Is Germany at war because of ISAF?

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Our politicians (well, those in power) resist the notion that we're at war or that at least the Germans in Afghanistan are waging a war.

I'm quite sure that Afghanistan is a country at war; there's a civil war between the "national" and foreign forces on one side and a decentralized collection of Taliban groups plus some other armed fores (smuggler clans, for example) on the other side.

This doesn't mean that we or our soldiers there are at war - not in itself.
Combat itself is not necessarily war.

So let's have a closer look at it:

- - - - -

The German ministry of defence writes on its website:

Seit Dezember 2001 ist die Bundeswehr – gestützt auf ein breites Mandat des Bundestages – in Afghanistan präsent. Im Rahmen der International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) unterstützt sie die afghanische Regierung bei Herstellung und Wahrung der Inneren Sicherheit, solange einheimische Kräfte dazu noch nicht vollständig in der Lage sind. Außerdem wirkt sie beim Wiederaufbau des Landes mit.

Translation:
Since December 2001 is the Bundeswehr - resting on a broad mandate of the Bundestag - in Afghanistan. It supports in the framework of the (...) ISAF the Afghan government in the establishment and maintenance of the internal security as long as indigenous forces aren't fully capable to do this. Furthermore, it helps in the reconstruction of the country.

-> Official national (BMVg/government) position:
ISAF supports the Afghan government as long as it cannot do its jobs on its own.



The ISAF website says

NATO’s main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. It does this predominately through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force.

Since NATO took command of ISAF in 2003, the Alliance has gradually expanded the reach of its mission, originally limited to Kabul, to cover Afghanistan’s whole territory. The number of ISAF troops has grown accordingly from the initial 5,000 to around 50.000 troops coming from 42 countries, including all 26 NATO members.
(...)
In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping.
(...)
ISAF is a coalition of the willing - not a UN force properly speaking - which has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Nine UN Security Council Resolutions relate to ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776 and 1833 (on 23 September 2008). A detailed Military Technical Agreement agreed between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority in January 2002 provides additional guidance for ISAF operations.

NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003 upon request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and soon after, the UN gave ISAF a mandate to expand outside of Kabul.

-> Official multinational (ISAF/NATO) position:

"ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations (...)"


Now let's look at the international stage (United Nations);
ISAF was authorized by the UNSC, after all.

It began with
S/RES/1386 (2001)

Authorizes, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment;

It got extended (duration) by S/RES/1510 (2003).

S/RES/1563 (2004) extended ISAF again and added

Calls upon the International Security Assistance Force to continue to work in close consultation with the Afghan Transitional Administration and its successors and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate;

S/RES/1623 (2005) extended again...

S/RES/1659 (2006) was a bit more creative extension:

3. Affirms the central and impartial role of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including coordination of efforts in implementing the Compact; and looks forward to the early formation of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan Government and the United Nations, and with a secretariat function to support it;
4. Welcomes the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (iANDS) presented by the Afghan Government and the political, security and financial pledges made by participants at the London Conference; notes that financial assistance available for the implementation of iANDS has now reached $10.5 billion; further notes the intention of the Afghan Government to seek debt relief through the Paris Club;
5. Recognizes the risk that opium cultivation, production and trafficking poses to the security, development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally, welcomes the updated National Drug Control Strategy presented by the Afghan Government at the London Conference, and encourages additional international support for the four priorities identified in that Strategy including through contribution to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund;
6. Acknowledges the continuing commitment of NATO to lead the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and welcomes the adoption by NATO of a revised Operational Plan allowing the continued expansion of the ISAF across Afghanistan, closer operational synergy with the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and support, within means and capabilities, to Afghan security forces in the military aspects of their training and operational deployments;

S/RES/1707 (2006) extended.

S/RES/1776 (2007) had this as creative part:

Stresses the importance of increasing the effective functionality,
professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector in order to provide long-term solutions to security in Afghanistan, and encourages ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as resources permit, to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces, in particular the Afghan National Police

S/RES/1833 (2008) adds another extension to 13 October 2009 and has this

Stresses the importance of increasing, in a comprehensive framework, the functionality, professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector, encourages ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as resources permit, to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces, in order to accelerate progress towards the goal of self-sufficient and ethnically balanced Afghan security forces providing security and ensuring the rule of law throughout the country, welcomes in this context the progress achieved by the Afghan Authorities in assuming lead security responsibility for Kabul, and stresses the importance of supporting the planned expansion of the Afghan National Army;

-> Official international (U.N.) position:
ISAF is a mission to assist the Afghan government under NATO leadership in consultation with an UNSecGen representative and OEF.

- - - - -

These statements are lacking an important part or a war mission: They do not tell that ISAF's mission was to defeat an enemy or to at least force warring parties to end warfare. ISAF is by official design not meant to win or end the war, but to add security and stability to Afghanistan till the Afghan government takes over.
It was meant to be an Afghanization project from day one (unlike OEF-A).

