The comments on the skirmisher topic reminded me of the widespread mistake of today: People are thinking about land warfare as a clash between combat troops. And I may have neglected to push attention towards when it's not.
Combat troops vs. combat troops is a mostly correct scenario only in slow-moving land warfare with defended positions and even then it's only true regarding direct fires.
Highly mobile (fluent) land warfare is in great part about tanks facing (and crushing or dispersing) non-combat troops. Remember; combat troops are a small minority in an army in the field. Well less than 25% of the personnel are combat troops, even less if you don't count recce, arty, mortar teams and the likes as combat troops.
Even the combat troops are battle-ready only in a fraction of the time and against certain kinds of combat troops (an ATGM team is not of much use in a close fight with infantry, for example). They won't fare much better than non-combat troops when surprised while not battle-ready.
The 'combat troops vs. combat troops' paradigm is completely pointless in regard to elusive forces (skirmishers, guerillas). The U.S.armed forces had more non-combat troops KIA in Iraq than combat troops KIA for this reason (and because they employed non-combat troops as auxiliary security personnel / MP).
Light forces akin to skirmishers cannot only be employed to cause trouble to armoured spearheads. They can persist in the area (leave behind, kind of Jagdkampf* tactic) and then engage the many, many non-combat troops that have negligible to weak combat power. A skirmisher/Jagdkampf platoon doesn't need to measure its combat capability in terms of its ability to destroy MBTs head-on as tank companies do; it primarily has to look at how well it can entrap and annihilate a convoy of 30 non-combat vehicles.
This (and thus the skirmisher and Jagdkampf concepts) has extremely far-reaching consequences. The current force structures in Western land forces may be unbelievably brittle and ill-advised against an opposing force that adapts to exploit the Western infantry and dispersed combat weakness.**
S O
*: I have not found an English summary of Jagdkampf.
It's basically about a stealthy infantry platoon fighting in isolation,
possibly even guerilla-like as leave-behind forces in the enemy's back.
Jagdkampf and Stoßtrupp (infantry assault platoon) are
the two dominant German infantry concepts, as opposed to the anglophone
obsession with a "patrol".
Jagdkampf as it was in pre-2002 field manuals was a deeply flawed concept based on improbable assumptions. It could have been much better; there were plenty military theory contributions to this end in the 70's and 80's that were not as half-assed. I have not seen how the doctrine was adapted after the Afghanistan experience. The extinction of the German long range scout / LRRP establishment indicates to me that the Heer does not bet on dispersed small unit operations at all.
**: Similar concerns were already voiced by the early 1980's based on a mechanised warfare threat, see as example the booklet "Battlefield Central Europe" by Uhle-Wettler.
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Jagdkampf as it was in pre-2002 field manuals was a deeply flawed concept based on improbable assumptions. It could have been much better; there were plenty military theory contributions to this end in the 70's and 80's that were not as half-assed. I have not seen how the doctrine was adapted after the Afghanistan experience. The extinction of the German long range scout / LRRP establishment indicates to me that the Heer does not bet on dispersed small unit operations at all.
**: Similar concerns were already voiced by the early 1980's based on a mechanised warfare threat, see as example the booklet "Battlefield Central Europe" by Uhle-Wettler.
I 'feel' as if I understand cold war European land war, (minus the nukes which rendered the whole thing pointless, but non the less).
ReplyDeleteI 'feel' as if I could grasp what drone swarm war would be like, in-theatre factories, optical communications, mesh networks, vulnerability exploitation etc...
I havent got the slightest clue what a 'fight tonight' war would be. We're in a middle time, not one thing or the other. Building out conventional essentially cold war armies now seems a waste because near term technologies will render them hopelessly vulnerable. But the amount of time and money that needs to be invested in those technologies would leave a budget hole that would leave you open to those conventional cold war armies in the near term.
The Iranians seem to have eschewed the conventional, even in the face of the permanent threat they live under. Seems to be working. Their enemies seem sufficiently respectful of their capability. Might be the missile arsenal more than the fast boats and suicide squads.
Maybe thats the ticket? 10,000 IRBMs on short ready.
