There are a couple books, articles and other documents to which I appear to make references to (here and in general) a lot. A LOT. It's a group of about thirty documents overall, maybe a bit more.
One of them is Wigram's report from Sicily, which describes some human psychology elements of combat and some other details, but also coins him as a man who doesn't seem to think much about which reactions his actions could provoke.
Anyway, it's rather annoying to send it out individually again and again and a former link on an old blog post died, so I think I'll just quote it here in full. Being able to simply refer to one's blog instead of writing or attaching the very same things a dozen times or more often is one of the few actual benefits of blogging.
This is the version I have, including typos, OCR mistakes and so on. I strongly suppose there's no copyright problem. (The most interesting part is in chapter "2. ATTACK - BATTLE DRILL".)
____________________________
Dear Brigadier,
As requested I am
appending (In its original form this epistolatory opening runs
straight on into the body of the report.) a report of the lessons of
the Campaign in SICILY as they have occurred to me. As you know owing
to the kindness of the Div Comd I was allowed to come over to SICILY
as an observer at the beginning of the Campaign, subsequently
rejoining 78 Div on its arrival. As a result of this I was able to
see some eight or nine different Bns in action, and to study and
compare their various methods. I was also able to meet a very large
number of old students from BARNARD CASTLE of all ranks. I was able
to discuss all the points I am making below with a large number of
officers with considerable experience in battle, and I find that
there is general agreement. As you know it also transpired owing to
the fortunes of war that I found myself at different times commanding
a Section, a Platoon, a Company and finally a Bn, and I was thus able
to get first hand experience of many of the matters to which I refer.
1. ATTACK BY INFILTRATION
The Germans have
undoubtedly in one way scored a decided success in SICILY. They have
been able to evacuate their forces almost intact having suffered very
few casualties in killed and wounded. They have inflicted heavy
casualties on us. We all feel rather irritated at the result, well as
we have done.
Why has this happened? One
hears it said on all sides that the country is mountainous and
difficult, and therefore ideal for defence, impossible for attack.
In my view this is a
completely erroneous impression of the country. It is true that the
country is mountainous but it is everywhere close. Every hill is
covered with olive groves, plantations standing crops etc, and in
addition the system of irrigation by deep ditches, high stone walls
and a great number of ditches and wadis makes the country perfect for
individual infiltration. It is quite easy for the Germans to defend
by maintaining a very thin screen of MGs and gunner and mrtr OPs
sited on the reverse slope of the hills and to get magnificent
cross-fire shoots both by day and by night. If we attack such
positions frontally even with Hy Arty Supp we play right into his
hands. He maintains his screen until the last moment inflicting heavy
casualties, then as our attack pushes in, pulls out to take up a
further position in the rear. So we find invariably that he has gone,
and the small number of dead bodies found and the small number of
Prisoners taken tell their own story.
To my mind we have not yet
in our training put into practice the lessons learnt in the Battle of
FRANCE, and more especially in the battles of MALAYA against the
Japs. In MALAYA our own position was very similar to that of the
Germans in SICILY. We had prepared our withdrawal from hill to hill
expecting the Jap to attack us. He did nothing of the kind. By
employing minute parties of specialist tps armed with TGs and MGs he
filtered through the cover by night in ones and twos and was able
every morning to establish road blocks in our rear to shoot up our
tpt and communications, to pick off OPs and W/sets, and so to
disorganise us that we were compelled to withdraw in disorder from
position to position without getting a sight of the enemy: His tps
who carried out this work suffered very few casualties.
I think that the whole key
to our future success in the coming battles of EUROPE will lie in the
organisation of similar forces. From now on the Germans are going to
fight a series of rearguard battles wherever they happen to be. If
each Bn could produce one or two Pls trained, I suggest, to work in
threes, each group of three carrying one MG and one TG and each being
prepared to work entirely on its own, the problem would be solved. As
soon as contact is gained these tps would be sent out at dusk and
would be in position behind the enemy by first light. This would
invariably compel the enemy to withdraw.
I make the following
points in regard to these suggestions:
(i) I am convinced that we
have been too ambitious in trying to teach each soldier the art of
infiltration. Even fanatics Like the Japs and Germans found that only
a few men could be trusted to do this job, and they have always left
it to specialists. It is an impossible ideal to hope to train the
Army as a whole in it.