The clausewitzian understanding that war is about breaking the will of an enemy (if necessary by disarmament or death) is completely missing in ISAF's mission.


The job of ISAF is - as I read it - not to defeat the Taliban or any other group, but to assist the government (forces) and to provide security. It's a kind of policing job.

ISAF is more about buying time than about defeating an enemy.

- - - - -

Well, is ISAF at war, is Germany at war?

It's certainly a strange situation - it would be a very unusual level of violence for a war with German participation, for sure.

My take is now that we're in fact not at war. The official documents about the ISAF mission, the political intent, the intensity of violence and the art of war tell me that we're not at war.

We're instead in what could be called a peacekeeping mission gone wrong. ISAF doesn't really succeed to keep war away - it merely succeeds in keeping the Taliban mostly in the underground and in suppressing large-scale violence. Yet, we don't pull out either.

I was changing between the "it's war" and the "it's no war" position for a long time, and now I think that -unless we see great changes- it's not a war. It's another kind of mess.


ISAF is a peacekeeping mission gone wrong.
I stick to my opinion that we should have no more than maybe a dozen soldiers (military observers) in Afghanistan. The investigation of the topic's question was nevertheless interesting. I also recovered a little bit of my respect for our SecDef. Just a bit.

Sven Ortmann
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Lisbon treaty and Germany's constitutional court

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I'm a bit late with this, but it's nevertheless interesting.

The development of the EU has been a top-down affair in Germany (and other European countries); politicians agreed on it as a good idea and did it.
The first steps were the most obvious ones and got the most positive effects at little or no price - the ratio deteriorated as increasingly less obvious opportunities of unification were exploited.

The pro-EU propaganda was usually an afterthought for decades, and its effect is probably mediocre.

The EU is (my perception) seen by many people as something that helped a lot to maker travel and business easier in Europe and made warfare among EU states unthinkable, but it's also being seen as overly bureaucratic and with only weak democratic legitimation and control.
The latter problem derives from the fact that much of the EU's policies are ill-covered by the media and pretty much negotiated as compromises on government levels.

The last steps of European unification have encountered some popular resistance; both the € currency and the Lisbon treaty.

The German federal constitutional court has now (a week ago) ruled that European integration stops at the Lisbon treaty. No further integration would be legal without a popular vote.
The problem is obviously that more integration would begin to dissolve the constitutional order of Germany - and that's illegal. The only exception would be if Germany gets a new legitimate constitution.

in German:
F.A.Z.
FTD
Welt

I personally prefer a reform of the EU with a slow catch-up of public opinion to the state of unification. Our media needs to emphasize European politics more in its news - like page three in newspapers and 20% average time share in TV news. A joint policy requires a joint public - and this requires that the public cares more and learns more about EU politics.

THEN it would be the right time to go on - if supported by public opinion.
Governments pressing for EU treaties, failing in popular vote and just launching public votes again and again till they get the desired result is no fix to the popular support problem.

A unified, multi-national state tends to explode (USSR, Yugoslavia, Austria-Hungaria) if imposed by rulers and not widely supported by the people. I really don't want to see a European civil war just because pro-EU gung-ho politicians pressed for maximum unification.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

On another note:
Germany has ordered 405 Puma IFVs. The planned annual production rates have a Japanese accent in my ears (production run 2010-2020).
405 Puma IFVs - that's 405 x 6 = 2,430 seats for dismounts unless the TC dismounts as well (+405) or additional equipment/ammunition takes another seat (-405). The original expectation was for 8 dismounts per vehicle, and earlier German studies (NGP) considered 7 as minimum, 6 as inadequate.

S O
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New German RoE and a new medal

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http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,634338,00.html

The RoE interpretation got more offensive in the past weeks, and now the RoE have been changed to allow unprovoked use of weapons.

I'm not sure which restricting caveats remain, but I'm not especially curious about it because I'm no fan of the whole Afghanistan mission anyway.

The change was politically necessary because we'll most likely have a change of government this fall. No other coalition was as likely to allow the new RoE as the present one.

- - - - -

On another note:

Today (6 June 09) Chancellor Merkel awarded four medals for valour to German soldiers.

We had no military medal for valour in action since 1945 (WW3 would have been too short to award any, at least for us). This prompted a campaign and petition for a re-introduction of the Iron Cross.

It took a while till the SecDef picked up the idea and created a new medal: The Ehrenkreuz der Bundeswehr für Tapferkeit (Honour cross of the Bundeswehr for valour).


The four soldiers did apparently rescue comrades and Afghan soldiers in face of multiple secondary explosions.

I heard previously a rumour that Sergej Motz might get it posthumously. He was said to have saved several other soldier's lives before he fell.

S O
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Grand strategies in foreign policy

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The very abnormal time of the Cold War is over, but certain patterns in foreign policy have become visible as near-constants.

The approach of important powers to foreign policy differ a lot.

