2009/07/12

Afghanistan: A messy year 2009

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This screen capture of a recent presentation of Petraeus (video) shows how the quantity of "Security incidents" changes in cycles and grows in strength. This statistic does not seem to include combat initiated by ISAF/OEF/ANA/ANP forces.

It's going to be a messy year.

- - - - -

The loss of blood and treasure in Afghanistan hurts us, but the duration of the war may hurt us in the long term even more.
It's undeniable that the Western forces engaged in Afghanistan adapt themselves to some degree to this conflict. The theater's conditions change these forces, and we might end up being much better prepared for yet another Iraq or Afghanistan conflict than for the real next conflict. Some people even claim that we'll be more often engaged in this kind of conflict in the future decades than in conventional conflicts and "peacekeeping" military missions.

One answer might be to pull out, another would be a delicate balance between the ongoing mission and preparing for realistic future missions.
Sadly, the latter becomes ever more difficult as the intensity of the war in Afghanistan increases.

Sven Ortmann
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2009/07/11

About counterinsurgency theory

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I dislike counter-insurgency (COIN) theory (and practice) because of my fear that the gained expertise might some day be used against legitimate (maybe even domestic) resistance.
I'm therefore quite reluctant to contribute anything to or about COIN theory.

Nevertheless, I want to share this* as a frame for the understanding of what's going on in regard to COIN theory.

The methods for bending or breaking an opposing or neutral will can be violent and non-violent.

Guerrillas first bend/break the will of the population to get access to what they need for their own survival and to attempt to break the will of organized armed opposition with a chance of success.

This leaves several opportunities for the organized armed opposition:
1) be determined and fight (no-brainer)
2) protect the population (COIN's fashion of the day)
3) bend/break the will of the population yourself (hearts & minds, "Hama" method)
4) deport the population (Stalin's strategy)
5) establish militias and possibly move rural people into defensible settlements

Strategy (1) is the minimal requirement. There's no way of succeeding against guerrillas than to stay active and keep fighting till the end of the hot conflict. This is the no-brainer and the starting point for those officers who are/were not educated on COIN.

(2) is the current fashion of the day in counterinsurgency theory. The reason is probably simply that ISAF and OEF are failing in it due to lack of quantity. There aren't enough troops to really protect the population, and I strongly suggest that there will never be enough for it.
nevertheless, the need to 'protect the population against insurgents' is the talking point de jour.

(3) has been the great fashion of the day among COIN theorists for a while now. They emphasized the non-violent "hearts and minds" style. "Hearts and minds" isn't much different from "divide et impera" in a conflict.
The proponents of (1) resist the idea of (3), and it's really about the right balance. Great military theorists and leaders have warned many times in history about the dangers luring behind the idea of winning without fighting. Most of them criticized primarily ideas about defeating armies by out-maneuvering them without a final battle, of course.


The "Hama" option is the other extreme of option (3); it's about breaking will without even trying to bend it. An excessive employment of violence can instil so much fear and organizational shock that the resistance collapses. The Hama massacre was one of the most recent examples and is often used as a representative for a millennia-old strategy ("Alexander the Great" was 'great' at it).


(4) deprives the guerrilla of all support by taking away the population like taking away water from a fish. Stalin was a ruthless master of this strategy; that's how he handled and broke the resistance of small nationalities in the USSR.


(5) is obviously a two-edged sword. The loyalty or at least neutrality of the civilians is critical to the success of any program that seeks to protect them by arming them.
It may be necessary to force rural population into defensible and controllable compact settlements. This has the potential of provoking even more unrest, so it's a good idea to provide a superior living standard and acceptable access to agricultural areas in the new settlements. The strategy of armed and resilient population that keeps the guerrillas away with only minimal army support (at minimum a radio for calling help in every settlement) is a way to go for numerically weak armies.
The American "Sons of Iraq" program of auxiliary militias was a version of (5), British indirect rule in its Empire was another, more distantly related, version.

This framework should dispel the 'magic' from every fancy and supposedly great counter-insurgency strategy. Counter-guerrilla activities are always about resisting/confronting the violent opposition and/or depriving it of its support. It becomes easily visible that the ideas used are new only in detail and all have their difficulties attached.

There's no easy solution, and that's a good thing. I wouldn't want to live in a world where state governments could quell any (even armed) opposition easily.


