.
Think Defence asked that question on Twitter and I counted what the (many) replies were (at that time):
- 13 variations of 'spend more' (not counting proposals to add members)
- 5 variations of 'determine its purpose'
- other replies were not proper answers or I could not group them
Well, in reality even European NATO (not counting U.S. and Canada, but counting Turkey for once) very much outspends the Russian federation + Belarus on military power (also in PPP). Our troops outnumber them almost 2:1. Europe only has to defend to the East, while Russia has security challenges in the Caucasus region, Central Asia and East Asia as well.
The quantity of spending cannot really be the problem, so the most numerous response was an expression of ignorance, or worse.
/2014/01/european-and-russian-military-capability.html
/2015/10/military-im-balance-in-europe.html
(These links are dated, but the overall picture didn't change much except that the UK isn't part of the EU any more.)
This is not specific to TDs twitter followers; it's a widespread misconception.
I wrote for years that readiness and especially the readiness to deploy suitable ground forces quickly (in days) is the biggest issue, with vulnerability of European air power and other high value targets to a strategic surprise attack a close second.
The Americans are very, very close to worthless in regard to timely providing useful land power, but they're providing a deep air power reserve much of which could be deployed within weeks. The Battle of France 1940 has proven the limited usefulness of such deep air power reserves in face of a quick invasion, though. It's more of a reinforcement for the old NATO than for the newer members of Eastern Europe in case of a strategic surprise attack.
So we basically need land forces suitable for fighting mechanised Russian forces in Eastern Europe that can deploy 500...1,000 km a day on roads, that can bridge rivers (Oder, Vistula, Duna) to bypass busted bridges and that possess sufficient battlefield air defences against combat aircraft and drones. These land forces better keep the location of their high value targets (such as big radars) unknown to Russian agents and satellites in peacetime.
This doesn't require more spending at all. I am certain that European NATO could cut military spending substantially and still get much more deterrence and defence power out of it.
So why do we have armed forces that are inefficient and poorly oriented?
I blame naivete. A critical mass of naive military fanbois (from voters to politicians) tolerate or support military spending the way it is because
- they fell for the attraction of stupid small wars in the past three decades and/or
- they fell for the attraction of inefficient prestigious toys and/or
- they were and are naive enough to believe that senior officers pursue national defence interests when in reality their decision-making is biased in favour of organisational and individual self-interest. A general or admiral wanting something is a worthless information and should simply be ignored by politicians and voters. The only way to more efficient spending is to ignore the biased advice given by insiders and to think for yourself.
some (not all) related blog posts:
/2016/07/theses-on-future-air-war-future-air.html
/2021/05/navies-obsession-with-peacetime-hull.html
/2021/02/military-punditry-and-think-tanking.html
/2015/07/why-military-budgets-are-as-big-as-they.html
/2013/04/armed-forces-create-doctrine-to-justify.html
/2012/09/military-capability-as-emotional-need.html
/2017/01/human-sacrifice-and-military-spending.html
/2017/05/the-ideal-minister-of-defence.html
/2013/09/effective-oversight-over-bureaucracies.html
/2013/08/more-about-armed-bureaucracies.html
/2013/08/niskanens-bureaucrats.html
/2010/12/supply-demand-and-weird-statement.html
/2014/03/the-principal-agent-problem-politicians.html
/2018/03/luftwaffe-f-35-or-typhoon-for-airground.html
/2010/04/military-spending-free-riding.html
/2017/02/stephen-m-walt-on-2-debate.html
/2014/11/nato-summits-and-spending-pledges.html
/2014/02/how-nato-changed-perception-of-what.html
/2017/03/dossier-europe-and-military-affairs.html
S O
P.S.: The main purpose of NATO is clear to me.
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As a politician I need to ask someone for advice on how to spend the funds allocated for defense. Generals and admirals seem the most obvious choice. Of course some of them have their pet projects, but if the whole body has just pet projects, then there's something wrong with the organization. So what's your approach on determining spending?
ReplyDeleteWe will probably disagree in how far we see Europe as individual nation states versus an alliance.
To recognise the bias is step 1, to understand the politician's role as superior to the uniformed officers because said officers would do it wrong if left to their own devices is step #2.
