It's a wonder there are not more dead civilians in Syria

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Hat tip to ELP

Outright crazy civilians and something between crazy and inept soldiers. It's difficult to keep in mind how low you can go in regard to military skill, but such videos help. The initial movement of the AFV team to the entry point was already done stupidly. It only got worse afterwards.
 

This reminds me of what flabbergasted Americans said to Israelis in 1991, the meaning was approximately:

'So you bragged all these years about defeating these Arabs?'

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

edit: Video was removed, this article sums it up.

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Dangerous bus drivers yet again

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Maybe you remember how I made fun of the supposed dangerousness of errorists, especially compared to the dangerousness of bus drivers. Whenever some errorist attacked Germans anywhere, bus drivers had proven their superior dangerousness in the meantime since the last errorist incident.

This was all statistics, of course. Somehow the idea of dangerous bus drivers did not attract so much public attention as did the idea of dangerous errorists. Well, sometimes statistics are mere grey theory and it takes some emotional input to raise an alarm.

Today I got such an emotional input: I experienced with my own eyes how a bus driver disrespected another driver's right of way and rammed a car.

So where's the WOBRD?

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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More about the nonsense of the Afghanistan mission (ISAF)

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A report of the Afghanistan Analysts Network has made it into national news in Germany. Here it is:

www.afghanistan-analysts.org/reluctant-interventionists-isafs-influence-on-local-power-structures-in-kunduz-and-badakhshan

and its two-page summary is here.

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German grand strategy and economics

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(Trust me, there is a link between this text and defence, at least in a wider sense.)

Germany's culture produces a birth rate lower than the mortality rate. This has been resistant to political efforts (some of them quite costly) to change it, even to those efforts which copied seemingly successful policies from abroad. This cultural characteristic extends to immigrants; the fertility among Turks in Germany has dropped below 2 per female long ago as well.

Immigration is being kept moderate and insufficient to compensate the shrinking of the population, for more immigration would provoke greater problems than the shrinking population does (we saw that already). Germany also fails to attract a large share of well-qualified immigrants (and even when they arrive we typically dismiss their official job qualification in jobs such as teacher, physician or nurse), as do many countries with substantial immigration.

It's thus a rather safe bet to assume that Germany will experience a moderate shrinking of the population for decades to come. The German population doesn't disappear, of course. Official scenarios predict a reduction from a zenith of about 82.5 million to about 65 or 70 million by 2060.

The change of the working age population is more troublesome. The changes are slow and thus allow us to get used to the future, but there's nevertheless a widespread expectation that the ratio between working and not working people in Germany will deteriorate. (Articles tend to exaggerate a bit by looking at working-to-retiree ratio, neglecting that a small youth  share is a partial counterweight to this.)

So this a long-term background for German policy, and one determinant of a German grand strategy (as it  forms accidentally and incrementally).

______________

One of the concerns caused by the demographic change for decades (began in the 80's) is that the current system of pensions may fail us and not provide enough income to retirees in the future. It is a transfer system with current working population paying for current retirees. This may indeed look ugly by 2040 with fewer people working and more people being retirees, although I expect us to get used to it and to adapt easily, not the least because the rate of technical progress is still well above 1% per annum. Retirees of 2040 will probably live better than today's retirees.

This way of financing pensions is the only approach for a nation as a whole which made sense. Back in the 50's "we" knew that fortunes were destroyed in two world wars, a hyperinflation, a great depression and then again in Nazi disrimination of minorities and political opponents - all in the previous 40 years. A savings-based pension systems wouldn't have survived this.

There's an increased effort to provoke more width of savings in Germany, with the middle class being asked to save for extra pension income in order to improve on their pensions. This seems sensible for middle class families, but how does it make sense on the national level? What could these savings do? The really, really durable investmens are typically investments in public infrastructure. I can tell that I often ride a train along a route which was obviously cleared and fortified more than four generations ago, for example.