*: It's mine, not really a quote. I like the format for the purpose..

2009/07/10

Our fiscal policy is scary

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Our government (grand coalition) promised to get the debt growth under control. They failed (not because of the economic crisis; they didn't get their expenses under control).

They launched a law to limit the ability of future governments to add net debt ... and I had hope.

This new F.A.Z. graphic is outright scary.

It shows the projected rise in official public debt 65.9 to 82 % BIP (~ GDP).

I'm not sure about their definition of public debt (especially not about the "verdeckte Schulden" - concealed debt, on the right side), but the general direction is realistic.

History has proved again and again that fiscal health is important. States that spend several per cent of their GDP on servicing debt are weakened in social, economic and defence matters.
Sun Tzu already wrote about the importance of state finances, and the Romans regularly struggled with the financing of their army.
European wars depended more on money than anything else from about the age of Crusaders till the French revolution. national population and industry became important afterward, but those aren't exactly great strengths of ours any more as well.

Public debt equal to 82% GDP would cost us much more annual interest payments than we've got defence expenditures. The economic arguments about public debt are split, but even the pro-debt faction doesn't advocate such massive amounts of debt.

- - - - -

Public debt is the most visible phenomenon of a more general problem:
Organizations (like states) accumulate problems and restrictions over time. They become more and more rigid. Only major events can break this trend till it makes itself felt again.

That's one of the reasons why large companies change their strategy and re-organize so often.
States don't reform themselves in a five-years rhythm - they keep accumulating problems.

Public debt is such an accumulated problem, and the debt levels are quite distressing.

- - - - -

The response of Britain and France to Hitler's re-armament was in part so slow because these states were still weakened by the burden of the Great War debt. Germany had been relieved of that huge debt by a disastrous hyper-inflation in the 20's.

Such a surprise inflation might actually happen soon as well, but that's another topic.

The public debt situation is deteriorating, and I consider that as a more distressing problem for national security than those misguided assholes who can't even match random lightning strikes in lethality statistics.

Sven Ortmann
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2009/07/09

Is Germany at war because of ISAF?

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Our politicians (well, those in power) resist the notion that we're at war or that at least the Germans in Afghanistan are waging a war.

I'm quite sure that Afghanistan is a country at war; there's a civil war between the "national" and foreign forces on one side and a decentralized collection of Taliban groups plus some other armed fores (smuggler clans, for example) on the other side.

This doesn't mean that we or our soldiers there are at war - not in itself.
Combat itself is not necessarily war.


So let's have a closer look at it:

- - - - -

The German ministry of defence writes on its website:
Seit Dezember 2001 ist die Bundeswehr – gestützt auf ein breites Mandat des Bundestages – in Afghanistan präsent. Im Rahmen der International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) unterstützt sie die afghanische Regierung bei Herstellung und Wahrung der Inneren Sicherheit, solange einheimische Kräfte dazu noch nicht vollständig in der Lage sind. Außerdem wirkt sie beim Wiederaufbau des Landes mit.
Translation:
Since December 2001 is the Bundeswehr - resting on a broad mandate of the Bundestag - in Afghanistan. It supports in the framework of the (...) ISAF the Afghan government in the establishment and maintenance of the internal security as long as indigenous forces aren't fully capable to do this. Furthermore, it helps in the reconstruction of the country.

-> Official national (BMVg/government) position:
ISAF supports the Afghan government as long as it cannot do its jobs on its own.



The ISAF website says
NATO’s main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. It does this predominately through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force.

Since NATO took command of ISAF in 2003, the Alliance has gradually expanded the reach of its mission, originally limited to Kabul, to cover Afghanistan’s whole territory. The number of ISAF troops has grown accordingly from the initial 5,000 to around 50.000 troops coming from 42 countries, including all 26 NATO members.
(...)
In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping.
(...)
ISAF is a coalition of the willing - not a UN force properly speaking - which has a peace-enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Nine UN Security Council Resolutions relate to ISAF, namely: 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 1707, 1776 and 1833 (on 23 September 2008). A detailed Military Technical Agreement agreed between the ISAF Commander and the Afghan Transitional Authority in January 2002 provides additional guidance for ISAF operations.

NATO took command of ISAF in August 2003 upon request of the UN and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and soon after, the UN gave ISAF a mandate to expand outside of Kabul.
-> Official multinational (ISAF/NATO) position:
"ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations (...)"


