenal is a bit limited; Alarm, Maverick and MALD should play a big role for Tornado ECR.
It would have been a good idea to get the wild weasel capability much earlier (up to two decades earlier!), too.


NH90 - transport helicopter - modern

The NH90 development is mostly unnecessary. Just like we could have bought Apaches in the mid-80's instead of the army's Tiger helicopter program. The alternatives to the NH90 were Super Puma and Black Hawk. I consider the NH90 program more as industrial policy than as a military necessity.
It's a great helicopter and now the best of its kind, but the development costs were not necessary.


Jäger90 / EFA / Eurofighter / Typhoon - fighter and later multi-role aircraft - modern

This project simply lasted for too long. A quarter century is too much time for a project. The 90's peace dividend delayed the project in addition to the normal delays in a multi-national program (like the French leaving it in favor of the Rafale).
The EFA was a great 80's design, would have been the world's best fighter in the 90's - and entered service directly as an aircraft that was not inferior to unfriendly nation's inventories, but way behind the state of the art.
It was turned into a normal multi-role combat aircraft, a fighter-bomber, real quick.
We should begin the next fighter development now. Maybe the Japanese would allow us to participate in their ATD-X program?

I see several possible alternatives; the Eagle (this time the C/D versions), the Hornet, the Fighting Falcon XL (this suffers from its small radar, though) and possibly also the Mirage 4000.
Every of these alternatives could have entered service in the 1980's, the only "cheap" alternative would have been the Fighting Falcon XL - at the same time the weakest beyond visual range (BVR) fighter in the list.


A400M - transport aircraft - modern

We should have joined the An-70T project instead of this mess. See also here.
Furthermore, we should have bought a junior partner instead of following the old one-size-fits-it-all approach: The CN-235 comes to my mind.


My opinion is that the Luftwaffe had a fighter technology weakness since its rebirth in the 1950's. The few Typhoons of today are OK, but only because the challengers are even more dated.
The attack aircraft, transport aircraft and air defence equipment otherwise was mostly adequate.
It's no wonder that some U.S.Americans have the perception that the U.S. and not the Europeans bear the responsibility for air superiority in NATO. The French had always good fighters, but few - and most other European NATO air forces had rather mediocre fighter equipment. The fighter equipment of the USAF wasn't good between the Sabre's prime time in the 50's and the arrival of the F-15 in quantity, though.
Luckily, the MiG-21 was a terrible fighter (and a mediocre interceptor), later reinforced by mediocre MiG23s.

We won't have the luxury to choose the best among several in-production fighter designs in the future - and usually missed such opportunities in the past anyway.

I criticized some U.S. projects like the F-22 (or more accurately: their fans' positions) several times so far. The German air force procurement is in my opinion no better. It just doesn't offer as interesting lessons. Political influence and a failure to appreciate available and superior designs were our problems - not such shiny errors like belief in wonder weapons.

S O

edit 2014: I wouldn't call the NH90 "great" any more, as it has design faults.
I'd also emphasize the ignored option of creating a powerful 70's Luftwaffe with 1,000+ F-5E/F. Their cost effectiveness was astonishing. Their dogfight strength, frugality, efficiency, mission radius and versatility was perfect.

Active Protection Suites (for AFV): state of the art

.
edit 2014-04: The mentioned article has become available in English.

I was repeatedly annoyed by a phenomenon of the language barrier between German and English: A wide-spread ignorance in the English-language public about non-U.S., non-Israeli and non-Russian active protection suites.
This ignorance leads to wrong perceptions of APS potentials and relative qualities.

The Israeli Trophy system (2007) is the first and only operational Western APS and therefore the best one (the only known/published Russian examples were 1980's hardware).
The resulting perception that it's the best one is apparently wrong, and Trophy does not show the full potential of APS at all.

We had an article on APS in Strategie und Technik (previously known as "Soldat und Technik"), a German journal on military affairs (mostly hardware and organizations) in October.
The author was Dieter Haug, a present and long-time employee of the German ministry of defence, department for procurement and occupied with protection technologies.
The article would have gained a lot of attention and sparked extreme interest and many discussions if it had appeared in a generic English language journal, accessible for Americans and Brits.

The article mentions three categories of APS based on the interception point (the smallest distance from which a shot can be fired and still intercepted):
Close range IP: up to 2 m
Medium range IP: 2 to 30 m
Far-Range IP: more than 30 m

APS can also be grouped along their reaction times into
microsecond (hard kill),
millisecond (hard kill)and
second APS (soft-kill).