DeleteStep #3 is that we need competent politicians (in all policy fields!). So far our political system produces universal dilettante executive branch politicians whose only required competence is networking and elbowing their way upwards.
Subject-matter expert politicians are usually backbenchers.
A path towards fostering competence could be to develop a healthy and diverse range of think tanks that are not dominated by German officers and independent from the arms industry and the states.
We've got almost nothing in this regard. I know of exactly one German mil policy think tank that used to be sensible (SAS), and its chairman told me years ago he's practically the only active member left and the organisation will die with him.
btw
https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2017/05/the-ideal-minister-of-defence.html
Networking for top social positions is hardwired in our biology and at odds with becoming experts. More think tanks and better advisors for the political leadership seem the sensible choice, but this is the job our military leadership is already supposed to fill. So instead of changing the minister, which is less likely, how can the structure supporting the minister be reorganized to be more effective?
DeleteI cannot speak for EU/EC nations, but it is naive to think that bad defense policies and spending are the providence of admirals and generals alone.
ReplyDeleteThe dangers of the "Defense Industrial Complex"; an alliance of vested interests from the defense industry, lobbyists, contractors, ‘think tanks’, academia (funded research), foreign interests (sales and grants), and of course the military, were identified by President Eisenhower some 70 years-ago, and are perhaps even more entrenched.
Most politicians, or their families, have direct financial interests in ‘defense’ owing to stocks, bonds, and mutual fund holdings. This is sadly true throughout much of the world, certainly in the USA.
GAB
"The Americans are very, very close to worthless in regard to timely providing useful land power, but they're providing a deep air power reserve much of which could be deployed within weeks."
ReplyDeleteYou are welcome!
You also might add: logistics support, transportation support, munitions reserves, communications and imagery support, and so forth provided by the United States. We remember the European fiasco in Libya that demonstrated the weakness of the European NATO members to wage a campaign.
That "we need..." bit you wrote about primarily falls on Germany, as the largest and most wealthy member of the EU/EC/NATO. Turn to!
GAB
Kosovo '99 and later Libya were a strain on the supply of GUIDED munitions in large part because we didn't want to deplete them fully in light of Russia being neighbour to NATO. Unguided munitions weren't even expended much.
DeleteThe exact size of the munitions warstocks is not public knowledge, but even small stocks of air/ground munitions might suffice. Wartime attrition would be in the 1%...5% range, so combat aircraft would not see many sorties on average, and the practical A/G payload is much smaller than the theoretical maximum becuase of droptanks, air combat missiles and external EW equipment being carried as well.
>>even small stocks of air/ground munitions might suffice>>
DeleteNo, they do not. Actually the lack of munitions is the main weakness of the german military and of many western militaries. Overall we are talking to much about plattforms, weapon systems and not enough about stocks of munitions etc
>>I wrote for years that readiness and especially the readiness to deploy suitable ground forces quickly (in days) is the biggest issue>>
Exactly. And exact for that reason counting numbers is so irrelevant. And exact for this reason the numerical advantage of the nato members over russia is irrelevant. The mentioned 2:1 overmatch says near to nothing about the true military power.
>>This doesn't require more spending at all. I am certain that European NATO could cut military spending substantially and still get much more deterrence and defence power out of it.>>
And that is as naive as you said about the military fanbois. It is naivete in the extrem to think, that you can readiness and the ability for quick reaction without more spending for defence. Such a level of readiness is actually not possible and to achieve it you have to invest money in the first place. Not in plattforms, but in doctrine, organisation, training, structure of the units, position of the units, infrastructure, munitions, spare parts etc etc
Even with reduced numbers (you one claimed here 4 brigades as sufficient which is realy ridicolous beyond my understanding, as even the belarus forces would be sufficient to destroy the 4 brigades of your structure quite fast) you have to invest money to compensate for all the failure and wrong developement of the last years.
I also claim here, that your ideas about efficency are unrealistic. Such an level of efficency is practially not possible at all. What you always write here in the blog is simply unrealistic. You can demand and claim whatever you want, it's practically not feasible in real terms and this real terms cannot be changed.
More money is even then necessary if the military would become much more efficient und cost-effective.