Now let's look at the international stage (United Nations);
ISAF was authorized by the UNSC, after all.

It began with
S/RES/1386 (2001)
Authorizes, as envisaged in Annex 1 to the Bonn Agreement, the establishment for 6 months of an International Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, so that the Afghan Interim Authority as well as the personnel of the United Nations can operate in a secure environment;
It got extended (duration) by S/RES/1510 (2003).

S/RES/1563 (2004) extended ISAF again and added
Calls upon the International Security Assistance Force to continue to work in close consultation with the Afghan Transitional Administration and its successors and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as well as with the Operation Enduring Freedom Coalition in the implementation of the force mandate;
S/RES/1623 (2005) extended again...

S/RES/1659 (2006) was a bit more creative extension:
3. Affirms the central and impartial role of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including coordination of efforts in implementing the Compact; and looks forward to the early formation of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, co-chaired by the Afghan Government and the United Nations, and with a secretariat function to support it;
4. Welcomes the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (iANDS) presented by the Afghan Government and the political, security and financial pledges made by participants at the London Conference; notes that financial assistance available for the implementation of iANDS has now reached $10.5 billion; further notes the intention of the Afghan Government to seek debt relief through the Paris Club;
5. Recognizes the risk that opium cultivation, production and trafficking poses to the security, development and governance of Afghanistan as well as to the region and internationally, welcomes the updated National Drug Control Strategy presented by the Afghan Government at the London Conference, and encourages additional international support for the four priorities identified in that Strategy including through contribution to the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund;
6. Acknowledges the continuing commitment of NATO to lead the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and welcomes the adoption by NATO of a revised Operational Plan allowing the continued expansion of the ISAF across Afghanistan, closer operational synergy with the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and support, within means and capabilities, to Afghan security forces in the military aspects of their training and operational deployments;


S/RES/1707 (2006) extended.

S/RES/1776 (2007) had this as creative part:
Stresses the importance of increasing the effective functionality,
professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector in order to provide long-term solutions to security in Afghanistan, and encourages ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as resources permit, to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces, in particular the Afghan National Police
S/RES/1833 (2008) adds another extension to 13 October 2009 and has this
Stresses the importance of increasing, in a comprehensive framework, the functionality, professionalism and accountability of the Afghan security sector, encourages ISAF and other partners to sustain their efforts, as resources permit, to train, mentor and empower the Afghan national security forces, in order to accelerate progress towards the goal of self-sufficient and ethnically balanced Afghan security forces providing security and ensuring the rule of law throughout the country, welcomes in this context the progress achieved by the Afghan Authorities in assuming lead security responsibility for Kabul, and stresses the importance of supporting the planned expansion of the Afghan National Army;

-> Official international (U.N.) position:
ISAF is a mission to assist the Afghan government under NATO leadership in consultation with an UNSecGen representative and OEF.

- - - - -

These statements are lacking an important part or a war mission: They do not tell that ISAF's mission was to defeat an enemy or to at least force warring parties to end warfare. ISAF is by official design not meant to win or end the war, but to add security and stability to Afghanistan till the Afghan government takes over.
It was meant to be an Afghanization project from day one (unlike OEF-A).

The clausewitzian understanding that war is about breaking the will of an enemy (if necessary by disarmament or death) is completely missing in ISAF's mission.


The job of ISAF is - as I read it - not to defeat the Taliban or any other group, but to assist the government (forces) and to provide security. It's a kind of policing job.

ISAF is more about buying time than about defeating an enemy.

- - - - -

Well, is ISAF at war, is Germany at war?

It's certainly a strange situation - it would be a very unusual level of violence for a war with German participation, for sure.

My take is now that we're in fact not at war. The official documents about the ISAF mission, the political intent, the intensity of violence and the art of war tell me that we're not at war.

We're instead in what could be called a peacekeeping mission gone wrong. ISAF doesn't really succeed to keep war away - it merely succeeds in keeping the Taliban mostly in the underground and in suppressing large-scale violence. Yet, we don't pull out either.

I was changing between the "it's war" and the "it's no war" position for a long time, and now I think that -unless we see great changes- it's not a war. It's another kind of mess.


ISAF is a peacekeeping mission gone wrong.
I stick to my opinion that we should have no more than maybe a dozen soldiers (military observers) in Afghanistan. The investigation of the topic's question was nevertheless interesting. I also recovered a little bit of my respect for our SecDef. Just a bit.