It becomes clear over the course of the article that APS in the millisecond/medium range IP range have quite long minimum distance against targets like HEAT tank gun shells and high velocity ATGMs - even against man-portable anti-tank weapons like RPG-19 more than a hundred meters.

The use of actively emitting radars that can be exploited by the enemy for reconnaissance and targeting with passive radar sensors is another problem, but not common to all APS.

He also tells about the quantity of known hard kill APS systems (projects) in the world: 50! The public discussion of hard kill APS is based on a basic knowledge of less than ten systems as far as I know!

Finally, the article had a great table at the end. I found some of the intercept distance and weights to be unlike info from other sources and we need to keep in mind that these systems are unproven, but it's still a great table.

Sadly, it's in German, but I compiled some interesting info for a German system (AMAP-ADS), an U.S.American system (Quick Kill) and an Israeli system (Trophy) into a table of my own:

(click on it)
AMAP-ADS was the only system with claimed microseconds performance in the table - with claimed effectiveness against KE (APFSDS long rods being possibly deflected/broken/turned) and even EFP (explosively formed projectiles - very fast) while emitting no radar signal - too good to be true?


I hope this helps to improve the understanding of modern APS technology beyond the German language area.

S O

The defense stimulus topic and this blog

.
Maybe you remember my December post
"Military procurement in 2009/2010".
Well, it turned out to be a very early (actually the earliest I've found) text about the use of military spending as part of current stimulus plans.

Here's a short list of some articles about the topic:
(My mini-article was published on 2008-12-14.)

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123008280526532053.html
2008-12-24

http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2399
2009-01-02

http://marathonpundit.blogspot.com/2009/01/hey-obama-defense-stimulus-would-be.html
2009-01-07

http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0108/p01s03-usmi.html
2009-01-08

http://solari.com/blog/?p=1983
2009-01-09

http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/story?id=6614384&page=1
2009-01-11

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/01/the-defense-stimulus/
2009-01-13

Then I stopped tracking them, but here's a new one:

http://www.commentarymagazine.com/blogs/index.php/boot/52861
2009-02-01


I once showed the blog after its first couple posts (before I really made it public) to others and got feedback like "not original content" (that was about the very early COIN text). Well, I believe I paid attention to that critique and had a lot of original and unique content over the past one and a half year.
The stimulus article was even a precursor to a public discussion (albeit irrelevant in it, as this is no major newspaper, after all).

Most other articles on the subject didn't get the same point as me, about the opportunity to increase near-term spending in the military budgets without additional long-term debt. That's a bit sad. Maybe they should read this blog ;-) .


Anyway - I have about two dozens of topics prepared (or noted in keywords) for future posts. Stay with me for many more months of non-mainstream, sceptical coverage of defense and freedom topics!

S O

Fractures in our military superiority

.
John Halldale has published a noteworthy article at defpro.com;
Is American Air Power on the Verge of Collapse?.

He includes much that I agree with (about 70%, and I actually still plan to write blog posts about some of those points). I propose to read the relevant chapters of this book in addition.

Russia doesn't spend its much on modernizing its military, but on modernizing its weapon and munitions design pool. They develop new equipment without buying it for their armed services.

That leaves the impression of almost useless, obsolete forces - a strong argument for those who don't consider Russia as a near-peer.
At the same time, they have the designs finished to modernize their military (and para-militaries) in just a few years - take the re-armament of Germany 1933-1939 as reference. Most of the German designs procured in 1933-1937 were 1928-1933 developments.

The Russians use one more approach that misleads many observers; secrecy. Their highest-profile weapon systems like their new tank T-95 and new generation fighter PAK-FA are mysteries for the Western public; we don't have any reliable information about these.

Finally the third reason for the underestimation of the Russian's potential; they don't always follow the same lines of development due to different challenges.
It's not as easy to compare as a simple match up of alike systems. They sometimes don't focus so much on designing a comparable counterpart, but a dissimilar countermeasure. Their long-range missiles against AEW&E aircraft (like AWACS) is such an example - and without counterpart in the West.

The F-35 is a ground attack pane with air/air self-defence capability - and surely also a viable fighter against 1980's and 1990's systems. Its power lies in its avionics, and it's not meant to fight for air superiority. Rafale and Typhoon are both multi-role combat aircraft and will be the dominant combat aircraft in some European air forces once Tornado IDS and Mirage 2000 approach the end of their useful lives. Neither will really be up to the task of matching the quality of PAK-FA - simply because being an overmatch to them must be the premier requirement for the newer PAK-FA. The F-35 will likely be different, but not significantly better in air combat.

