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Anthony G. Williams has published a well-done contribution to this decades-old dicussion about military small arms calibres:
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/The%20Next%20Generation.htm
related:
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/07/infantry-combat-ranges.html
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2009/01/modern-small-arms-calibers.html
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2010/06/07
Hexawheel concept
Gaza blockade
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The French minister of foreign affairs has apparently said that the EU would be ready (even happy) to take over the naval blockade of Gaza in order to prevent arms transports to Hamas.
That smells as if there's a 10-20% probability that the German navy will get one more distant patrol mission.
I hope that they'll at least drop one other mission in exchange if Merkel agrees to yet another naval patrol mission.
S O
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Aviation - should it be a separate service or not?
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The question whether aviation should be exclusively in an air force, partially in navy/army or all in navy/army is a tricky one.
I reasoned that the supplier-customer relationship in the force structure is the key question for several years.
Aviation supports both naval and ground forces. The most obvious example is CAS (close air support); aircraft providing fire support to ground troops, not completely unlike artillery. Reconnaissance and logistical aviation are in similar support roles.
The USAF has the A-10 aircraft for CAS, and a long history of neglect (in comparison to its great affection with fighters and their pilots) has lead many in the U.S. Army to believe that the USAF prefers to be its own customer (air superiority, long-range attacks far away from battlefields) over being a mere supplier for its customer, the Army. The USAF did indeed focus on CAS only during wars, while during peacetime it invested heavily in more 'sexy' (prestigious) planes (50's: nuclear bombers, since 70's: fighters) than in CAS assets.
Part of the reaction was that the Army produced and emphasized a new aviation branch (after having lost the (United States Army) Air Force when that one became independent); helicopter army aviation and drone projects.
The relationship between infantry and artillery is similar; the infantry keeps its mortars as a hedge for the unreliable artillery that at times prefers to prepare for counter-artillery fires over hazardous close support fires.
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The interpretation of the problem as a supplier-customer optimization problem has its difficulties, though. This point of view would assume that independent air forces neglect CAS and prefer so-called 'strategic' attacks while army-integrated air forces would be expected to focus on supporting the army.
The historical record trashes such a hypothesis. (That's too bad, for it was a really nice hypothesis.)
The independent German air force of 1935-1945 focused on 'operational' air support (supporting the operational plan of the army) and neglected so-called 'strategic' attacks (attacks on industry & cities) as much as was possible under the circumstances. This could be excused with several facts if it was the only exception tot he rule: The Luftwaffe was built by former army officers, influenced by WWI pilots who knew only air war over battlefields, had most enemy industrial centres well in range of medium bombers and resource constraints didn't allow for a 'strategic' bomber fleet anyway.
It wasn't the only exception, though: The Imperial Japanese Army Air Force had both CAS aircraft and long-range bombers (although the latter were also used in for some kind of 'strategic' interdiction and for missions in support of ground forces).
The U.S.A.A.F. (United States Army Air Force) was very much focused on 'strategic' bombing well into WW2 despite being part of the U.S.Army.
The independent WW2 Red Air Force of the Soviet Union (VVS,) did focus almost entirely on air attacks in divisional areas (very close to the front) as an independent air force. The Red Air Force had many long-ranged bombers in WW2 and used them almost entirely with a bomb overload (additional bombs, but minimal fuel) on very short range attacks. Its passing interest in long-range aviation was probably entirely dependent on the general Soviet Union's interest in long-range aircraft for civilian purposes.
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Military history is less paradox in regard to the support of navies by independent air forces. The almost dismal naval performance of the Luftwaffe in WW2, the poor support of the Italian Navy by the Italian Air Force in WW2, the troubles of the late Italian Navy with equipping its Giuseppe Garibaldi aircraft carrier and the discouraging experience of the Royal Fleet Air Arm in the 30's all seem to confirm that navies need their own aviation branch or else there will be no good air-sea warfare capabilities.
(Hint: The German Navy lost its Tornado IDS wing to the Luftwaffe a few years ago. *Sigh*)
The Israel Air Force (IAF) may be a positive example. It did both the tactical/operational air support just fine in 1967 and 1973, was very capable in the rather 'strategic' Entebbe (1976) and Osirak (1981) raids and proved its 'operational' level capability again over the Beqaa valley (1982). Its later employments were rather mixed, in part because of inappropriate expectations.
Well, what's the optimum?
In regard to navies, the historical record seem to confirm that navies should have their own, unrestricted aviation arm.
A possible exception might apply to very maritime countries where an independent air force would not be distracted from air/sea warfare.