Sven Ortmann
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2009/07/07

Lisbon treaty and Germany's constitutional court

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I'm a bit late with this, but it's nevertheless interesting.

The development of the EU has been a top-down affair in Germany (and other European countries); politicians agreed on it as a good idea and did it.
The first steps were the most obvious ones and got the most positive effects at little or no price - the ratio deteriorated as increasingly less obvious opportunities of unification were exploited.

The pro-EU propaganda was usually an afterthought for decades, and its effect is probably mediocre.

The EU is (my perception) seen by many people as something that helped a lot to maker travel and business easier in Europe and made warfare among EU states unthinkable, but it's also being seen as overly bureaucratic and with only weak democratic legitimation and control.
The latter problem derives from the fact that much of the EU's policies are ill-covered by the media and pretty much negotiated as compromises on government levels.

The last steps of European unification have encountered some popular resistance; both the € currency and the Lisbon treaty.

The German federal constitutional court has now (a week ago) ruled that European integration stops at the Lisbon treaty. No further integration would be legal without a popular vote.
The problem is obviously that more integration would begin to dissolve the constitutional order of Germany - and that's illegal. The only exception would be if Germany gets a new legitimate constitution.

in German:
F.A.Z.
FTD
Welt


I personally prefer a reform of the EU with a slow catch-up of public opinion to the state of unification. Our media needs to emphasize European politics more in its news - like page three in newspapers and 20% average time share in TV news. A joint policy requires a joint public - and this requires that the public cares more and learns more about EU politics.
THEN it would be the right time to go on - if supported by public opinion.
Governments pressing for EU treaties, failing in popular vote and just launching public votes again and again till they get the desired result is no fix to the popular support problem.

A unified, multi-national state tends to explode (USSR, Yugoslavia, Austria-Hungaria) if imposed by rulers and not widely supported by the people. I really don't want to see a European civil war just because pro-EU gung-ho politicians pressed for maximum unification.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

On another note:
Germany has ordered 405 Puma IFVs. The planned annual production rates have a Japanese accent in my ears (production run 2010-2020).
405 Puma IFVs - that's 405 x 6 = 2,430 seats for dismounts unless the TC dismounts as well (+405) or additional equipment/ammunition takes another seat (-405). The original expectation was for 8 dismounts per vehicle, and earlier German studies (NGP) considered 7 as minimum, 6 as inadequate.

S O
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2009/07/06

New German RoE and a new medal

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http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,634338,00.html

The RoE interpretation got more offensive in the past weeks, and now the RoE have been changed to allow unprovoked use of weapons.

I'm not sure which restricting caveats remain, but I'm not especially curious about it because I'm no fan of the whole Afghanistan mission anyway.

The change was politically necessary because we'll most likely have a change of government this fall. No other coalition was as likely to allow the new RoE as the present one.

- - - - -

On another note:
Today (6 June 09) Chancellor Merkel awarded four medals for valour to German soldiers.

We had no military medal for valour in action since 1945 (WW3 would have been too short to award any, at least for us). This prompted a campaign and petition for a re-introduction of the Iron Cross.

It took a while till the SecDef picked up the idea and created a new medal: The Ehrenkreuz der Bundeswehr für Tapferkeit (Honour cross of the Bundeswehr for valour).


The four soldiers did apparently rescue comrades and Afghan soldiers in face of multiple secondary explosions.

I heard previously a rumour that Sergej Motz might get it posthumously. He was said to have saved several other soldier's lives before he fell.

S O
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2009/07/05

Grand strategies in foreign policy

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The very abnormal time of the Cold War is over, but certain patterns in foreign policy have become visible as near-constants.

The approach of important powers to foreign policy differ a lot.

The U.S. kept its Cold War approach of containment, applied it to Iraq, Russia, Iran, China and North Korea. It expanded its approach with strategies of direct military regime change (first seen in Panama) after decades of only indirect meddling.
The UK plays along (with little interest in North Korea apparently) and exerts relatively small influence in the EU.

Russia has lost its rule over the other USSR nations and turned to a policy of an influence sphere. Actually, it wants exclusive influence and even integration (CIS). The tools range from aid to intelligence activities, 'peacekeepers', inciting minority conflict and invasion.