The U.S. kept its Cold War approach of containment, applied it to Iraq, Russia, Iran, China and North Korea. It expanded its approach with strategies of direct military regime change (first seen in Panama) after decades of only indirect meddling.
The UK plays along (with little interest in North Korea apparently) and exerts relatively small influence in the EU.

Russia has lost its rule over the other USSR nations and turned to a policy of an influence sphere. Actually, it wants exclusive influence and even integration (CIS). The tools range from aid to intelligence activities, 'peacekeepers', inciting minority conflict and invasion.


Their ambitions seem to be limited to former USSR territory so far.

France keeps a less strict policy of an influence sphere, primarily in regard to its former sub-Saharan African colonies. Its European strategy is based on its embrace of Germany and the political and economical integration of both former arch-enemies into European order.

The PRC, South Korea and Japan seem to focus on a policy that secures access to raw materials by investment and trade, using their economic power instead of military power for leverage.
The PRC is also engaged in North Korea and still dissatisfied with the de facto independence of Taiwan. There seems to be a long-term re-unification strategy for the absorption of Taiwan (involving economic entanglement and deterring military strength).

Germany and Turkey have a cooperation & good relations strategy to preserve a satisfactory situation. The German policy collides with he U.S. containment strategy for Russia while the Turkish policy collides with the U.S. containment policy on Iran and Syria (and previously on Iraq).
Turkey's friendly policy has exceptions with the Kurds and Southern Cyprus. Turkey with its Muslim majority even wants to be friends with the Israelis, but not really with its own minority, the Kurds.


The Turkish foreign policy is still pretty much limited to regional influence.

Australia plays a role as UK light. It didn't emancipate itself from the alliance with the U.S. as did the smaller neighbour New Zealand. Well, that was the world stage strategy. Australia actually seems to have a kind of sphere of order strategy in its region, acting as a kind of policing/peacekeeping power nearby.

Canada also plays along with the U.S. as a UK light.

Brazil doesn't seem to have much of a grand strategy except that it's peaceful and wants to be a kind of first among equals in South America (despite it's the only state with Portuguese as language in South America). I suspect it's active behind the scenes against U.S. influence in South America.

India doesn't seem to have much of a grand strategy; they're locked in their long hostility and arms race with Pakistan and seem to pretty much ignore their neighbour Burma/Myanmar.
The Himalaya pretty much separates India and PRC better than an ocean could; border disputes are minimal and the Indian army is still not well-prepared for high altitude combat.


I cannot discern the present grand strategies of Spain and Italy for sure.
Spain looked like UK light under conservative rule, while Italy had probably too many governments for a coherent grand strategy and appropriate influence.


It's interesting how diverse the (grand?) strategies of allied powers are.
NATO seems to be split in four parts, with significant resistance to U.S. foreign policy in some places.

It will also be interesting to see whether UK, Australia and Canada will keep playing the auxiliary troops supplier for long, as they don't seem to experience much success or have much influence that way. The U.S. orientation of the UK pretty much costs the British a lot of influence in European affairs.

Some great powers seem to spell more troubles than they solve:
The U.S. (bullying some unfriendly small nations), PRC and Russia (both only in their vicinity).
That could cause to major wars.

Another question of interest is how much extrovert powers like China, India and Brazil will become.

China could begin to look beyond its region not just with investments, but also in politics and with military might.
India could look more than ever to Africa for resources (in competition to East Asian powers) and exploit the existing network of Indian traders in Africa.
Brazil could attempt to become the stabilizing and policing power of South America, for example.

New powers could gain much more than regional relevance under certain circumstances. Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia have the necessary weight, for example.

Sven Ortmann
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A list of German MilBlogs

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A list of German military-related blogs.
Isn't that impossible?

Actually, not really impossible.
There aren't hundreds or thousands - more like a dozen.


The (preliminary) list:

http://www.bendler-blog.de/

http://afghanistanblog.wordpress.com/

http://www.deutsche-armee.com/blog/
(only about history and barely in blog format)

http://faz-community.faz.net/blogs/sicherheit/default.aspx

http://www.geopowers.com/
(a classic)

http://immer-treu.blogspot.com/

http://militaer.blogspot.com/
(short-lived and inactive)

http://soldatenglueck.de/

http://speakingnotes.de/

http://www.stinner-bloggt.de/

http://thomasrid.wordpress.com/

http://waffen-diehler.de/
(merely an arms industry critique blog)

http://weblog-sicherheitspolitik.info/
(hardliner bias)

http://wiegold.focus.de/
(hosted by a weekly political journal)

I know I missed one, but simply cannot find it.

There are probably more, but I've yet to see them.

Sven Ortmann

edit: updated a link, added another one

edit: Added Thomas Rid
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Infantry combat ranges

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Discussions about optimal rifle calibers and optimal infantry armament often include a rule of thumb like '90% of infantry combat happens at less than 200m'. This is of interest because external ballistics influences the effectiveness of weapons differently at certain ranges.