I'm not so sure that the F-22 is a proper solution, though. Its concept is publicly known since about 1991 and the Russian likely design PAK-FA to match or overmatch F-22 with the advantage of the later design. The extremely high cost of the F-22 design is a huge problem as well.

Maybe we should simply stop assuming that we would always enjoy air superiority (or supremacy). We cannot be sure about our superiority in hardware quality, combat morale, logistics, tactics, operations - no matter how often some will tell us about our superiority.
The U.S.A.A.F. and USN pilots despised the Japanese air power as paper flyers, mere victims before Pearl Harbor - and found themselves to be quite inferior in many regards during the first months of the war. Such wrong perceptions happen sometimes.

It's really about time to look at what can go wrong, not at how great we are - just like Mr. Halldale did in the article.

The Russians don't want to invade us and turn us red. They probably never really did. They CAN subdue neighbors that were traditionally under Russian control if they are convinced that we wouldn't dare to face them, though.
That's why a realistic assessment of the deterrence effect of nuclear weapons, our commitment and the relative military state of the art between us and them count.

S O

p.s.: Hat tip to The DEW Line

Guided munitions history

.
Precision munitions have been hyped up at the very least since the obscene TV war for Kuwait in 1991.

Precision munitions were later a cornerstone of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), along with improved communications, computers and sensors. The (assumed) ability to hit & destroy every detected (and identified) enemy is fascinating to many.

Let's use (military) history to enrich the perspective.

The only truly new guided weapons are those which employ active laser seekers (like LADAR, still quite uncommon), millimetre wavelength radar (imaging radar, actually already 1980's stuff) and satellite navigation (the famous JDAM family and similar).

1970's technologies are already very old news, and include imaging infrared guidance with lock on, electro-optical guidance with lock-on (both in the AGM-65 A and D Maverick missiles (D was developed in 70's and became operational in 80's), for example).
Laser beam riding missiles are also a product of the 1970's - like RBS 70.

1960's technologies include the semi-active laser (SAL) guidance that became so famous during the 1991 war - the first example was the Bolt-117 glide bomb of 1967, used in Vietnam.
SAL guided bombs, Mavericks and Tomahawk cruise missiles were the most significant of the guided weapons used against Iraq that caught so much attention in 1991 and later.

The 1950's technology advance was mostly semi-active radar homing (SARH), a principle usually employed against aerial targets and rarely against ships - an example is the AIM-7 Sparrow missile.

1940's technology includes manual electro-optical guidance, both by wire and by radio - Hs 293D. Another ground-breaking missile development was the automatic active radar homing Bat glide bomb. The first passive radar homing missile originated in WW2 as well, an experimental version of Bv246.
Several German companies developed also similar examples of passive infra-red seekers for guided weapons, although these weren't mounted on missiles any more.
Active and passive automatic homing for torpedoes was also developed in WW2.

Now the clou:

The technology for guided munitions is actually even much older than that.

Just a few years after the ground-laying research of electromagnetic waves by Heinrich Hertz began the development for radio remote controls.

A Christian Hülsmeyer got a patent for a device for the triggering of certain mechanism by electric waves in 1902.

The first experiment of wire guidance/remote control happened three decades earlier, basing on works of Werner von Siemens: A boat with wire-command electrical continuous current rudder control was tested - under remote control.

Imagine: We could have had remote-controlled steam boat bombs already in the 1870's (if a war at that time had involved Germany)! That's a time when most artillery was still muzzle-loaded with black powder!


The company Siemens-Schuckert worked (unsuccessfully) on remote-controlled torpedoes and air-dropped missiles during 1907 and 1911 - before the air got weaponized at all.

Wilhelm von Siemens worked on wire and radio-controlled missiles in the First World War with considerable success, including a radio remote control for a motor boat of the Fa. Röver (a company).
The more spectacular examples were remote-controlled gliders (radio or wire guidance) which carried torpedoes to be released close to the target ship.
This technology was revived for the Second World War, but the fire control problem was insurmountable for the human operator - the technology itself works. It's simply difficult to aim right with such a glider in the terminal phase and to time the release well.

This is an experimental 300 kg wide-guided glider, tested with airships in 1917:

Other examples weighed up to 1,000 kg.
The Funktechnische Versuchsabteilung (radio technology testing detachment) in Döberitz developed successfully a remote-controlled (radio) aircraft ("Fledermaus-Apparate", "bat devices") in 1918; five modified two-seater biplanes.