In regard to armies, the historical record seems to suggest a "It depends." answer. It depends on the national needs, on the circumstances and on the available technology.
A possible exception would apply to very small militaries. I doubt that it makes sense to separate air force and army in a military of less than about 100,000 total personnel. A separate air force in such a small military would likely be inefficient because of avoidable bureaucratic overhead.
S O
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2010/06/01
Thoughts on tactical agility
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An old rule of thumb advocated a triple superiority for the attacker in order to almost guarantee a successful attack. Historical examples for such 3vs1 offensives typically matched one of two basic models:
(1) Outflanking attacks where the attacker used superior numbers to create a longer line and win on one or two flanks.
(2) Frontal attacks with superior force density.
The greater the firepower (and especially its effective range), the less was (2) a convincing choice. The problem was especially evident at Kursk and during the Cold War. It was nevertheless necessary whenever the defender was able to put up a continuous, noteworthy front line (between two obstacles such as a sea, a neutral country or nearly impassable terrain).
Continuous front lines are not being expected for most future conventional war scenarios and weren't really relevant for (good) military thought back in the late Cold War either (two dozen divisions along a 1,000 km front were simply unable to man and defend a continuous front line).
Again, the question arose how to handle the defensive fight and avoid being outflanked by superior forces?
Thinking in the "lines" paradigm would suggest that we recreate the battle lines of the 18th century. An oblique order (counter-)attack or simply a full width delaying action would be possible in a 1vs3 situation.
We could alternatively look at the scenario from a non-linear perspective, assuming that the forces are more compact and able to turn quickly.
I recalled what I learned at martial arts about the fight against more than one opponent; reduce it to a 1vs1 fight by avoiding the second. The second attacker may move to your left, then you move to your right in order to keep him behind the first attacker who's in front of you. You circle around the first opponent by moving to the left if the second attacker threatens your right side.
It's surprisingly simple to keep the second attacker in a useless position behind the first one until you run into an obstacle or until the first attacker adapts his tactic.
This evasion of much of the enemy's attack power is interesting and effective, but its requirements are difficult to meet in battle.
The agility and reaction times of leadership and units put restrictions on this. Sadly, even resting forces cannot move very quickly into a new direction (although this can be much improved with proper training).
Even more reason for pessimism is being provided by the military historical experience about how difficult it is to disengage, to break contact. It's very difficult to pull back formations that are engaged in combat.
Forget the image of the nimble Karate or Taekwondo fighter for a second and think of classical Greco-Roman wrestlers. 1vs1, the entangle each other; it's almost impossible to disengage before the fight is over. A 1vs2 situation would ensure defeat, or a second attacker could easily move into a perfect position for his attack.
Sadly, the latter is a more accurate description of many modern land forces.
The great simplification in this text - modern brigades are more like a cluster of battle groups than a solid body of whatever shape - doesn't change the fundamental shortcoming.
Again, I'd like to emphasize the importance of battlefield or tactical agility - from brigade staffs down to Platoons. Reaction times need to be a fraction of those tolerated in peacetime training. Changes of orders must not create confusion and chaos, but rapid adaption and execution. Breaking contact on short notice with few losses is an important core skill for battle groups and brigades. It's not only useful if not crucial for the defence, but also of great utility on the tactical offence (more about this probably later).
One could expect that the well-funded Western armies train accordingly and are masterful at quick and agile manoeuvres at battle group to brigade level thanks to many, many free play exercises on diverse training areas.
The truth is more close to computer gaming. The enormously important training of (off-)road marches and actual outdoor tactical manoeuvres is being neglected. Such training happens mostly at unit, not at formation levels.
This is one of many reasons why our extremely expensive Western armies fail to reach their potential and to come close to the historical gold standards of experienced and slim wartime forces. Their excellence lies in the lack of threats who do it right at comparable funding levels.
S O
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E-Petition about better information on the German ISAF mission
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Sascha Stoltenow from one of the very few German MilBlogs (BendlerBlog) has initiated an e-Petition. I propose that the German readers take the time to read his proposal and think about signing the petition:
2010/05/31
Köhler resigned
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I wrote in 2009/11:
Sven Ortmann
The President of the Federal Republic of Germany Horst Köhler (mostly representative head of state) has resigned because of the strong reactions to an interview he gave just a few days ago (transcript).
The interview has been interpreted as championing the aggressive use of military force to further national interests (= in my opinion a possible interpretation of his words).
The reactions pointed out that this would be way beyond the constitutional limits and that the Federal Republic of Germany has military forces for self defence, not for Banana Wars.