Very little but family homes is as durable. But we already have badly scattered settlements in Germany. The lesser efficiency of public services in for scattered settlements in comparison to cities points against the idea that every middle class family buying a family home could make sense. Even if they did; the low income groups in Germany cannot save much, especially not since the Schröder reforms ten years ago.

Nevertheless, the promotion of family savings for retirement - especially based on subsidised plans offered by insurance companies - is an important reaction to the demographic change expectations. Insurance companies and many individual savers don't buy family homes, though: They invest in financial markets.

Now how exactly could this be helpful on the national level? How could savings now reap benefits in 2050?

This is simple, outright trivial, in microeconomics. Meanwhile, it only works in macroeconomics (the nationwide view) if we export capital.

After all, machines built now won't last till 2050, so they won't raise incomes in 2050. Private capital investment now is a very poor substitute for missing workers in 2050.

We can invest now and expect this money to somehow keep working till 2050, then in conjunction with foreign workers. We can invest savings abroad.

This means capital exports now and capital imports in 2030-2060. In fact, it means net capital exports and imports. There's an entity between capital export and goods and services exports in macroeconomics; we can only build up our savings abroad by exporting more goods and services than we do import (save for a couple usually unimportant exceptions such as transfers).

This still doesn't help German low income groups, but at least it kind of makes sense for our middle class. Fact is, much of the saving is actually being done by the rich instead, but that's our very own distribution and allocation issue and not felt by foreigners.

Now with capital exports being the same as goods and services exports and us having a huge net export, there's a lot of criticism about that. Famous Nobel prize winner and columnist/blogger Krugman and now even the EU appear to led a charge against this, demanding a more balanced trade (I would actually like that, but it's not compatible with the grand strategy elements laid out so far). They look at the short term, and at how the export strength requires a depressed wage level (since the other balancing mechanism, the common currency, fixed the exchange rates between Germany and many other European countries). This demand makes a lot of sense in the short term, but it completely fails to appreciate why this behaviour actually makes sense (= is a somewhat promising stratey) for Germany in the long term. Well, if our savings don't evaporate.

The Euro crisis is in part so horrible to Germans because it threatens the idea that we could have our savings work for us abroad and recall them piecemeal only at retirement age. Such investments need to be reliable, low risk, in order to make sense. It's especially pointless to maintain depressed wage levels, work hard, save and export much if this only means you'd be forced to support those who did the opposite in order to balance out your deviation from the average.

So that's the economic policy short / long term conflict between Germany and much of the EU. Notorious short-term-only thinkers such as Krugman don't get this, but now maybe readers of Defence and Freedom get this.

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I promised a link to defence. Well, remember what I wrote before; world wars wiped out savings twice. Unreliable foreign governments can decimate savings, too.

The optimum world for this new German grand strategy element (to counter the demographic change's consequences at least for the middle class) is a world of reliability, of the rule of law (the rule of rules), of no wars between great powers, of cooperation instead of confrontation. "We" want stability and reliability. 

Countries with a decade of trade balance deficits as their background may be first and foremost be concerned about trade or political crusades; but countries with a decade of trade balance surpluses as their background may actually be most concerned about the risk to savings abroad.

Assume a country turns into a troublemaker after being a net import of German goods for a decade. This could lead to less trade, and Germany as a whole would lose annual benefits from trade equal to a few per cent of that trade (profits, savings). Meanwhile, losing savings invested in that troublemaker country could easily be twenty times as great and thus be much worse than years of no trade with the country in itself.

The classic post-1945 grand strategy of West Germany was about the integration with the Western world and the industrial pursuit of wealth for the masses. The grand strategy of the 90's was about pulling East Germany up to West Germany's level of prosperity and sensibly remove the shackles and attitude of Cold War's Germany; which was on both sides of the wall coined by limited sovereignty and little freedom of action. The common Euro currency finally led in conjunction with the wages-depressing Schröder reforms to what I described above. It wasn't really figured out by one or two geniuses (as was the Cold War strategy of Adenauer and Erhard) and then enacted, but grew as different actions and outcomes compounded to a whole, not being changed because it seemed to make some sense.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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[For Life] The answer to (almost) everything!