More elaborate discussions and presentations about this have more elaborate information, like this graph based on NATO data:


It's obvious that short lines of sight (as in urban terrain) prevent engagements at long range in most cases, and the graph shows it as well.

I am personally not much interested in this because it's of little utility. You could decide to optimize your weaponry for engagements at less than 200 metres - but that would expose yourself to an enemy who attempts to avoid your strength and to exploit your weakness by preferring longer-ranged firefights.
I'm therefore against some extreme proposals like the use of personal defence weapons calibres as general purpose infantry munition.

My take on the infantry combat range question is different.
I emphasize survivability a lot because we simply don't have much well-trained infantry. High infantry losses could quickly result in an overall infantry quality deterioration if rear-area troops and recruits would need to be pressed into infantry service. Approaches like "Every man a rifleman" and training a well-sized reserve help, but ultimately it's in our best interest to keep infantry casualties low.

Infantry has long lost its role as primary killing/destroying and even maneuvering element of armies. Modern infantry small units focus on taking over control of and exercise control over areas and population. Mortars, artillery air strikes and armoured vehicles are responsible for more killing and higher tempo. The infantry simply doesn't need to sacrifice itself much for what other arms can achieve more easily.


Therefore I'm coming from a survivability-emphasizing view on infantry, and why exactly should infantry engage infantry at 400+ metres distance (and thereby give away its location)?

The tactical situation with the greatest requirement for long-range engagements is a delay mission. Delay shall slow down enemy advances and inflict casualties while keeping the delaying force as intact as possible (or else it would not be able to fulfill the delay mission because it's typically weaker than the attacker).
This means that firing at long range is advantageous because it forces the enemy to take cover early. It also helps to avoid decisive close-in battles; a necessity because breaking contact would otherwise be almost impossible.

Yet, even in this scenario I ask:
Why should we use rifles and machine guns at long range?

Mortar fires (and indirect fires in general) don't compromise the position of friendly forward infantry and its effectiveness requires quite few forward infantrymen at all (mortar support for a small forward observer team doesn't need to be weaker than for a whole company).

Another weapon that can do the job without compromising the infantry's location is a sniper rifle (especially with flash-eliminating suppressors) because of its (potentially) very small signature.

Finally there are command-detonated mines (explosives); including the directional fragmentation mines (a.k.a. "Claymore"). Command-detonated mines are popular among totally overmatched insurgents because their use means very low risk.

This leaves only a small capability gap; running enemies cannot easily be hit with these weapons/munitions (unless a Claymore is in a suitable position).
The usual answer to running enemies are full auto bursts (machine guns), but those aren't exactly accurate at 400+ m. Bipod machine guns aren't even accurate at 200 m in combat.

Let's also keep in mind that a greatly camouflaged soldier is often impossible to detect at 10-20 m distance. A well-camouflaged, disciplined soldier should be able to surprise you at 30-100 m. It's rather unsound to expect competent enemies who present themselves as targets at 400 m or longer range (unless they don't expect combat at all).


Let's assume you could detect and track them at let's say 700m. Why should you shoot them?
That's almost a one-trick pony. You do it once, maybe do it a couple more times, but it wears down after a few days. The enemy adapts. He won't bring hot chow to forward units by walking openly any more. He would walk along concealed routes and crawl at times.
The result? You get less information from observation because the very obvious and pressing effect of lethal fires has made the enemy generally much more careful, more secretive.
This is not just about hot chow bearers, of course.

My standard opinion on infantry combat ranges is therefore that the infantry does not need to prepare for the long-range fight (more than 300 or at most more than 400 m distance).
It would compromise its position for rather limited gain - and superior alternatives are available. The three mentioned weapons/munitions should usually be the only tools of infantry long range combat. Exceptions prove the rule, and are unavoidable because war is and always has been complex

I also apply this to anti-tank weapons. Widely issued infantry anti-tank weapons now range to up to 600m. The hit chances are - no matter how long-ranged a system is - always worse at long ranges than at half maximum range (for example).
The driving factor behind longer-ranged infantry (not dedicated AT unit) AT weapons seems to have been that longer-ranged weapons force the enemy mechanized infantry to dismount earlier (to keep vulnerable IFVs out of range). The longer distance on foot made the mech infantry more susceptible because attacks lasted longer.
I don't consider this Cold War tactical defence scenario as relevant enough any more.

I stick to the opinion that 400+ m range isn't useful. It drives weight of weapons and munitions up and increases capabilities that can be substituted for and don't create a good chance/risk proportion anyway.