A little bit of military-technological history sometimes offers a valuable lesson.
We could have seen the first use of guided weapons in the First World War, at the same time when normal aerial bombs were introduced.
We could have seen World War 2 bombing campaigns based on guided weapons with a CEP of less than 10 m (X-1, AZON/RAZON; see also here) if the German air force wasn't so fixated on the pilot-skill focused dive bombing, the British Bomber Command not too cowardly for strategic daylight bombing and the U.S.American (Army) Air Force not so much focused on its complex Norden bombsight.

The technologies of WW2 had to be re-discovered for challenging targets in the Korean Air War and guided bomb technology (much neglected due to nuclear warheads that required little accuracy) got a well-deserved boost during the Vietnam War.

It was quite despicable negligence (in part because of a fixation on very low level flight) on our part that the share of guided munitions wasn't already dominant by 1991, but a mere few per cent.

Missile guidance technology was always ahead of its users; guided weapons history is a history of the failure to exploit available technology. In the 90's we were pretty much celebrating that the obvious and undeniable effects seen in hot wars against third rate opponents with mostly fine weather finally made us exploit the guided weapon principle to its full potential.
 

S O

p.s.: This was only what I know about guided weapons, I suspect several foreign early developments and omitted less relevant Japanese and Russian WW2 developments.

German light AFV armament

.
German armoured vehicles very rarely used heavy machine guns like M2HB - such weapons were used on the very first equipment in the late 50's and some in the 60's, but became irrelevant later on.

Our typical Cold War armament for trucks, armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and similar vehicles was the 7.62mmx51 MG3 machine gun, often without any shield.

Only the reconnaissance AFV, the Spähpanzer Luchs uses an effective 20mmx139 autocannon - a caliber that was capable enough to defeat enemy BMPs and BTRs, but wasn't powerful enough if used against better-protected vehicles like Western infantry fighting vehicles (IFV).
Another weapon was introduced as alternative post-Cold War, the 40mmx53 GMG - an automatic grenade launcher like the better-known Mk 19. Such weapons have a muzzle velocity of about 240 m/s, barely enough to be considered useful against moving armoured vehicles out to about 500 m.

A 40mm dual purpose grenade can penetrate light armour with a shaped charge and achieve 'some' effect inside, but it's severely restricted by its rather low muzzle velocity (reduced probability of hit at longer ranges), safety considerations (fragmentation) and volume (only 32 grenades per belt).

.50BMG weapons aren't entirely out of favour in the Bundeswehr; navy helicopters, KSK special forces, navy ships and infantry snipers use that calibre - it's just not in general use.
Mungo ESK, Grizzly, Yak, Boxer, ATF Dingo, LAPV Enok, Fennek and the old M113- the light armoured vehicle procurement (the list isn't complete) of the Bundeswehr appears to be very chaotic since the 90's, but nevertheless these vehicles have one thing in common: An armament with MG3 and/or GMG.

I consider this armament as quite unsatisfactory for several reasons;
A) It's inadequate as overflight and close-in deterrent against helicopters.
B) It's inadequate in surprise contacts with enemy light AFVs like reconnaissance vehicles. Even some 1930's reconnaissance AFVs would be superior in 1-on-1 vehicle combat due to superior firepower.
C) Unsatisfactory external ballistics of the 40mm calibre. 240 m/s muzzle velocity is the key problem, but it's not possible to improve the muzzle velocity because of the exponentially growing muzzle energy and therefore recoil.
D) Inadequate armour penetration of 7.62NATO bullets against everything that was armoured; the lowest armour rating for vehicles is aimed against this calibre (and the Russian 7.62mmx54R). Only expensive high-end armour penetrating cartridges like SLAP have a good penetration capability.

I'd like to give a pleading for alternative armaments here.

Three alternatives come to my mind;
1) Heavy machine gun calibres; 12.7mm and 14.5mm, but potentially also much weaker ones, between 7.62NATO and .50BMG.
2) 20mm lightweight autocannons; some of these approached the weight and size of a heavy machine gun by the end of WW2. They can use explosive shells, but with little fragmentation effect.
3) 30mm low recoil autocannons; these became available during the 80's and use dual purpose (shaped charge plus fragmentation) shells. The AH-64 Apache helicopter uses the same ammunition to good effect even at quite long ranges.

I'd like to point out the other two interesting alternatives that don't require any new development.