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Let's assume a scenario; quality shortcomings are rampant at your workplace. Maybe some plastic sheets are defective too often or paperwork doesn't get done often enough or a surgeon forgets stuff in patients' intestines or an army workshop platoon doesn't do serious carbine training.

There's a bureaucratic and textbook approach to fix this; introduce rules. Such as ISO 90001 certification and other elaborate and annoying scripts.

There's also a good answer to this, and it applies in general. Wirthout at least a sall dose of it no rules will ever do the trick:

Ambition

Leaders cannot spot, understand and solve all problems or spot, understand and exploit all opportunities on their own. The way to go is instead to wake up the folks and instill ambition. To instill pride (and to enable pride by leading by example and not sabotage pride) is an important ingredient for this.

Typically the only problems left once your people are ambitious are scarce resources and to avoid over-ambitiousness.

Think about it: Which problems wouldn't have been solved, which opportunities ould have been wasted if the people involved had had a lot more ambition?

 

Ambition - a directed driver of intrinsic motivation - is what organisations such as a military bureaucracy need to foster, and at the same time they need to keep down at a healthy level. This is much, much more important than questions about force structures and tables of organisation. It's also more important than the tools and weapons.

The importance (and risks) of ambition are also valuable in civilian life, much more so than all stupid management tools which you may hear about from consultants or at courses or university. Get your folks up to a fine level of ambition and performance will go up by itself.

This isn't a perfectly original stroke of genius - but it's a most neglected idea of great potential.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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A thought about individual camouflage

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So the U.S.Army messes up the entire individual camouflage pattern thing. Its universal grey camouflage was a disaster, as it was almost universally poor and actually didn't even look good in the original evaluation. An interim solution was specifically adopted for Afghanistan and now the bureaucracy cramps its way towards adopting the same thing as standard camouflage pattern. Meanwhile, they keep buying poorly camouflaged equipment in the old "universal" pattern.

This makes sticking with grey-olive monocolour clothes for decades (Bundeswehr 60's to 80's) look smart.

source

The graphic above shows in an abstract way the compromises required if troops need to move through different terrains during a single mission. No matter whether you pick specialised or universal patterns, you're going to be suboptimal in some environment.

It should be a no-brainer that the answer is a reversible overall smock with different camo patterns on both sides. I kid you not; Germany had this already 70 years ago. It's not fully compliant with the approach of overladen infantrymen with load carrying vests all over the upper body, of course.

Here's a different thought, one which takes human nature into account instead of staring at landscape photos and stuff only: Give some universal camo which works at least in shadows (where hiding is easiest) to the non-combat troops and mounted combat troops. Meanwhile, dismounted scouts and infantry should be given only a basic camouflage which nobody would misunderstand as sufficient in itself. These troops are actually (supposed to be) highly conscious about the need to camouflage, and they should do so depending on terrain. Let them add both factory-made and improvised camouflage elements to themselves, in order to be almost always very well camouflaged. This includes especially 3D camouflage elements which can beat any pattern hands down anyway.

The reasoning is that supporters aren't going to do individual camo well anyway, so they should get the best factory-made and universal camo. It takes a disciplined army to ensure that supporters have at least their guns cleaned and are skilled in their use - no army has ever been able to enforce much camo discipline on individual support troops.

Meanwhile, the few troops which are the most exposed individuals (infantry, dismounted scouts, possibly dedicated tank hunters) can be kept camo-aware by a disciplined army. They're also the ones for which a second-best camo is not good enough. So don't fool them into trusting the inadequate patterns when 3D camouflage elements are much superior. Force them into applying these by handing them only obviously inadequate camo suits which are nevertheless a fine basis for additional camo efforts.

factory-made, still fresh and clean ghillie camo suit example

I suppose this approach of basic camo for combat troops and enforced extra camo efforts should be tested. Maybe it's great, maybe not.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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"necessary"

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This is what I think most often when I read what people think is "necessary" in regard to 'war or peace' decisions.