This doesn't seem to be mainstream opinion, though (or else I wouldn't write about it).
Instead, the drive for longer ranges is well and alive.
Sniper rifles (and their sights and ammunition) are being meant and developed for ranges like 1,500+ m instead of (usually) about 700 m nowadays.
The long-range sniping in relatively open Iraqi and Afghani terrains has probably created a bias.
Such long-range sniping isn't much of a problem, though. Snipers are difficult to detect, especially at long range. The requirement merely makes sniper rifles longer, heavier, bulkier - and less likely to be issued to general infantry. The quest for longer sniping ranges rather opens the gap between general infantry designated marksmen (assault rifle + scope, sticking to their infantry squad/platoon) and full-blown snipers (long-range rifle, small sniper team).

Long-range general infantry weapons are another issue.

This is one of the more extreme examples.
A multi-functional recoilless HE projector with 1,200m range.



Now this doesn't make much sense (although a shorter-ranged version would likely not be much lighter). I simply fail to see what it's good for.
Sure, it's technically great, but what is it good for?
It should be possible to do the job with 300m weapons and mortar fire. The latter is absolutely essential anyway.

The rifle and machine gun calibre discussion also tends to drift to long range fire. We already had that after the Boer Wars more than a hundred years ago when the British came back from the open South African terrain and emphasized long-range marksmanship as a lesson. Next, they got bogged down in Northern France with short-range combat only.
That sounds a lot like some Afghanistan lessons learned to me.

- - - - -

It's not infantry terrain at all if you cannot at least close in to 400 m before opening fire.

It's quite hopeless anyway if you're in tank terrain where infantry cannot easily close in to 400 m but have no vehicle, air or indirect fire support. Such a terrible situation would place an even greater premium on stealth.

Let's also keep in mind that long-range weapons and munitions are not only heavier, but you also need more ammunition to achieve the same effect as in a shorter range fight. Infantry equipment weight is a terribly important factor, and presently out of control.

I regret that modern experiences against ill-equipped, ill-supported and ill-trained opponents in Iraq and especially in Afghanistan plus their non-representative terrain forms have likely done some harm to our understanding of modern infantry combat.

The attempt to exploit the opportunities given in these conflicts has led to developments and understandings that would be very suboptimal (in my opinion) in conventional war.

And keep in mind; only conventional war can cost your nation its sovereignty or part of it. Some distant militia/guerrilla fighters in a land far, far away can't do much harm to you if you don't insist on sticking to their neighbourhood.

S O

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Ad hominem with selective, misleading quotes

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Ad hominem arguments are a preferred tool for people who ran out of real arguments (or are unable to understand someone else's opinion in the first place).
It's so much easier to just attack another person instead of attacking his arguments (especially if the other person is right.)

I'm used to it, as my often unconventional opinions are rather difficult to explain without much elaboration. Many people are simply unwilling to understand uncommon opinions.
I rarely discuss matters if I agree with a majority. It would seem kind of pointless to me. I'm therefore always a minority and disadvantaged in several regards in discussions.
I'm used to it.

I'm not used to ad hominem attacks with quotes that become badly misleading without context, though. This blog - full of unconventional opinion - is apparently a rich hunting ground for people intent on using such a primitive rhetoric trick.

I encountered such an example recently in the comments of another blog. Here two quotes he chose:

“The USA was never really necessary to protect Western Europe against the Soviets, simply because the Soviet military power as we remember it was in great part a fantasy of U.S. intelligence services.”

(from here)

Indeed, whenever the West discussed an x gap or an y gap because the Soviet Union was supposedly more powerful in this or that aspect, it was wrong. The U.S. intelligence services overstated the Soviet Union's strength right to the day of its collapse.
The consequence was that the West deemed a stronger military necessary than was really necessary. This means that the U.S. forces in Europe (who provided a rather small minority of NATO combat power in Europe and Central Europe anyway) were pretty much excess strength.

The U.S. forces weren't all excess strength because especially the amphibious capability had global consequences in the bloc struggle - but U.S. forces weren't really necessary for the defence of Europe.
About four divisions, some smaller ground units and some air wings; that's not much even in comparison to the German army alone (almost 12 divisions), it's much less in comparison to German, French, British, Dutch, Belgian and Danish units. The deployment of U.S. reserves in time was unrealistic and wouldn't have matched European mobilization anyway.
Now that's something that "Fulda Gap" tunnel vision people don't accept.

The inflated intelligence estimates had the further problem that they heated up the arms race and conflict - a strictly non-desirable part of the Cold War.
We were about on par with or superior to the Warsaw Bloc but sensed a "gap", closed that "gap" and in fact had made the next step in the arms race (ahead of the WP) that forced them to follow (and made the WP truly believe that we were intent on invading them).
This part of the history is not nice, and I won't let them get away with outdated Cold War age myths.

The problem: Someone without the right background knowledge could draw very wrong conclusions from that quote. "in great part" was probably not the best choice of words as well.

Americans (well, at least right wingers*) like to declare all critique and refusal to accept pro-U.S. myths as anti-Americanism.
"They're all haters" is a convenient explanation that enables them to avoid the tough job of admitting that all that glitters is not gold.