Jagdkampf, this the kind of thing?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ef10Eo8QlWo
In contemporary warfare a small unit (in relation to its foes) without generous indirect fire or air support is in danger of being destroyed. The skirmisher runs into a problem of being potentially too heavy for a reconnaissance/harassment unit but too light to be a combat formation. Their ability to successfully attack non-combat convoy formations or softer targets is totally reliant on whenever or not hostile electronic ELINT, COMINT sucks. With the way the Russians are using those methods of intelligence in Ukraine, the skirmishers might be reduced to the role of well trained partisans.
ReplyDeleteThus to make skirmishers relevant in today's battlefield they need communications that are not readily detectable by hostile ISR/electronic warfare. They need dedicated support in the form of artillery or air to compensate for their lack of firepower. They should ideally be placed in terrain where they can easily perform hit and run tactics without being decisively engaged such as mountains or forests. Skirmishers if possible should not be located too far away from the main body effort if not in ideal terrain so they cannot be fixed and isolated (much like the slingers of yore). Skirmishers must be stealthy or be co-located under an effective anti air umbrella or become somewhat better armed insurgents.
Current military doctrine of Hybird warfare already envisions having to destroy stragglers with a semi-coin force following the main effort.
In summary, located too far away from the main body they cannot afford to take casualties, resupply is too inconsistent to allow for maneuver, they lack the fire power to take on heavier formations if need be. The fire power problem can be fixed with tactical nuclear weapons (if it comes to it), and the survivability/maneuver problem is a question of location in relation to the main body or sanctuaries.
I suppose you did not read the 'Swarming' link from last post.
DeleteThe best way to make the LRRP Jagdkampf concept work is to make them elite intelligence gathering formations. The idea is to get the most value out of a small formation whose effects are disproportionate to its size. They need to be deployed in areas where there is a lack of electronic intelligence. A four to eight man team escorted by twelve man security element being able to help map out the electronic order of battle and locations of enemy control nodes is much more useful than even a division's worth of partisans doing random acts of social violence. When they locate expensive communication suites, these systems can then be destroyed by air power, drones, cruise missiles, whatever forcing the enemy to use cell phones and unreliable radios, which then makes them vulnerable to intercept. Thus the metric of the effectiveness of the Jagdkampf is to provide an accurate picture of the battle space to the commander while denying such to the adversary.
ReplyDeleteThey share the same weaknesses of low density units such as they are best employed in alpine, mountain, or forest. Cold War style European theater combat tends to be heavy on a "hands across America or Europa" find the cigarette butts in the parking lot thorough so forces need to be inserted or placed behind the hostile main effort rather than hoping that they don't get bumped. That being said, the lightweight hard to detect radio is still a technological barrier.
I find it interesting that Chinese military doctrine is moving towards disrupting or destroying (Systems Destruction Theory) enemy communication, communication intercept, electronic warfare systems, and guidance systems while Western military doctrine is still focused on maneuver and supply.
The "elite" nonsense was peacetime BS added to the LRRP concept. The LRRP of Vietnam were normal infantry with an extra course and they did the job.
DeleteThe "elite" fetish and gold-plating was added later in peacetime.
The technology for undetected radio comm is available. It only takes a properly directed beam for SatCom. This could even be laser pulses. A few hundred bytes per day with one time pad crypto suffice.
There were very different kind of lrrp units in vietnam. From ordinary infantry with not sufficient training in this kind of stuff (as nearly every batallion formed and lrrp platoon or even an lrrp company) to dedicated extreme elite units like the lrrp groups of the SOG. That so many were normal infantry as you have written here was regarded as an problem and also the results of this units were extremly different. This resulted in the recondo school to improve such units through additional training.
DeleteAs the SOG which tried the very concept that was described here from Unknown has proven, such units always had extreme loss rates. The rates of MIA / KIA of such units climbed to sheer unbelievable high numbers.
To mix fighting and intelligence gathering in the same unit was one major reason for that. For gatherin intelligence you need smaller, lighter and more elusive groups which then do not have enough fighting power to stand against even ordinary conscripts, regardless how elite the unit is.
Even the most elite SOG units which achieved an exchange rate of around 1 (SOG) : 150 (NVA / Vietcong) and i do not mean here civilians counted as Vietcongs, only real fighters - even such units fought mostly only against third rate enemy units and moreover they fought against
Non combat troops.
Regardless of that their losses became higher and higher as the war endured to the point their missions became nearly suicidal.