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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Non-combat vehicles musings

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I'm going to try to build my own vehicle strategy here. It's meant as a baseline for comparison with actual vehicle inventories. I'm fully aware that developing an actual vehicle inventory is messy, incremental, and done by successive leaderships.

The comparison is thus not necessarily a critique, but rather an attempt to make the difference between actual and optimal (or what I think would be optimal) visible.

(1) Road march and driver efficiency

Up to as quarter of the personnel of a division or brigade can be full-time or part-time drivers. Almost none of these troops would abandon their vehicle during contact and fight in effective small units. This drain of personnel strength is astonishing. Many formations have a substantially lower share of drivers, albeit 15-20% drivers is still bad enough. The trouble doubles once you assume a second man in the cabin for manning a defensive gun. This issue adds to the attractiveness of big, high capacity vehicles as you get more capacity per head.

A similar effect is visible in regard to maintenance. The maintenance requirements of trucks don't scale nearly with their nominal or average payload. Again, attractiveness bonus for high capacity vehicles.

The third effect of this kind is about column length. Both the convoy length and convoy time of passing a certain point (from first to last vehicle) should be short. A high capacity vehicle may have five times the payload of a small one, but be only about twice as long. The mandated spacing between vehicles (for avoidance of traffic issues, accidents and for diminishing the effect of attacks) is even the exact same for a car and a heavy truck.

As a consequence of these considerations, I am no fan of light trucks. A HMMWV-based vehicle park is very suboptimal in my opinion.

Many vehicles have functions which only require a 1.5 or two-ton truck's payload capacity, and the common practice is to not allocate a bigger vehicle than necessary for the job. Sometime ago I already wrote about my alternative; multi-role vehicles. A light truck with a radio cabin may be replaced by a medium truck with a radio cabin, a powered water purifier, surplus diesel fuel capacity, and a small flatbed with some supplies, for example. The overall quantity of vehicles would be decreased, and the overall quantity of drivers and gunners would be decreased.

one ACMAT VLRA version (light truck)

(2) Spare parts logistics

Having the same steering wheel in all trucks is a largely pointless commonality, but having the same engine spare parts (even if the engines of two trucks have a different cylinder count) or the same tires (two or three standard tire sizes could suffice for almost all vehicles) is a different story. The French had great success with their ACMAT VLRA family of vehicles and Germany had partial standardisation with its MAN trucks as well. I am under the impression that these laudable efforts are withering away.

(3) Fuel standardisation

Most modern armies have standardised on diesel fuel, with some jet fuel for rotary aviation. This move of the 70's and 80's was a wise one, but it also helped to drive motorcycles out of the armies, and that was probably not such a good idea. Luckily, there are a few diesel engines for medium weight motorcycles available off the shelf today, so a perfect fuel standardisation on diesel fuel should be self-evident nowadays. You never know what dearly paid-for lesson the bureaucracies throw out of the window next, though.

(4) Night march capability.

A limitation of headlight effects was important during the Second World War up to the Vietnam War, but modern combat aviation has introduced sensors which question the relevance of such discipline nowadays.

The suppression of the visible light signature at night may still be worthwhile because of the ground threat, though. This assumes that only negligible civilian traffic drives at night, of course. Civilian trucks would both provide false positives to hostiles and the risk of traffic accidents with dark military trucks would force the latter to switch on their headlights on temporarily in order to avoid crashes.

One solution to the problem is the use of infrared driving aids

The use of such driver's aids actually adds another issue: It makes little sense to build mixed convoys of vehicles some of which have such aids and others don't. I suppose we need to limit the employment of such driver's aids for some years to come, and I assume the vehicles in manoeuvre and scouting units should get such aids, as should the advance guard of large convoys.

We should always afford the very simple, cheap yet effective devices used for night marches at correct intervals used in the past. Mere reflector crosses and other simplistic pro forma measure for night driving safety aren't nearly as good.