Example: Vektor (Denel) GAMA
This is a South African automatic weapon that can be mounted on a vehicle (even a jeep) just like a heavy machine gun. It's a weapon for multiple calibres and can be converted to another calibre in 10 minutes without special tools.
12.7mm x 99 (.50BMG, very common in NATO, SLAP available), 12.7mm x 107 (Russian), 14.5mm x 114 (Russian), 20mm x 82 (very low impulse, old German cartridge), 20mm x 102 (a very common calibre in NATO) and 20mm x 110 (old Hispano-Suiza calibre) are possible.

Weight: 47 - 55 kg
Length: about 1.8 m
Muzzle velocity: 720 - 1,030 m/s
Cyclic: about 650 - 750 rds/min
Typical ammunition: AP, HE

Example: ASP-30
The best-known autocannon in the 30mm calibre for low recoil applications. It can be mounted on vehicles just like a heavy machine gun, but its ammunition is already quite big.
Calibre: 30mm x 113 B (the ADEN/DEFA pattern, used by fighters since decades and also used by AH-64 Apache attack helicopters)

Weight: 52 kg
Length: 2.06 m
Muzzle velocity: 820 m/s
Cyclic: 400 - 450 rds/min
Typical ammunition: HEDP

The armament of light armoured vehicles with only rifle calibre machine guns and low muzzle velocity grenade launchers is inadequate in my opinion. Weapons in between combine a much better effect than a MG3 with a much better ammunition supply than a GMG. The self-defence capability beyond rifle range could be much improved.
We already missed the opportunity to use Eastern German 14.5mm weapons for a free upgrade, I hope we won't stick to 7.62NATO and 40mm x 53 as light AFV armament forever.

S O

Free riders

.
The current economic crisis and the piracy affair have one thing in common; they remind us of free riders.

Banks and industries never wanted much state involvement in their markets when the markets were fine and they themselves had money are calling now for state's aid.
Big corporations were often evading taxation with the help of lawyers and consultant (and by moving administrations to places like Ireland) - but want to get back from the society what they didn't give to it in the first place.

Shipping companies did the same - they evaded taxes and regulation by flying the colours of some unimportant Latin American countries like Panama.
It's strange to read that a "German" ship was now captured by pirates off Africa's coast. The crew is Filipino with a single Indonesian - no Germans anyway.

Why should such a ship be considered as a German ship? Why should the shipping company have the right to expect our state to bother about the affair?
Those shipping companies should call the navy of Panama, not ours!

The use of the military to protect our shipping is OK, its use to protect business interests leads only to shitty military actions and small wars - we should avoid that.


Such free rider phenomenons weaken and exploit states - and end up drawing us into crisis situations without justification. Much has been proclaimed about the decline of the state, allegedly powerless European governments and such.
It's about time to strike back, to protect the interests of our citizens and to show the cold shoulder to opportunistic companies.

The 'bad bank' discussion in Germany is a good opportunity; we should investigate the banks and learn which ones are about to fail without state assistance - and socialize them. Take away all shares from the shareholders who drove such greed and opportunistic behavior - a punishment as warning for future shareholders.
We can set up a re-privatization plan immediately afterward and withdraw all state influence in less than five years, when state-appointed small bank and savings bank managers have repaired the damage done by their incompetent idiot colleagues.

That won't work because our politicians aren't much better (they actually allow the idiot bankers to sit at the table when they discuss state help for banks), but it's allowed to have some political dreams ... maybe sometime in the future the useless conservatives won't be in the government.

We SHOULD nevertheless demonstrate state strength against free riders and force them to bear the appropriate responsibilities. Rights are the twins of responsibilities - we should grant no right without responsibility.

Sven Ortmann

Frauenparkplätze

.
"Frauenparkplatz". I despise (and ignore) that word.
It's written behind many parking lots and means "parking lot for women". It's usually at some of the best placed parking lots (the very best are almost always empty and reserved for disabled people), close to the shopping center and supposed to provide women with - well, whatever.

I've seen an even more discriminating and outrageous sign a few weeks ago, but succeeded in forgetting the rubbish.

This kind of discrimination is a puzzle piece in the greater picture of how good intentions and political correctness can overstep the limit of appropriateness and can begin to hurt our freedom and equality in an inappropriate way.

The big things like CCTV and database scandals have our attention as freedom limiters and dangerous foreshadows, but the small things count, too.

I commit to prefer to park on a Frauenparkplatz whenever possible to protest and to take away the desired effect from these despicable signs.

Sven Ortmann