Federal presidents tend to have more integrity than common top politicians and it's to be respected that he resigned that quickly because he felt that he hadn't enough respect and support any more.
I interpret his speech as the latest step of an multi-party salami tactic that was employed since about 1993 in order to increasingly get used the Germans to distant and even offensive use of military power. A normal politician would have proposed a stupid mission, got resistance and have postponed the accustomization till a later date.
I wrote in 2009/11:
(...) Then came the end of the Cold War.
German politicians proceeded with a salami slice tactic for so-called "out of area" missions of German troops, one step at a time. It began with a field hospital in Cambodia, then logistical support troops in a safe place in Northern Somalia and so on. Peacekeepers here, peacekeepers there, finally some purely anti-radar missions of Tornados in the 1999 Kosovo Air War and then more peacekeeping in Afghanistan coupled with up to 100 commando soldiers on AQ hunt.
Well, now we're in the stupid business of small wars - with a strong popular majority rejecting this policy and at the same time re-electing the conservatives for domestic policy reasons.
photo: Roosewelt Pinheiro/Agência Brasil
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2010/05/30
War and economic growth
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It's not exactly uncommon that people believe in positive economic effects of warfare, but those effects are mostly illusions, caused by tunnel vision.
S O
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Oliver Stone's documentary "South of the Border" apparently includes this account of the former Argentine president Kirchner about a conversation with GWB:
It's not exactly uncommon that people believe in positive economic effects of warfare, but those effects are mostly illusions, caused by tunnel vision.
In the realm of macroeconomics, expenditures for warfare are about equal to expenditures for a program to build buildings, then blow them up, build again, blow them up, ... it's consumption that does not stimulate anything and doesn't meet the consumption preferences of the population.
Investments usually increase the economic output (depending on circumstances), while additional consumption does so at most by a factor of 1 unless the economy was running at significantly less than full potential (and only if the circumstances allow it).
A war can of course erase unemployment, but keep in mind that all the mobilised soldiers don't really "work" in the economy during war. They're the equivalent of unemployed people, adding nothing to the nation's economic output.
There is one valuable thing in war, though: War - and especially the emotional mobilisation of the population by it - can provide motivation, break up resistances and such. Re-distribution fo income becomes fairly easy during war.
Motivation is the key in every economy, it drives them. It's what comes before the worker even raises his hand. A very detailed research into the motivation effects on the micro and macro scale could consume the whole career of hundreds of economists, and economists tend to be more interested in researching peacetime economies.
It's therefore difficult to tell what exactly changes due to the changes in motivation, but it's quite safe to say that these effects do not apply significantly to peacetime military spending.
Even IF the motivation of the population in wartime would change enough to enable a net positive economic effect; that effect would not mean that peacetime military spending could be considered as an economic advantage. It's simply a form of government consumption actually.
There are additional reasons why a look at the economic effects is almost excessively difficult; most wars are short. It's possible in wartime to postpone the replacement of old machinery and buildings, for example. These investments are a huge factor in normal, peacetime economies. You can postpone them - which merely postpones investments and frees production potential for other production.
There's also the problem of waste. The GDP metric is generally under fire for being a poor indicator for welfare. To raise a building and then blow it up does increase economic output just as two neighbours helping each other does not while them doing the same and paying each other an identical sum does.
The welfare effect of economic output isn't shown in GDP. The GDP merely shows the extent of official economic activity.
The economic activity of warfare has very little to do with welfare (private consumption drops significantly in major wars), and even worse - much of the war expenses are usually wasted. Again, this waste is not being subtracted from the GDP.
In short; even if (and that's not for sure) warfare does increase the GDP on paper, it's among the most crappy tools for economic recovery. High peacetime military spending is similarly crappy for the purpose.
Then again, it's not surprising or even unbelievable that GWB recommended war as economic policy.
S O
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2010/05/29
Those irrational, misled, conspiratorial Muslims
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I recommend it. Excerpts:
By Glenn Greenwald
I recommend it. Excerpts:
[...]Of all the myths identified by the NYT article, the implicit one conveyed by that photograph -- Pakistanis harbor anger toward the U.S. only because of false conspiracy theories they're being fed -- is easily the most extreme. [...]
[...]There is a lot of propaganda, paranoia and myth in Pakistan, along with most places in the world. But the American media's fixation on pointing to it and deriding it has the principal effect (if not intent) of obscuring the role we play in enabling (and even justifying) those sentiments, along with at least our own equal share of such propaganda and our own media's central role in bolstering it.[...]
S O
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2010/05/28
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