(ii) yet our men can do
this job. Instance the Bn I am at present commanding, at RIVOGLIA Bn
HQ was being constantly menaced by enemy snipers and MGs hidden in
the rocks and trees at the foot of Mt. ETNA. I sent off a young Pl
Comd to deal with the matter. He first of all tried to use his whole
Pl but subsequently picked four men and with them fought an
individual infiltration battle against the Germans which lasted the
whole day. The result of the battle was as follows
- Our casualties nil
Germans 3 killed for certain, 6 prisoners captured. German equipment
captured - 2 heavy MGs and large quantities of sniping gear. I saw
these men when they returned, they said they had been very frightened
at first, but as the day wore on and they realised what rotten shots
the Germans were they got a feeling of superiority and towards the
end were thoroughly enjoying themselves.
I think that every Pl
could find a few men like these.
(iii) All the evidence
points to the fact that the Germans at any rate in SICILY do not
withdraw on a timed schedule but `under pressure'. There is no
recorded instance of them standing to fight to the last round and to
the last man. They always cleared out as soon as they were really
menaced, and the morale of those captured was decidedly low. This
strengthens my view that they would clear out even more quickly if
attacked from the rear (or merely threatened from the rear).
(iv) It has several times
been suggested that the same object could be achieved by infiltrating
whole Bns round to the rear. This may be so, but I do not think it
would be nearly as successful and it would result in heavy casualties
as the German always protects his flanks by MGs and gunner OPs. I do
not think that even a Coy or a PI could do it successfully except on
very favourable grd.
(v) Until we have these
little groups trained I do not think Comds have any option but to
continue the present costly methods. The matter is just one of
training and I am sure it would only take a few days. I would very
much like to have the opportunity of training and organising a force
of this kind. There are all sorts of small points - camouflage,
admin, comns etc.
2. ATTACK - BATTLE DRILL
It was my chief concern to
see the application of Battle Drill to battle and I watched it very
closely. I have come to the conclusion that a number of revisions are
necessary if we are to deal with realities.
There is nothing wrong
with Battle Drill in theory, but it presupposes that you have a PI
team in which every individual knows his job and his place, and in
which every man is brave enough and experienced enough to do as he is
told. Of course in practice you have no such thing. Probably about
half the Pl really understand the Battle Drill thoroughly, and as I
shall show below in any case quite a number of the men in the Pl
cannot be relied upon. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that
Battle Drill as at present taught is very useful training, and will
give first-class results when applied by regular Bns who have
practised it for many months, but we need something very much simpler
for this war.
I want first of all to
describe how Pls are fighting at the moment. Attacks are invariably
carefully prepared, the tps go forward under arty concentrations or a
barrage. When the barrage lifts (if the enemy has not gone) he opens
up with his MGs, and it is here that the Pl battle starts and it is
here that the battle itself is lost or won.
In very rare instances Pl
and Coy Comds have applied some sort of Battle Drill to knock out
these enemy MGs. Where they have done so they have invariably
succeeded in taking the position with very few casualties.
But, in the very large
majority of cases, no sort of Battle Drill is used. No attempt is
made at Fire and Movement. The positions are taken by what I call
`Guts and Movement'.
The battle goes something
like this:-
Enemy MGs open fire, the
whole PI lie down except the PI Comd and three or four gutful men.
Five or six men start making tracks for home, meanwhile the gutful
men under the PI Comd dash straight in to the enemy position without
any covering fire and always succeed in taking the position. In some
instances some positions are taken by as few as two men, and every Bn
Comd will confirm that it is always the same group of nine or ten who
are there first, and on whom the battle depends.
I have personally seen
this method of attack used in all, except one, of the battles in
which I took part, and this explains one of the mysteries I have
never been able to solve before - that is the saying of many
experienced soldiers that `you must never allow men to lie down in a
battle'.
This method of attack is
peculiarly British and from the point of view of sheer courage it
really has no equal. I am convinced however that we can find other
and better methods, and I make the following observations:
(i) Some Comds say that
this method is successful with few casualties. This is true if you
speak of casualties in quantity, but it is far from true if you speak
of casualties in quality. The PI in action is almost invariably
twenty-two strong and of whatever Regt good or bad, every Pl can be
analysed as follows:
Six gutful men who will go
anywhere and do anything, 12 `sheep' who will follow a short distance
behind if they are well led, 9-6 who will run . away.
I have discussed these
figures with many people and they all agree, although there is some
slight disagreement on figures. These figures are roughly accurate as
shown by the number of Court-Martials for running away that follow
every Campaign. Every Bn has between forty to sixty and there are, of
course, many others who aren't caught.