(5) Climate control

German military vehicles need only the basic heater and no cooling climate control. Neither Germany nor NATO or EU can be defended in an African desert, period.
Cabins full of electronics are an obvious exception, of course. There should nevertheless be provisions for an upgrade with a standardised climate control kit (for export, if nothing else).

(6) Fuel tanks, road range

Wheeled vehicles can quite easily reach great on-road ranges. 1,000 km is easily possible, and 1,500 km is possible as well. It has been documented that even in heavy formations the trucks are the main fuel guzzlers, not the tanks. Even the notorious thirst of the Abrams tank prior to introduction of its auxiliary power unit did not change this. Logistical trucks drive more and are so numerous that their combined movement of weight is much greater than the combined movement of armoured vehicle weight even of a mechanised brigade.

Now let's take into account that manoeuvre forces (such as a mechanised brigade) are very difficult to resupply during mobile warfare. Often times they receive supplies only every second day, even if daily resupply was intended. The longer they can make do without resupply, the less trouble for the leadership. The additional fuel thirst from carrying the extra weight of extra fuel and fuel capacity does not come close to compensate for this.

I would thus set a minimum road range of 500 km (except for motorcycles) under realistic conditions including whatever electrical power has to be supplied for the payload. The vehicle fleet as a whole should have about 1,000 km road range. The transfer of fuel from longer-endurance vehicles to shorter-endurance ones should be possible, quick and easy with on-board equipment. This way the higher fuel capacity vehicles (heavy trucks) would probably be the only ones being refuelled by fuel resupply and then much of this fuel could be further distributed over time to lower endurance vehicles. The filling of fuel tanks should be visible outside, so no driver could refuse to hand out fuel as long as his truck's fuel supply is above a marked level (such as equivalent to 500 km road range), by claiming that he's short on fuel.

(7) Protection

Armour protection for trucks is terribly in fashion nowadays. Even RPG-proofing with the aesthetic armageddon of cages is widespread. Protection against mines is focused on the command-detonated types, both below the hull (V-shaped belly, shock absorbing structure, roof-mounted seats) and roadside.

The classic pressure-fused mine threat is being neglected by comparison (otherwise we would prefer to have the front axle well ahead of the cabin, so the cabin isn't directly above the explosion of a pressure-fused mine). We also don't care much nowadays about scatterable mines either. Anti-vehicle (anti-tank) mines can be scattered by multiple rocket launchers, combat aircraft, dispensers underslung a helicopter et cetera. I suppose this threat is something to consider for vehicles in a manoeuvre formation.

Does up-armoring make sense? It depends. One thing is certain, though; it does again favour the higher capacity vehicles. The armour protection for a truck cabin weighs in at about a ton, so two-ton trucks cannot reasonably be up-armoured and still be employed in a two-ton truck role. The drivers of 15-ton trucks barely notice a difference.

It makes sense to keep the overall standard truck design compatible with up-armouring and lightly armoured versions, but I doubt that today's fashion of very much protected cabins and trucks will last for long.

We will probably go back to mere bullet-proofing and add a reduction of secondary effects (reduced fire hazard, spall liners to limit the effect of penetrations, protection against common mines) to it. Even this kind of protection may be limited to those units most exposed to wartime hazards.

(8) Fuel consumption

Very high pressure tires, much electronics, no armour weight and very aerodynamic, curved shapes would be ideal for fuel efficiency. Instead, many military vehicles are rather technically primitive, boxy vehicles. Modern civilian trucks are in between.

I suppose there's a golden middle. We can have the electronics, but the vehicles should keep going in a back-up mode if they fail. We can have the boxy cabin structures that allow easy addition of armoured panels, but we can have aerodynamic, curved skins on them. The 1950's era innovation of central tire inflation systems is widespread anyway and allows for high air pressure tires during road marches and soft, wide tires on soft soil. Alternatively we could use airless tires.