- - - - -

Another quote:

There are reasons to believe that the Jewish/Israelis have left the “victim” status and went over some limit of what Europeans generally consider acceptable behavior in the handling of neighbors.”
“Don’t get me wrong – there’s more support for Israel than for Arab countries in Europe. That’s because the Israelis are somewhat accepted as some of “us” (participating in European sports and arts contests) in addition to the holocaust argument (which has become a strange argument after two generations).

I don't really doubt that I wrote it, but even google was unable to find the quote on my blog.

Here are two points; 1) acceptable behaviour.
Bombing, raiding and occupying neighbours is not acceptable in Europe, that's a fact. The Serbs got beaten up for much less. No European state has as difficult relations to his neighbours, but it's just fair to point out that none has treated his neighbours like Israel did in the post-WW2 period. The Serbs and Russians came close, and neither behaviour was considered as acceptable.

The second point is about the holocaust argument.
I called it a "strange" argument in the context of inter-state relations, and for a reason.
Imagine you get beaten up badly by some guy. You go to hospital.
Decades later you decide to beat up your neighbours.
Your lawyer defends you with the fact that you've been beaten up yourself.
Now I would call that a "strange" defence, at best!

I most certainly wrote "Jewish" because Israel has a significant non-Jewish minority and the policy of the state of Israel doesn't look like the policy of its Arab minority to me.
I was sometime last year advised that in English the word "Jewish" is OK and "Jews" problematic.

The previous choice of a quote for a ad hominem argument was (in my opinion) aimed at the exploitation of prevalent anti-Americanism paranoia.

This latter choice of a quote was apparently intent on painting me as a nazi (not the first time this has happened - it's a popular and cheap ad hominem attack on Germans).
Nazi ideology doesn't fit to any of my ideas, this should be very obvious in regard to foreign relations for anyone who reads here.


Nevertheless, I exercise my right of free speech and call out the nude emperor if there's a wrong myth or if conventional wisdom is tainted by political correctness.
I don't let some idiots of a previous generation limit my freedom of speech.

A fair discussion is almost a precondition for a good discussion.Cheap rhetoric tricks deserve to be exposed and sanctioned.

"anti-american" and "anti-semite" stereotypes are widely known and therefore easy fodder for ad hominem attacks. The pity is; the world is so much more complex than most of those who need to resort to lowly rhetoric tricks seem to grasp. People with unconventional opinions are especially prone to be targets of ad hominem, and conservatives know it. The use of such rhetoric tricks doesn't help, though. The smart people are seeking smart people for exchange of ideas, not those who resort to rhetoric tricks.

S O

P.S.:
The simple fact that my opinions are not widely shared suggests that some of them are simply wrong. The majority of those in disagreement doesn't discuss my opinion, though - they resort to ad hominem. That's not helpful in any way. I'm always interested in a proper discussion and have changed my opinion many times because of convincing additional arguments or information.

*: Left and right wing in the U.S. seem to differ in their opinions and their view of the world more than I've ever experienced with Frenchmen, British, Canadians or other nations.
Germany has a small anti-military and a very small pro-military wing, but the great majority is rather uninvolved.

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Europe-bashers and their next misunderstanding

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I've already blocked or deleted about a dozen comments that were insulting to Germany/Germans in general or to Europe/Europeans in general. Unsurprisingly, there was never anything substantial in those comments, just mere aggression and offensive behaviour.

One of the Europe-bashers' ideas seems to look like this:

The U.S. is great and powerful, therefore Europe isn't.

A weak Europe cannot defend itself.

Well, Europe wouldn't event try.

They're a bunch of people who surrender.

They already surrendered to the Muslims without a fight.

They're already doomed & lost.

The background is - obviously - that there's a significant Muslim minority in Europe.

This minority is noteworthy in Britain (South Asians, especially Pakistanis), France (from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia) and Germany (from Turkey), for example.
The British and French example are rooted in their colonial past while the German example is rooted in a policy of inviting South Europeans and Turks to work temporarily in Germany*.


I've actually already encountered people who tried to tell me that Muslims would be a majority in a generation. I have a *low* opinion of that opinion (and their math skill).


There's a new study (and therefore articles) about Muslims in Germany, and I expect that it's going to feed the trolls.

Germany Has 1 Million More Muslims Than Thought
*feigning to be shocked*

There's a title over the title: "Challenging stereotypes".

The article and the study summary are worth reading.
Seriously; read it!

It's pointless the repeat it here, so I'd like to add my take on the topic of "Muslims in Europe".


They're not a bloc, and especially not an organized one. Most of them are simply a part of the European lower(-earning) classes, with sub-cultures just like indigenous lower class people.

* The median and average education is low.

* The median and average income is low.

* Almost none are working in the state's institutions of power (police, courts, military).

* They lack political representation; Muslim members of parliament are rare exceptions.

* The degree of political organisation (political parties, national clubs) is close to non-existing.