Because numbers count in this buisiness and the rest is learning from trial and error the non combat troops and third rate fighting units become fastly better if confronted with such tactics and their quantitative advantage then makes them stronger. Especialy in pure infantry combat the quantity is of the outmost importance.
In Summary: an light infantry jagdkampf / lrrp / concept is in reality a very difficult and delicate thing, with extreme high losses amongst such troops and a overall disadvantage for them the longer the conflict endures.
A complete different thing would be an real guerilla warfare force fighting from and out of the civilian population. But soldiers in uniforms with an jagdkampf concept are not such an force.
PS: For exact that reasons the SOG again and again demanded the built up of an guerilla army in north vietnam and in laos under their command but that was denied by the politics.
It is very hard to get away from the necessity of having "elite units". Now I do not mean the glorified swat teams of the current year that pass as special forces, but units with a legitimate mission that provide an effect that is disproportionate to their size. If you ever been in the Army you know that in any given unit you got a small number of studs but most people are just ordinary joes. You move as fast as the slowest man, and sometimes or rather nearly always the time hack is unacceptable even during basic exercises. The public usually sees pencil whipped results. This is why there are always "special clubs" even in regular units. Such as in the 101st, there is always the reconnaissance platoon where high PT and competent lower enlisted endeavor to join as a career enhancing assignment. This is the essence of the High-Low military mix. You don't need everyone to be good. You simply need the good to punch a hole, create momentum, and have lesser ability troops follow up or act as reinforcements for situations requiring lots of shooting.
DeleteThe Russians are utilizing their skirmisher concept in Syria to great effect. You know how they fight? To make up for their lack of talent keyhole and airborne SIGINT they have KSO or GRU Spetsnaz specialized scouts go out and create collection sites to vector in artillery and air power on ISIS, rebel fighters, and to keep tabs on CJSOTF-S for the Osnaz analysts.
When we start getting into systems destruction warfare such units will be great demand in all militaries. Satellites, all of which are easy to track will be destroyed by ASATs in the opening moments of the conflict. Signals intelligence naval ships and drones will not have the survivability to loiter and collect information. High altitude pseudo satellites cannot survive in an IADs. You are left with wheeled or foot borne specialist intelligence soldiers to go collect information for analysts in the rear.
For America only, they might be able to fly an extended range F-22 with a collection suite and beam that back home but that is only America.
I won't go into it specifically but if you are ever fighting a serious opponent never ever use satellite coms if you are far from a large group of friends. I suspect the only reasonably safe means of communication might have to involve long range SWIR/IR lasers which...I believe the Russians are doing in Syria as well.
https://www.sciencealert.com/pentagon-testing-laser-communications-systems-concerned-by-russia-china
As an Add-On (as i overall agree very much with your statement): Such an low-tech approach in an high tech war as a counter to the vulnerability of the same high tech assets against other high tech in peer warfare must take into consideration, that it also can be countered by an low tech defence against such units - as it was done for example in laos and cambodscha (to stay with the vietnam / sog experience).
ReplyDeleteThe question is imo how important the first phase of the war will become and how long the war endures. And if our western tm societies such as they are can endure a long protracted war at all - or will collapse after the first fight or will cease the fighting after the first battle.
Such a short and bordered war is especially in peer warfare imo more likely than an protracted long war. And to the opposite: in assymetric warfare the long war dominates the picture. As such dedicated elite units will suffer high losses and moreover can be countered by low-tech tactics they are likely to have the biggest effect in the beginning - therefore in the first phase of an war which becomes imo more and more important in modern warfare.
So i agree, that such units are very valuable, especially for this tendency of an shortening of warfare in peer warfare. As Syria is not such an war, it is imo not so good as an example. The successes of russian lrrp units there are not and example of how such units would act, and survive in peer warfare. There is always then the danger to try to make yesterday perfect and the danger to make the wrong lessons learnd. If we see the next greater war as a kind of syrian war, the effort of such units there and what was necessary for them to achieve their succeses would blind us against the outcome and results of such units in serious peer warfare. This would be an failure that we must avoid.
Much of your skirmisher/Jagdkampf mission could be accomplished just as effectively with PMN mines or the equivalent.
ReplyDeleteGAB
You're merely talking about munitions, a hardware.
Deletehttps://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2011/08/on-infantry-breaking-contact.html