(9) Off-road requirements

Most vehicles don't need greater agility or off-road ability than the trucks used in the forestry industry. The ones which need better off-road ability can be divided into groups. The greatest off-road aspirations would have the scouting vehicles and combat engineer vehicles (some of which could even be reasonably equipped for amphibious movement) followed by combat vehicles. Most other vehicles even in manoeuvre formations would not drive in difficult terrain often. Most importantly, they are unlikely to cross drainage ditches, fences or walls often. Driver training is a greater determinant of off-road capability in such trucks than the gearbox or axles. There is little to be gained by noticeable variations in the off-road capability of such vehicles. An offroad-wonder such as a Unimog in the same unit as a barely modified 7-ton road truck would allow the convoy effect to kick in: The leader would need to limit his routes and speed according to the limits of the poorest vehicles and drivers.

(10) On-board spare parts

I've long-lost the source, but I remember an anecdote about a convoy in Bosnia during the 90's which got harassed by snipers so badly that hundreds of tires were ruined during a day's trip. Sure, we have run-flat tires nowadays, but once pierced these still require replacement and at least some serious repair. The very small quantity of spare tires has always irritated me. I suppose we need many more, and vehicles should be prepared to carry many more full quality spare tires, ready for a quick change. Two full quality and inflated spare tires on or in a four-wheel vehicle should be normal, not noteworthy. Again, airless tires may be a reasonable alternative.

(11) Radios

All trucks should have the rather large radio antennas (to keep observers from identifying leadership vehicles) and all should be (are) prepared to accept a quick upgrade with a military radio set.

Short-range (hundreds of metres, with automatic relay function) radios should be in all vehicles. Their use should not be more distracting than unavoidable. The costs of this kind of technology have dropped so much that there is really no excuse for not having short-range radios in all trucks. No troops should be forced to resort to improvisations with civilian mobile phones.

(12) Camouflage and deception

Certain paints can reduce infrared contrast, certain netting can reduce both radar and infrared signatures. Exhausts and coolers can be placed and designed to leave less of a signature.

All these signature reduction measures should be considered with the possibility of blending with civilian-type vehicle traffic in mind. I'm not really thinking of mixing with civilian traffic, but many civilian trucks with quick military paintjobs would be used in a major conflict. They would be driven either by contractors or by soldiers.

Either way, they would be lower priority targets than the dedicated military trucks. The latter possess more capabilities, are more likely to be part of manoeuvre forces, and are more likely carrying valuable equipment.

The heavy army trucks should thus be able to switch between an almost civilian appearance and trying to hide entirely (not on the move, of course). Special versions such as trucks with multiple rocket launchers or expensive air defence or electronic warfare equipment should be able to look identical to their less important military truck cousins of the same basic vehicle type.

(13) Crew comfort other than temperature control

Many heavy civilian trucks possess a module on top of the cabin (or in its rear) with a bunk for sleeping. Military trucks don't, for somehow we still pretend that a weapon on most if not all trucks is a good idea.

We should nevertheless provide some more comfort for these troops. Sleep deprivation is a huge problem during military campaigns, and it is well-known that tired drivers cause many accidents. These accidents are 'friction' which sabotages the execution of the commander's intent. A reduction of this friction requires enough sleep for drivers. Yes, this should be a truck design issue, too. The truck's side could have a quick folding tent roof and a quick-folding camp bed with enough insulation for a European spring or autumn night. Maybe there is actually enough personnel for two men per cabin; the second one should be easily able to adjust his seat, get a pillow and sleep during a road march. Many cabins weren't designed with this in mind.

(14) Navy and air force have little need for standardisation or off-road capabilities

Dump all vehicles which were found deficient in practice there.

(15) Mobilisation
It should be possible to satisfy the need for trucks during an emergency doubling of the army within six months. The production of enough trucks should be possible on short notice and civilian commandeered trucks should be adapted in time.

(16) Temperature range
Useful down to about -40°C, without excessive breakages. This includes suitable coolants, rubbers and lubricants.

S O

edit: Updated link in (6); it's relevant for (8) as well.
edit 2014: Related earlier text

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Extremist rebels

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Imagine your country's state is completely corrupt - from lowly policemen who rape and extort up to the head of state.