* They're not ethnically homogeneous. The "Turks" in Germany aren't all "Turks", for example. We have both Turks and Kurds here. They would never ever unite to topple the Germans.

* The 2nd and 3d generation Muslims are quite unlike the 1st generation and therefore don't really have the same culture as the 1st generation's homeland.

* Median/average Muslims in Germany aren't very religious. I have yet to see a Turk who interrupts work for one of the daily prayers or even prays in my field of view. Here are very few mosques in relation to the Muslim population.

* The median/average fertility is higher, but simple math keeps them from becoming a majority for many generations.

* We have quite few new Muslim immigration in Germany as far as I know. The last immigration wave came rather from Russia (better to avoid that topic...I don't really *like* our policy in this regard).

We had no census since 1987 (next is planned for 2011) in Germany, so there's little hard data on Muslims in Germany. Even the data from the new study is probably not very accurate.

Here's a graphic that helps to get the *take-over by baby boom* myth back to earth:


It's about the development of birth rates.
"Türkinnen in T." = Turkish females in Turkey
"Türkinnen in D." = Turkish females in Germany
"Deutsche" = Germans
"Deutsche Musliminnen" = German female Muslims

(Keep in mind that fertility is just one side of the coin; the other one is mortality, and I suspect that's higher as well.)

The data tells the obvious; they're humans just like us and kind of converge. There's no way how they could outnumber "Christian" or "Atheist" Germans with status quo fertility in this century.
And keep in mind; they're not a homogenous bloc; Turks and Kurds are more friendly to Germans than to each other.

Sadly, the intense and repeated B.S. propaganda about the issue of Muslims in Europe has mislead even many of those who otherwise have rather reasonable ideas. I know several such examples personally.


Oh, by the way; the unspectacular percentages of Muslims in Europe.
France: less than 10%
Germany: about 5%
UK: less than 3%
Spain: at most about 2%
Italy: less than 2%

The only European state that suffered from anything like a Muslim take-over was Yugoslavia. The Serbs "lost" Kosovo because the Muslim Albanians settled in Kosovo and achieved majority status long ago.
We actually helped the Kosovars to achieve a seemingly final success.
I suspect that this Kosovo story has inspired the outlandish myth that European countries like France will be taken over by Muslims soon.


I'd like to suggest that next time somebody approaches you with a wild opinion about Muslims taking over Europe you either tell him some facts or just smile at him and go away. The myth is not worth spreading.

Muslims in Europe won't take-over European states any time soon, they're simply no security hazard of that scale.

S O

*: That was a quite stupid and despicable policy in my opinion. The foreign workers were called in to solve a workforce shortage. I don't accept "workforce shortage" as a problem at all. A different term for it is "full employment".
To "solve" this "problem" was not in our interest. A proper approach would have been to invest excess capital in foreign countries or to reduce the national savings rate.

edit:
There's another debunking blog post about the "Muslim takeover" hysteria at the Tiny Frog blog. I didn't even know the video in question, I was merely annoyed by recurring distribution of the myth distribution through other channels.

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Attention - a scarce resource

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The past days repeated an important lesson about human behaviour and possibilities:
It revealed the scarcity of attention.

Our attention was in great part focused on the Iranian unrest for days, and that would likely have been true for the next day; if Michael Jackson hadn't died.


His death was as untimely and unexpected as the deaths of Elvis Presley, Bob Marley and Bruce Lee. He was a culturally very important person and his death justified a lot of coverage in the media.

Did the Iranian unrest become less relevant because of his death?
No - it was just crowded out by the other news.

We cannot really influence the Iranian affair with our attention (albeit some are 'optimistic' enough to think so). It was just a great example because of the stark contrast.


In a perfect world we would have a variable amount of daily news coverage - depending on how much actually happened.
Yet, in this world we have a fixed amount of daily news (newspapers with near-constant pages, TV news with near-constant time slot) plus a variable add-on volume of 'news' on special occasions.

Attention is a scarce resource, and it's important that we learn and accept this.
We can consciously improve the situation if we're aware of this limit.

We can block irrelevant information to save attention for relevant information.
I've made that point in regard to pirates and economic crisis repeatedly; the latter deserves the attention that the former get.

Attention on problems creates pressure to solve problems. This is one of the reasons for the media's importance in democratic societies.

Our societies' ability to solve problems could be enhanced very much if we chose consciously to pay attention primarily to important things.
This would also help to improve the efficiency of resource allocation. It's simply not smart to spend billions on marginal problems.


Military institutions should also understand that wide-spread attention to shortcomings is a good thing - no matter how unpleasant it is for those (failing officers) in charge.

S O

P.S.: RIP
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Heavy armoured fighting vehicles for Europe

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Europe had played along in the Cold War arms race for decades and ended up with thousands of first grade (late 70's to 80's) and even more second grade (60's and 70's) tanks in the early 90's.