At least i want to mention, that it is not the high ranking officers who have the main fault for the wrong armament policy of the last two decades but that the main fault was from the civilian political side here. Lets take for example the idea of air-mechanisation with helicopters as you mentioned it several times as an example of an wrong developement. I have some insight there in this point specifically. It was not so much the military which wanted this air mechanisation bullshit, but only a few officers and the majority was against this. And the decision to follow this path came clearly from the civilian politics. If the civilian leadership wants something in a specific way this way will become real.
If the civilian leadership listens to the views of high-ranking officers, and then they like a view (for whatever reason) that is held by very few or even just one, then that individual view will prevail. Against the advice and against the conviction of the absolute majority of everyone else. It is this mechanism that is very often the problem. This ranges from the G36 assault rifle to the helicopters.
And that's where the influence of industry comes into play in civilian leadership. Industry literally directs the civilian politicians to act in their interests, and the civilian politicians then enforce those industrial interests over the military. To do this they use false individual opinions and then promote those very people to the top because they agree with them and are therefore useful to the secret agenda behind them.
The real problem is not that the officers are largely incompetent, for the majority are not, but that here in this country we have too much systemic corruption, especially on the civilian side.
"No, they do not."
DeleteI brought a decisive argument by pointing at the attrition rate. Combat aircraft and artillery cannot expend much munition if they don't survive for long. Resisting math is futile.
"The mentioned 2:1 overmatch says near to nothing about the true military power."
It shows that we spend enough, any remaining shortcomings are about the quality of spending.
"It is naivete in the extrem to think, that you can readiness and the ability for quick reaction without more spending for defence."
Transitory effects aside, Germany could simply scrap the useless Patriot SAMs and the useless navy and the for alliance defence useless KSK to free the funds needed to have the best mechanised brigades in the world.
"you one claimed here 4 brigades as sufficient which is realy ridicolous beyond my understanding"
No, a German battlegroup done right can easily be superior to Russian forces twice its size. This isn't all about numbers.
"I also claim here, that your ideas about efficency are unrealistic."
You should read more about military history. That's where I got the idea from that forces can be extremely superior in quality if done right.
About air mechanisation; this charade was continued for two decades. The professional officer corps had plenty time to mitigate whatever mistake was done early on. Instead, I saw much cheerleading around it.
"Kosovo '99 and later Libya were a strain on the supply of GUIDED munitions in large part because we didn't want to deplete them fully in light of Russia being neighbour to NATO."
DeleteUtter rubbish and deflection. NATO begged the USA for munitions because NATO countries did not have them in stock.
Even stored perfectly ammunition components do degrade and Europeans never bought many of them to begin with. The 'not public knowledge' bit is ridiculous; even in the USA you can calculate the number of weapons purchased simply by
going back to the appropriations documents - it does not account for expenditures or losses, but it gives a good baseline.
GAB
"even in the USA" - the Americans also publish field manuals by the dozens, Canadians a handful, French published a couple powerpoint slides, nobody else publishes any current FMs in Europe AFAIK. It's a different transparency culture.
DeleteYou cannot calculate the quantities so easily in Europe.
Feel free to prove me wrong by pointing at some published study about European A/G missile stocks. It ought to be out there if calculating purchased stocks was as easy as you claimed.
Guided munitions - especially HARM - stocks became dangerously depleted in '99. Dumb bombs and the then not yet banned cluster bombs were hardly used at all. ICMs were banned in 2008, thus all those 1980's cluster munitions were still in the depots by '99, but even HRW only estimated the expenditure of few hundreds of CBUs. Ten thousands of British BL755 CBUs were produced (an obsolete munition and the figure is thus known by now) and weren't exported before 2000 AFAIK.
Germany didn't prepare for American Desert Storm-style air war in the 1980's at all. It prepared for low level attacks with iron bombs and ICMs (MW-1 mostly). HARM and Kormoran were exotic exceptions. We had no Mavericks and no LGBs at all. We could have played this style of air war on an altogether different scale, instead we had a handful of Tornados there which expended a substantial share of our HARM stocks.
It was similar with the British, French and Italians, despite the French and British having at least some guided munitions (AS-30L comes to mind).
In short; you mistake the European inability to wage air war American style on a grand scale with a general inability to wage air war on a grand scale. The Americans followed a different route after they developed LGBs for attacks on North Vietnamese bridges.