Their ambitions seem to be limited to former USSR territory so far.

France keeps a less strict policy of an influence sphere, primarily in regard to its former sub-Saharan African colonies. Its European strategy is based on its embrace of Germany and the political and economical integration of both former arch-enemies into European order.

The PRC, South Korea and Japan seem to focus on a policy that secures access to raw materials by investment and trade, using their economic power instead of military power for leverage.
The PRC is also engaged in North Korea and still dissatisfied with the de facto independence of Taiwan. There seems to be a long-term re-unification strategy for the absorption of Taiwan (involving economic entanglement and deterring military strength).

Germany and Turkey have a cooperation & good relations strategy to preserve a satisfactory situation. The German policy collides with he U.S. containment strategy for Russia while the Turkish policy collides with the U.S. containment policy on Iran and Syria (and previously on Iraq).
Turkey's friendly policy has exceptions with the Kurds and Southern Cyprus. Turkey with its Muslim majority even wants to be friends with the Israelis, but not really with its own minority, the Kurds.


The Turkish foreign policy is still pretty much limited to regional influence.

Australia plays a role as UK light. It didn't emancipate itself from the alliance with the U.S. as did the smaller neighbour New Zealand. Well, that was the world stage strategy. Australia actually seems to have a kind of sphere of order strategy in its region, acting as a kind of policing/peacekeeping power nearby.

Canada also plays along with the U.S. as a UK light.

Brazil doesn't seem to have much of a grand strategy except that it's peaceful and wants to be a kind of first among equals in South America (despite it's the only state with Portuguese as language in South America). I suspect it's active behind the scenes against U.S. influence in South America.

India doesn't seem to have much of a grand strategy; they're locked in their long hostility and arms race with Pakistan and seem to pretty much ignore their neighbour Burma/Myanmar.
The Himalaya pretty much separates India and PRC better than an ocean could; border disputes are minimal and the Indian army is still not well-prepared for high altitude combat.


I cannot discern the present grand strategies of Spain and Italy for sure.
Spain looked like UK light under conservative rule, while Italy had probably too many governments for a coherent grand strategy and appropriate influence.


It's interesting how diverse the (grand?) strategies of allied powers are.
NATO seems to be split in four parts, with significant resistance to U.S. foreign policy in some places.

It will also be interesting to see whether UK, Australia and Canada will keep playing the auxiliary troops supplier for long, as they don't seem to experience much success or have much influence that way. The U.S. orientation of the UK pretty much costs the British a lot of influence in European affairs.

Some great powers seem to spell more troubles than they solve:
The U.S. (bullying some unfriendly small nations), PRC and Russia (both only in their vicinity).
That could cause to major wars.

Another question of interest is how much extrovert powers like China, India and Brazil will become.

China could begin to look beyond its region not just with investments, but also in politics and with military might.
India could look more than ever to Africa for resources (in competition to East Asian powers) and exploit the existing network of Indian traders in Africa.
Brazil could attempt to become the stabilizing and policing power of South America, for example.

New powers could gain much more than regional relevance under certain circumstances. Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia have the necessary weight, for example.

Sven Ortmann
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2009/07/04

A list of German MilBlogs

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A list of German military-related blogs.
Isn't that impossible?

Actually, not really impossible.
There aren't hundreds or thousands - more like a dozen.


The (preliminary) list:

http://www.bendler-blog.de/

http://afghanistanblog.wordpress.com/

http://www.deutsche-armee.com/blog/
(only about history and barely in blog format)

http://faz-community.faz.net/blogs/sicherheit/default.aspx

http://www.geopowers.com/
(a classic)

http://immer-treu.blogspot.com/

http://militaer.blogspot.com/
(short-lived and inactive)

http://soldatenglueck.de/

http://speakingnotes.de/

http://www.stinner-bloggt.de/

http://thomasrid.wordpress.com/

http://waffen-diehler.de/
(merely an arms industry critique blog)

http://weblog-sicherheitspolitik.info/
(hardliner bias)

http://wiegold.focus.de/
(hosted by a weekly political journal)

I know I missed one, but simply cannot find it.

There are probably more, but I've yet to see them.

Sven Ortmann

edit: updated a link, added another one

edit: Added Thomas Rid
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2009/07/02

Infantry combat ranges

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Discussions about optimal rifle calibers and optimal infantry armament often include a rule of thumb like '90% of infantry combat happens at less than 200m'. This is of interest because external ballistics influences the effectiveness of weapons differently at certain ranges.