Looking at these figures
it will be seen that the group from which casualties cannot be spared
is the gutful group, yet I would say that casualties in this group
are often 100 per cent per month. We must find a method of fighting
which is more economical. .
(ii) Battle Drill or Fire
and Movement is Not applied because in its present form it is too
complicated, and it presupposes that when a Section is told to do a
thing that it will do it whilst in actual fact, as the above Pl
figures show, they will probably do little or nothing.
What we need is an
extremely simple Battle Drill which takes cognisance of the fact that
there are only 9--6 men in the PI who can be absolutely relied on to
do as they are told under enemy fire.
The following is my
suggested drill:-
(a) Night attack behind
arty concs or barrage (commonest standard stroke employed out here).
The Pl of 22 men is
divided up as follows:- ·
1st group - All the
riflemen under the Pl Comd.
2nd group - 3 Bren groups
(3 men to each gun) comd by the Pl Sgt. 3rd group - two-inch Mtr team
follows up in rear of group 1.
The leaders of the above
three groups have absorbed three of the reliable men in the P1. The
other three reliable men will act as 2nds in comd to take over if the
leader is killed or wounded.
The method of movement is
simple as the Pl is handled as a Section. The rifle group will be in
fairly tight night formation (patrol). (This is essential to make
sure that nobody drops out.) The Bren groups will be in a similar
formation and the two groups will move side by side (preferably Bren
groups a little to the rear) with a gap of about 50 to 100x
(according to the visibility between the two groups). The two-inch
mrtr group keeps about 50x in the rear of the Rifle group.
As soon as the barrage
lifts and the Rifle group is fired on, the Rifle group goes to
ground. The Pl Sgt (who can really be relied on) at once gets his
three Brens into action shooting at the enemy MG or MGs. This will
invariably silence the enemy guns for the time being. I have made
particularly careful observation on this point and have checked it up
with a large number of Pl Comds. As soon as our MGs open up the
Germans (who are always using tracer) stop. I think they do this
because they are nervous or in order to observe our fire. They always
keep quiet until we have finished our hate, then as soon as there is
a lull they open up again. One almost never sees or hears Spandau and
Bren firing together at the same time. It is always one followed by
the other. Even inaccurate fire from our Brens will quieten the
Spandaus until we have finished firing.
As soon as the Brens have
quietened the enemy MGs the PI Comd gets on his feet, persuades all
the rest of the riflemen to do likewise, and leads them straight into
the enemy position under cover of the Bren fire. He may tell the
Mrtr to put down a bomb or
two also if necessary. He will nearly always be able to make the
enemy position in a single bound as the Germans, as a rule, hold
their fire (particularly at night) until we are within 200x. If he
cannot make it in a single bound he will have to lead his men forward
into cover, open up with his two-inch mortar and get his Brens
forward in this manner. This will complicate the operation but will
rarely be necessary.
(b) Day attack with Arty
concentrations
Same method of grouping,
but groups move much more dispersed, men being at 5x intervals 1s. If
forward movement is across country likely to be covered by enemy the
PI Comd tells the Pl Sgt to position his Bren groups before moving
himself, and the Pl advances by Fire and Movement handled as a
Section in every way.
c) Day attack, little
battle without Hy Arty concs (e.g. A single Coy sent up to picket a
height.)
All Pls in the Coy will be
organised as suggested above, and the leading Pl will move forward as
described in (b).
If the leading Pl comes
under fire from more than one enemy MG post it will be regarded as
pinned and the Coy Comd will deploy the rest of his Coy round
whichever flank offers the best cover. This sort of battle requires
the most inf skill, and it should be practised at home as I think it
will be often needed.
NOTES
(i) There is this
further practical point on grouping the Brens collectively. In
hilly country the speed of
the Bren is far different from the speed of the rifleman with the
result that it almost always happens that when the riflemen are
caught under fire there is a frantic scream for the Brens who
invariably are found to be a long way in the rear. With the system
advocated the Pl Comd can watch the progress of the Brens so that he
does not get out of touch with them. It may be argued that the
Section Comds should be able to do this but, in fact, they are not
able to do so.
Team work between the Pl
Comd and the Pl Sgt is about 10 times more likely to succeed than
team work between the Sects - that is my strong point for this very
simple drill.
3. BATTLE INOCULATION
The Battle Schools have
not gone far enough into this important subject and have missed the
big point of it.