You go to vote, but even if you are not impressed by "irregularities" before the elections, you see how the elections are stolen with bribery and obvious fraud.

The organized crime makes up a huge portion of your country's economy.

Foreign - really, really foreign - troops back your government. They assassinate opposition leaders, sprawl the country with bases and pour a flood of money into their helpers and into corrupt officials.

They promise to help your countrymen, but their "help" efforts are dwarfed even by their fuel bill, probably even by their ammunition bill.

Now maybe - just maybe, since all peaceful alternatives for real change to the better are exhausted - maybe you're ready to oppose the corrupt clique and its backers? Maybe even violently?

You thought "no"?  Wimp.

You thought "yes"? So you would be a Taliban if you were born as Pashtun in Afghanistan.

What's your complaint? I didn't mention religious zealots, thus no Taliban?

Well, that's the tragedy. There's not so much of a choice.

It's utterly, utterly typical in military history that extreme guerilla organizations - be them left wing, right wing or religious - are composed of extremists and moderates.

Castro's Cuban revolutionaries weren't all reds either. The Vietcong weren't necessarily much into communism.

The moderates usually play a minor role in the leadership  in comparison to revolutionary zealots and are quickly discarded once the struggle is either successful or becomes marginalized. 

There are rarely "moderate" guerilla groups, you know?

Guerilla organizations tend to be more ideologically homogeneous (as in Yugoslavia in WW2) when there are several truly competing resistance organizations. 'Truly competing' means that a man has a choice - which is not really the case if said organizations have clearly defined territories.

Sadly, the latter is an approximation for the situation in Afghanistan, where the parallel guerilla organizations are even loosely allied (there's more than one kind of "Taliban").

It's a great tragedy and an expression of strategic incompetence that the Western meddlers in Afghanistan allowed the Taliban to become the only really active and highly visible opposition to the corrupt mayor of Kabul. This failure channelled the guerilla recruits into the arms of the Taliban groups. A real lasting defeat of the Taliban could have been attempted by allowing a non-religious Pashtu opposition group to rise to prominence. Who knows? Maybe it could even have been a non-violent, political opposition group. The only requirement was that it needed to be effective. It needed to be able to challenge the government, even the system. Oops, that was beyond the grasp of short-sighted meddlers.

Then again - who cares? So we messed up the thing with the Taliban. It's really not our problem. The Taliban aren't the enemy, but merely the former hosts of the enemy. The Afghani Taliban are even proved to be unessential for AQ, as they have long since scattered. We just forgot about that unimportant detail.

Darned mission creep!

Sven O

P.S.: Written in 2011, published only with great delay. It became a bit more interesting with the discussion of extremists among Syrian rebels in the background.

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The Poles are pretending they're Japanese (Obrum PL-01)

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To add smooth armour packages and lots of electronic gadgets to a CV-90 doesn't make a sound light or medium tank. Nor do cool LED headlamps.

The tracks don't extend forward enough, restricting obstacle crossing ability a lot. Sensors and APS are too exposed to mere bullets. And to pretend that your tank doesn't need antennas isn't a promising approach either.

It is notable that Poland is at least still trying to develop tracked armoured fighting vehicles with some degree of at least superficial ambition. The ridiculously expensive British MoD projects, the technically challenged German Puma or the French wheeled armoured trucks aren't going to carry European mechanised forces into the 2030's, that's for sure.

We need a 40-50 ton hull, 1500 hp (+ enough kW electrical power) engine and drivetrain with moderate fuel consumption, little maintenance needs and high reliability and durability. Once we've got that, the different countries could develop different variants for their use. I still think the German industry is first choice for developing such a platform (preferably with its own money), but they first need to get the Puma project done and learn from it.

Don't get me wrong: We don't "need" new tanks now or soon, but we need to prepare long-term, so we don't need much in the 2030's either.

related: 2009-06: Heavy armoured fighting vehicles for Europe

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

PS: The reference to Japanese was because of the Type 10. The 1990's Experimentalwanne Gesamtschutz (EGS) had a passing similarity as well, though.

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