The end of the Cold War (offering an opportunity to save on government consumption (military spending)) and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe changed the picture.
(The treaty has since been called into question (2007) due to less-than-optimal politics of Russia, the U.S. and also European member nations.)

The old/outdated tanks were scrapped and the modern ranks (especially German Leopard 2) were dispersed in Europe, even into former Warsaw Pact countries.
Britain and France replaced their old tanks (not badly outdated in the British case) with new ones during the 90's.

Today's Leopard 2 users:
Austria, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapur, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey


The tightened budgets, the focus on peacekeeping/occupation missions and the obvious modernity of the current inventory stalled new tank development projects like the German NGP. Instead, we got an influx of many non-standardized wheeled armoured vehicles - almost none meant to be used in line of sight of conventional opposition.


The war experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan changed the limited upgrading efforts from a tank-on-tank battle focus (frontal armour protection against KE threat, higher energy gun) to close-in fighting equipment (like all-round protection against mediocre CE threats).


Sometime around 2000 the focus had finally shifted away from conventional wars with armour brigades facing each other.
Just one example; a book of the German 'armour pope' Hilmes of 1999 still emphasized frontal armour and gun KE energy while the next edition of 2007 finally became more balanced.


The last NATO Cold War MBT generation (Leopard 2, Abrams, Challenger) entered service in 1979-1983. The 90's NATO MBTs (Challenger 2, Leclerc, Ariete) aren't very different and rather comparable to later versions of Leopard 2 and Abrams (with Ariete following a low sophistication approach).

We're now equipped with what's basically 1970's technology tanks plus new electronics.
That's comparable to the situation of navies and air forces - except that they're in the process of replacing their old platforms.

The development of a new MBT in peacetime would take up to a decade, so we should better launch a development program if we want modern MBTs (or direct combat battlefield tanks of a new concept) in the 2020's.

I made my mind up on this some time ago; I want to see a heavy tracked family of vehicles at about 40-50 tons (likely to grow to 55 tons later in the life cycle) and a new concept for what kinds of vehicles should be used in line-of-sight combat. This should be supported by a truck family of vehicles and a lightly armoured family of vehicles.

video: New Japanese Type 10 MBT (44 tons)

I think so because I am convinced that armoured vehicles are still the answer to the old problem of rapid movement in high threat environments. A LAV-mobile infantry force of forward observers might be great as a delaying force, but a total failure as an offensive force.
The tank's ability to negate most threats with its protection in order to exploit the internal combustion engine's power for mobility and finally its high concentration of firepower and electronics payload is still a great combination.

There's not really a successor concept; the discussion was and is rather about the optimal mass of passive protective materials to be incorporated in such a vehicle.

picture: FCS MCS, meanwhile found to be too light at close to 30 tons

We should add new tank tactics, but the basic principle is still a necessary component of any fast-paced operational plan that faces competent and well-equipped enemies.

I have serious doubts about whether 1970's designs are a good answer to 2020's battlefields, though. We could upgrade them again and again, but that would keep their old limitations and end up being almost as expensive as new vehicles.

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I believe that it's about time for a European conference on a future tank design in preparation for a new German heavy tank family. Today's European Leopard 2 users should give conceptual and tactical input to help make it suitable for many European armies.

The design work should be done as a national German project to make it more efficient than multinational projects. nevertheless, the components should be sourced from the best European bidder, not only from German companies.

We must not develop any military equipment in cooperation with France any more; they screw their partners almost always when they learn that the production would not be 100% French.
Their army equipment designs also tend to get a poor reception in export markets (their only really successful export design was the 1950's AMX-13 light tank).


The new tank family should be affordable through quantity production, a 90% approach to costly components and by a modular approach. The latter should allow for everything from monkey export models for export to non-allied countries and a basic version for ill-funded armies up to highly sophisticated state-of-the-art machines.
Allies with basic versions could follow the prepared-for-but-not-fitted approach that's a quite popular cost-saving compromise in air force and navy procurement.

This tank should be suited to urbanized, interrupted forest, open agricultural and hilly terrains. Europe ranges from freezing cold polar to incredibly hot sub-tropic climates, a tank design needs to cope with many different climates and terrains if it shall be useful for defence at all European frontiers.

"Bomber" and "Panzer" are the two stereotypes most loathed by the most peace-loving fraction of the German population. It was difficult to secure the funding for the Eurofighter Typhoon and it would be difficult to get the funding for MBTs. The idea of many people that conventional wars (and their specific tools) are a thing of the past doesn't help.
Nevertheless, the primary and most honourable mission of the Bundeswehr is actual defence - and it needs the tools for the job.


A new heavy tank family would certainly face political opposition due to its costs, but seriously; it was possible to overcome this opposition for frigates and strike fighters. It should be possible to overcome it for tanks as well. The "chobham armour" generation of main battle tanks was a child of the 1970's. It would be a dereliction of duty if we kept them as our only MBTs in the 2020's.

S O
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