Even tps who have been in
quite a number of battles are unable to distinguish between Bren and
Spandau fire, between the whistle of our own shells and those of the
enemy. They go to ground as soon as there is any noise of firing,
although it is not directed at them. This often disorganises an
entire battle, especially at night.
Comds come back to find
their men, but they are seated at the bottom of deep holes and their
Comds cannot find them and, because of the noise, they do not answer
when called. This problem of offrs and NCOs losing all or a
substantial part of their men in night attacks is a very real one and
it happened in all the Bns I was with at some time or other. Tps
coming up from the rear e.g. tpt, A tk guns etc, ordered to be up for
consolidation at first light were particularly bad - there were often
considerable delays because of the mere noise of firing.
It is only fair to say
that the German appears to be the same. The noise of firing keeps him
quiet for a very long time.
(a) I suggest that at all
Battle Schools there should be the following deity Battle
Inoculation. Every student to listen to the noise of the Bren;
Spandau; Schmeiser and Tommy-gun.
(b) Advancing men to have
firstly fire not directed at them, then directed over them, so that
they acquire sufficient skill to know whether or not they are being
shot at.
(c) It must be impressed
on the men every day that . they have got to learn the difference
between the mere noise of battle and fire directed at them. The have
got to learn to keep moving fwd as fast as possible despite any noise
so long as they themselves are not the target.
4. INCENDIARY AMN
Events in this Campaign
have proved that despite 'very heavy shelling a small remnant of the
Boche will stay put. It is this small remnant that causes all the
trouble. I have seen a lucky shot from a 25-pr set the ground on
fire. The Germans immediately went although they were well dug in. I
am sure that one of our best weapons is the three-inch mrtr smoke
bomb used as a lethal weapon, that is fired directly at the enemy so
setting the area alight with the burning phosphorus.
If we could throw some inc
amn in our 25 prs we should have no further trouble with the Boche,
and I suggest that something on the lines of the RAF oil bomb would
be most effective. We can't blast him out but we could easily burn
him out.
5. BDE ORGANISATION
This is already out of
date, and I hope the authorities at home realise it. The Bde Supp Gp
is probably all right so far as the MGs are concerned although every
Bn Comd to whom I have spoken would prefer to have the MGs in the Bn.
The remainder of the Bde Supp Gp is unnecessary and quite useless for
the following reasons:-
Four point two-inch
Mortars
Very inaccurate - not as
quick into action as 25 prs. There is nothing they do which the 25
prs do not do better. If OPs are difficult to come by they are yet
another group of people occupying valuable space.
When suitable targets
presented themselves they were far out of range, or could be
adequately dealt with by the 25 prs. During a three-day battle when I
was almost continuously at an OP, the 4.2 mrtrs fired no rounds
during the whole period.
They have been used to
thicken up fire when concentrations are being put down, but as there
is nó shortage of guns it is rather a drop in the ocean to add
4.2-inch mortars to, say, 6 Fd Regts and 2 Med Regts. When they are
so used they can be very dangerous as they are not accurate enough to
do barrage work. During one attack of this kind we were continuously
shelled by something very heavy on our own side and we all thought
that this was the 4.2-inch mrtr (this may be doing them an
injustice).
20 mm A/A
General Montgomery said at
the beginning of the Campaign `I have no intention of starting the
land battle until I have won the air battle.' This is obviously the
policy which will be continued and as a result the 20 mm A/A is a
complete anachronism. These guns were ordered at a time when our
Forces in N. AFRICA were without
adequate air cover and were suffering severely. This picture has now
changed. These guns have hardly fired a shot and I suggest we cannot
afford to tie up such a large number of men in a defensive role of
this kind, whilst the inf remain desperately short in other ways.
I suggest that the bodies
saved by doing away with the 4.2-inch mrtr and the 20 mm A/A gnns
should be used in the following manner:(a) to provide an
establishment for Pls of Specialist Infiltration Tps as referred to
above.
(b) to in ease the size of
the Section which is still always woefully short in actual fact when
it gets into battle.
6. TRAINING AT HOME
My principal object was to
get careful first-hand notes of actual battles with maps, copies of
orders, details, history of events so that our Training Schools at
home could base their training on reality. I have kept very full
notes of all battles I have seen, and feel at home these battles can
be practised on similar ground and the lessons learnt with an
accuracy which it has not been possible to achieve in the past. I
think that the Campaign in SICILY has really been ideal from a
training point of view. We have had every kind of battle - the
advance to contact, the prepared attack on a big scale, the Pl and
Coy battle, the pursuit and even the flank protection role. In
addition we have been able to study the German methods of conducting
a rearguard action in detail.