More elaborate discussions and presentations about this have more elaborate information, like this graph based on NATO data:


It's obvious that short lines of sight (as in urban terrain) prevent engagements at long range in most cases, and the graph shows it as well.

I am personally not much interested in this because it's of little utility. You could decide to optimize your weaponry for engagements at less than 200 metres - but that would expose yourself to an enemy who attempts to avoid your strength and to exploit your weakness by preferring longer-ranged firefights.
I'm therefore against some extreme proposals like the use of personal defence weapons calibres as general purpose infantry munition.

My take on the infantry combat range question is different.
I emphasize survivability a lot because we simply don't have much well-trained infantry. High infantry losses could quickly result in an overall infantry quality deterioration if rear-area troops and recruits would need to be pressed into infantry service. Approaches like "Every man a rifleman" and training a well-sized reserve help, but ultimately it's in our best interest to keep infantry casualties low.

Infantry has long lost its role as primary killing/destroying and even maneuvering element of armies. Modern infantry small units focus on taking over control of and exercise control over areas and population. Mortars, artillery air strikes and armoured vehicles are responsible for more killing and higher tempo. The infantry simply doesn't need to sacrifice itself much for what other arms can achieve more easily.


Therefore I'm coming from a survivability-emphasizing view on infantry, and why exactly should infantry engage infantry at 400+ metres distance (and thereby give away its location)?

The tactical situation with the greatest requirement for long-range engagements is a delay mission. Delay shall slow down enemy advances and inflict casualties while keeping the delaying force as intact as possible (or else it would not be able to fulfill the delay mission because it's typically weaker than the attacker).
This means that firing at long range is advantageous because it forces the enemy to take cover early. It also helps to avoid decisive close-in battles; a necessity because breaking contact would otherwise be almost impossible.

Yet, even in this scenario I ask:
Why should we use rifles and machine guns at long range?

Mortar fires (and indirect fires in general) don't compromise the position of friendly forward infantry and its effectiveness requires quite few forward infantrymen at all (mortar support for a small forward observer team doesn't need to be weaker than for a whole company).

Another weapon that can do the job without compromising the infantry's location is a sniper rifle (especially with flash-eliminating suppressors) because of its (potentially) very small signature.

Finally there are command-detonated mines (explosives); including the directional fragmentation mines (a.k.a. "Claymore"). Command-detonated mines are popular among totally overmatched insurgents because their use means very low risk.

This leaves only a small capability gap; running enemies cannot easily be hit with these weapons/munitions (unless a Claymore is in a suitable position).
The usual answer to running enemies are full auto bursts (machine guns), but those aren't exactly accurate at 400+ m. Bipod machine guns aren't even accurate at 200 m in combat.

Let's also keep in mind that a greatly camouflaged soldier is often impossible to detect at 10-20 m distance. A well-camouflaged, disciplined soldier should be able to surprise you at 30-100 m. It's rather unsound to expect competent enemies who present themselves as targets at 400 m or longer range (unless they don't expect combat at all).


Let's assume you could detect and track them at let's say 700m. Why should you shoot them?
That's almost a one-trick pony. You do it once, maybe do it a couple more times, but it wears down after a few days. The enemy adapts. He won't bring hot chow to forward units by walking openly any more. He would walk along concealed routes and crawl at times.
The result? You get less information from observation because the very obvious and pressing effect of lethal fires has made the enemy generally much more careful, more secretive.
This is not just about hot chow bearers, of course.

My standard opinion on infantry combat ranges is therefore that the infantry does not need to prepare for the long-range fight (more than 300 or at most more than 400 m distance).
It would compromise its position for rather limited gain - and superior alternatives are available. The three mentioned weapons/munitions should usually be the only tools of infantry long range combat. Exceptions prove the rule, and are unavoidable because war is and always has been complex

I also apply this to anti-tank weapons. Widely issued infantry anti-tank weapons now range to up to 600m. The hit chances are - no matter how long-ranged a system is - always worse at long ranges than at half maximum range (for example).
The driving factor behind longer-ranged infantry (not dedicated AT unit) AT weapons seems to have been that longer-ranged weapons force the enemy mechanized infantry to dismount earlier (to keep vulnerable IFVs out of range). The longer distance on foot made the mech infantry more susceptible because attacks lasted longer.
I don't consider this Cold War tactical defence scenario as relevant enough any more.

I stick to the opinion that 400+ m range isn't useful. It drives weight of weapons and munitions up and increases capabilities that can be substituted for and don't create a good chance/risk proportion anyway.

This doesn't seem to be mainstream opinion, though (or else I wouldn't write about it).
Instead, the drive for longer ranges is well and alive.
Sniper rifles (and their sights and ammunition) are being meant and developed for ranges like 1,500+ m instead of (usually) about 700 m nowadays.
The long-range sniping in relatively open Iraqi and Afghani terrains has probably created a bias.
Such long-range sniping isn't much of a problem, though. Snipers are difficult to detect, especially at long range. The requirement merely makes sniper rifles longer, heavier, bulkier - and less likely to be issued to general infantry. The quest for longer sniping ranges rather opens the gap between general infantry designated marksmen (assault rifle + scope, sticking to their infantry squad/platoon) and full-blown snipers (long-range rifle, small sniper team).

Long-range general infantry weapons are another issue.

This is one of the more extreme examples.
A multi-functional recoilless HE projector with 1,200m range.



Now this doesn't make much sense (although a shorter-ranged version would likely not be much lighter). I simply fail to see what it's good for.
Sure, it's technically great, but what is it good for?
It should be possible to do the job with 300m weapons and mortar fire. The latter is absolutely essential anyway.

The rifle and machine gun calibre discussion also tends to drift to long range fire. We already had that after the Boer Wars more than a hundred years ago when the British came back from the open South African terrain and emphasized long-range marksmanship as a lesson. Next, they got bogged down in Northern France with short-range combat only.
That sounds a lot like some Afghanistan lessons learned to me.

- - - - -

It's not infantry terrain at all if you cannot at least close in to 400 m before opening fire.

It's quite hopeless anyway if you're in tank terrain where infantry cannot easily close in to 400 m but have no vehicle, air or indirect fire support. Such a terrible situation would place an even greater premium on stealth.

Let's also keep in mind that long-range weapons and munitions are not only heavier, but you also need more ammunition to achieve the same effect as in a shorter range fight. Infantry equipment weight is a terribly important factor, and presently out of control.

I regret that modern experiences against ill-equipped, ill-supported and ill-trained opponents in Iraq and especially in Afghanistan plus their non-representative terrain forms have likely done some harm to our understanding of modern infantry combat.

The attempt to exploit the opportunities given in these conflicts has led to developments and understandings that would be very suboptimal (in my opinion) in conventional war.

And keep in mind; only conventional war can cost your nation its sovereignty or part of it. Some distant militia/guerrilla fighters in a land far, far away can't do much harm to you if you don't insist on sticking to their neighbourhood.

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2009/07/01

Ad hominem with selective, misleading quotes

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Ad hominem arguments are a preferred tool for people who ran out of real arguments (or are unable to understand someone else's opinion in the first place).
It's so much easier to just attack another person instead of attacking his arguments (especially if the other person is right.)

I'm used to it, as my often unconventional opinions are rather difficult to explain without much elaboration. Many people are simply unwilling to understand uncommon opinions.
I rarely discuss matters if I agree with a majority. It would seem kind of pointless to me. I'm therefore always a minority and disadvantaged in several regards in discussions.
I'm used to it.

I'm not used to ad hominem attacks with quotes that become badly misleading without context, though. This blog - full of unconventional opinion - is apparently a rich hunting ground for people intent on using such a primitive rhetoric trick.

I encountered such an example recently in the comments of another blog. Here two quotes he chose:

“The USA was never really necessary to protect Western Europe against the Soviets, simply because the Soviet military power as we remember it was in great part a fantasy of U.S. intelligence services.”
(from here)

Indeed, whenever the West discussed an x gap or an y gap because the Soviet Union was supposedly more powerful in this or that aspect, it was wrong. The U.S. intelligence services overstated the Soviet Union's strength right to the day of its collapse.
The consequence was that the West deemed a stronger military necessary than was really necessary. This means that the U.S. forces in Europe (who provided a rather small minority of NATO combat power in Europe and Central Europe anyway) were pretty much excess strength.