7. MISC POINTS
(1) Value of Smoke
Smoke has been little used
in the Campaign, I feel that it might have been a great deal of use.
It was used very successfully in the battle of RIVOGLIA by your Bde
as you know.
(2) Drawing Fire
If the German sees a tank
or some smoke he fires everything he has got at it always. This gives
us two very useful openings:(i) a diversion
(ü) to locate his
positions
I have tried out both
these ideas successfully. They are old lessons but worth repeating.
(3) Patrolling ,
When ordered to send out
patrols to regain contact with the enemy who had retired we tried out
the idea of sending with them an 18 Set, borrowed from one of the
Coys, which was in communication with another l8 Set close to the
gunner OP. Whilst the patrol was moving out (in daylight) I manned
the OP and carefully registered all likely places where the enemy
might bc. As soon as the patrol came under fire they wirelessed back
to me and we at once brought down the fire of one Fd Regt on the
suspected place. This was always effective in silencing enemy fire,
and it enabled the patrol to move forward about two miles and to
occupy a good position forward of our line for 36 hrs without
sustaining casualties.
(4) A Tk guns
It is almost a universal
custom out here to group A tk guns under Bde collectively, and to
make the Bde A tk regt comd responsible both for their training and
their handling in war.
This method works
extremely well and it relieves the Bn Comd, who has very many other
things to do, of the job. Everyone says, also, how much better
gunner A tk gunners are
than the inf, and I would suggest that these facts be recognised and
the guns organised on a Gunner basis entirely.
The present system creates
numerous admin difficulties as the guns a handled by Bde, but
administered by the three separate Bns.
(5) Three-inch Mortars and
Carriers
These were hardly ever
used throughout the Campaign as the country was quite unsuitable for
Carriers (movement off the rds was impossible), and the three-inch
mrtrs invariably found that targets offered were out of range.
Our three-inch mrtrs (5
Buffs) did not fire a single rd throughout the Campaign. r
(6) LOB
Whatever we say about it
at home the facts are that a Bn leaves a certain nucleus out of
battle.
This usually comprises the
2 i/c, 2 i/cs of each Coy, and about six NCOs or men per P1. This
practice should also be recognised at home, and Bns handled in
training minus these percentages.
The size of the Sec should
be increased if possible to allow for it a; the present size was
determined on the assumption that there would be no LOB.
(7) Panic and Hysteria
When heavy shelling or
mortaring starts it is not unusual to find some men here and there
who lose complete control and start to clear out. These men are
invariably known beforehand. Their actions may often have the most
demoralising effect on the whole P1, which would otherwise behave
very well.
I used to think that it
was right to make chaps like this go into battle and take their
medicine like everyone else, but I am quite sure now that : was
wrong. They are too dangerous and can do too much harm.
Nearly every Bn has now
come to this conclusion. They know they have about, say, 20 men who
are definitely unreliable and they leave them right out of battle.
This will now have the effect of greatly reducing the number a
Court-Martials in this Campaign but it has not really solved the
problem. I fee that a Bn Comd should be able to get rid of men like
this simply by certifying that in his opinion X is not suitable for
front-line inf fighting.
(8) System of
Reinforcement
I do feel that this
militates against highly skilled inf methods. Men an first dumped
into reinforcement pools, then drafted anywhere. If this system is
essential, it very much strengthens my case for specialist
infiltration tps.
8. TAKING THE LESSONS HOME
The Div Comd has agreed to
allow me (subject to tpt difficulties) to use the present lull to go
back for a few days to explain the lessons and to bring out training
both in N. Africa and in England into line. Would you be kind enough
to let me have your own frank comments on the above together with any
additional points so that I can be quite sure that we are really
training a the right lines.
Yours
(Sd) L. Wigram, Lt-Col.
Comd 5 Buffs, 36 Bde
CMF
In the Field 16 Aug 43
____________________________
His observations are fine, but his conclusions about mortars, the possibility to use fire to capture mountains and so on are shockingly poor considering his rank and role.
S Ortmann
.
Why do you post it such as small font size as to make it unreadable? It seems counter-productive to post material you ofthen try to make people read but in such a state as to make it very hard to actually read...
ReplyDeletePlease, anyone could say what it's a "TG"? So much military acronyms...
ReplyDelete