The U.S. forces weren't all excess strength because especially the amphibious capability had global consequences in the bloc struggle - but U.S. forces weren't really necessary for the defence of Europe.
About four divisions, some smaller ground units and some air wings; that's not much even in comparison to the German army alone (almost 12 divisions), it's much less in comparison to German, French, British, Dutch, Belgian and Danish units. The deployment of U.S. reserves in time was unrealistic and wouldn't have matched European mobilization anyway.
Now that's something that "Fulda Gap" tunnel vision people don't accept.

The inflated intelligence estimates had the further problem that they heated up the arms race and conflict - a strictly non-desirable part of the Cold War.
We were about on par with or superior to the Warsaw Bloc but sensed a "gap", closed that "gap" and in fact had made the next step in the arms race (ahead of the WP) that forced them to follow (and made the WP truly believe that we were intent on invading them).
This part of the history is not nice, and I won't let them get away with outdated Cold War age myths.

The problem: Someone without the right background knowledge could draw very wrong conclusions from that quote. "in great part" was probably not the best choice of words as well.

Americans (well, at least right wingers*) like to declare all critique and refusal to accept pro-U.S. myths as anti-Americanism.
"They're all haters" is a convenient explanation that enables them to avoid the tough job of admitting that all that glitters is not gold.


- - - - -

Another quote:

There are reasons to believe that the Jewish/Israelis have left the “victim” status and went over some limit of what Europeans generally consider acceptable behavior in the handling of neighbors.”
“Don’t get me wrong – there’s more support for Israel than for Arab countries in Europe. That’s because the Israelis are somewhat accepted as some of “us” (participating in European sports and arts contests) in addition to the holocaust argument (which has become a strange argument after two generations).
I don't really doubt that I wrote it, but even google was unable to find the quote on my blog.

Here are two points; 1) acceptable behaviour.
Bombing, raiding and occupying neighbours is not acceptable in Europe, that's a fact. The Serbs got beaten up for much less. No European state has as difficult relations to his neighbours, but it's just fair to point out that none has treated his neighbours like Israel did in the post-WW2 period. The Serbs and Russians came close, and neither behaviour was considered as acceptable.

The second point is about the holocaust argument.
I called it a "strange" argument in the context of inter-state relations, and for a reason.
Imagine you get beaten up badly by some guy. You go to hospital.
Decades later you decide to beat up your neighbours.
Your lawyer defends you with the fact that you've been beaten up yourself.
Now I would call that a "strange" defence, at best!

I most certainly wrote "Jewish" because Israel has a significant non-Jewish minority and the policy of the state of Israel doesn't look like the policy of its Arab minority to me.
I was sometime last year advised that in English the word "Jewish" is OK and "Jews" problematic.

The previous choice of a quote for a ad hominem argument was (in my opinion) aimed at the exploitation of prevalent anti-Americanism paranoia.

This latter choice of a quote was apparently intent on painting me as a nazi (not the first time this has happened - it's a popular and cheap ad hominem attack on Germans).
Nazi ideology doesn't fit to any of my ideas, this should be very obvious in regard to foreign relations for anyone who reads here.


Nevertheless, I exercise my right of free speech and call out the nude emperor if there's a wrong myth or if conventional wisdom is tainted by political correctness.
I don't let some idiots of a previous generation limit my freedom of speech.

A fair discussion is almost a precondition for a good discussion.Cheap rhetoric tricks deserve to be exposed and sanctioned.

"anti-american" and "anti-semite" stereotypes are widely known and therefore easy fodder for ad hominem attacks. The pity is; the world is so much more complex than most of those who need to resort to lowly rhetoric tricks seem to grasp. People with unconventional opinions are especially prone to be targets of ad hominem, and conservatives know it. The use of such rhetoric tricks doesn't help, though. The smart people are seeking smart people for exchange of ideas, not those who resort to rhetoric tricks.


P.S.:
The simple fact that my opinions are not widely shared suggests that some of them are simply wrong. The majority of those in disagreement doesn't discuss my opinion, though - they resort to ad hominem. That's not helpful in any way. I'm always interested in a proper discussion and have changed my opinion many times because of convincing additional arguments or information.

*: Left and right wing in the U.S. seem to differ in their opinions and their view of the world more than I've ever experienced with Frenchmen, British, Canadians or other nations.
Germany has a small anti-military and a very small pro-military wing, but the great majority is rather uninvolved.
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