2022/02/15

Newbold deconstruction

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This is a deconstruction of the following article:

https://taskandpurpose.com/opinion/critical-military-theory/

 

The U.S. military has two main purposes — to deter our enemies from engaging us in warfare, and if that fails, to defeat them in combat.

Wow, delusion (or lies?) full speed ahead right at the beginning, without any warm-up. No, the purposes of the U.S. military are not those. These legitimate purposes have become an afterthought. The main purposes of the U.S. military are to bully if not take over Third World countries and to deter Russia from breaking out of its restrictive influence sphere and to deter China from setting up any kind of influence sphere in the first place. The latter two points can be interpreted as deterrence and defence to the benefit of certain foreign (not always allied) countries if one wants to be particularly nice.

[George Washington quote]

That's an appeal to authority - not a good smell

(...) the traits that deter a potential enemy and win the wars that must be fought: Conformity, discipline, unity. 

Either I don't get the translation completely right or the "conformity" part is total nonsense. More about that later.

“We sleep soundly in our beds because rough men stand ready in the night to do violence on those who would harm us.”

I had my own version of this, so I won't criticise it much. It still leaves a bad taste behind when I see such talk / writing elsewhere because this kind of talk (wolf/sheep et cetera) is all-too often linked to a Fascist-leaning demographic.

There is only one overriding standard for military capability: lethality.

No, that's bullshit. I understand he writes for civilians, but the statement is wrong (albeit it fits with usual American military-industrial talk on the topic).

These previous blog posts hint at what's most important in peer battles:

/2009/02/jericho-sirens.html

/2009/06/politically-incorrect-today-fire.html

/2010/01/repulsion.html

/2010/03/musings-about-military-theory-framework.html

In blunt terms; it's how scary you are. It sounds silly, I know. The era of armies just killing a third of each other in a day of battle are over. Nowadays (and especially during WW2) two peer armies facing each other respect the other's firepower so much that the various ways of scaring the opponent are dominant, and actual lethal action the exception. But as I mentioned before, the U.S. military is largely about bullying vastly inferior opponents, and against those you want great lethality in battle. It's too bad for Americans that too much inferior opponents understand this and minimise their exposure in long guerilla campaigns where lethality ifs again totally subordinated to reconnaissance & intelligence and the most promising path to victory is political, not military.

Combat is the harshest meritocracy

And we're on bullshit mountain again. The cowards tend to survive much longer in warfare than the high performers. His view only applies to wartime officer promotions in the field. I suppose what he's really trying to do here is to paint the military as somewhat noble.

A military force’s greatest strengths are cohesion and discipline. Individuality or group identity is corrosive and a centrifugal force.

That's kinda true, but on the other hand it's the particularly individualistic people who devise new tactics instead of simply following doctrine or blundering. German WW2 fighter and CAS strike fighter groups were astonishing examples of how extremely important - and often extremely effective - the unusual individuals were. Those pilots were also more drunk than disciplined, and NCOs didn't shy away from shouting at officers when the latter had fucked up on the previous sortie. It's very important to make good use of smart individuals despite their corrosive and centrifugal force nature. This retired Marine 3-star sounds very First World War-ish here.

Then again, I kinda wrote something similar without ever retracting it (for all I know the concerns I wrote about proved to be overblown).

(...) how conformity creates efficiency and superior group results (...)

And we're back to delusional. No, efficiency stems from letting the top performers do their thing and find for others something suitable and useful to do.

Taliban radio intercept after engaging U.S. forces.

This reminds me of how Americans told each other that the F4U fighter was called "Whistling death" by the Japanese. The Japanese were quite interested to learn about this after the war. My bullshitmeter broke.

because it’s service to others

Let's face it; enlisting in the U.S. military is nothing but a path to affordable college for a huge share of the recruits. Hardly anyone has thoughts of sacrificing himself herself or itself when enlisting.

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The U.S. military personnel systems are known for forcing service members to attend courses on all kinds of non-military stuff, including sensitivity stuff, anti-rape, anti-STD, whatever. There were also powerful efforts to open up more jobs to women, including combat specialisations. Opposition to this is widespread. The German Bundeswehr had decades of resistance and complaining about similar issues since the introduction of "Innere Führung". In the end, soldiers are too old to submit easily to efforts of educating them.

His basic concern is understandable, and I suppose he gets his message conveyed, but he used a typical amount of bullshit, delusion and pathos along the way.

For a similar takedown, have a look at /2018/04/a-deconstruction-of-micc-propaganda.html

S O

defence_and_freedom@gmx.de

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8 comments:

  1. It might be normal that the self-image of armed forces suffers from some delusions in order to be the good guys in their own story. Not everybody can write "War is a racket".
    Do these delusions interfere negatively with the capability to deny other nations a zone of influence?
    It didn't mention cooperation with allies.
    What role do allied nations play in upholding the US influence zone?

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  2. The writers at Task & Purpose and their sister publication The Warzone are all delusional. Very heavily influenced by and/or on the payroll of a US Influence agency. Don't ever expect critical thinking or honest reality from that mob

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  3. >>Combat is the harshest meritocracy.....And we're on bullshit mountain again. The cowards tend to survive much longer in warfare than the high performers.>>

    vs

    >>on the other hand it's the particularly individualistic people who devise new tactics instead of simply following doctrine or blundering. German WW2 fighter and CAS strike fighter groups were astonishing examples of how extremely important - and often extremely effective - the unusual individuals were. >>

    and

    >>we're back to delusional. No, efficiency stems from letting the top performers do their thing and find for others something suitable and useful to do.>>

    Surviving in war is not an end in itself and does not automatically bring a military advantage overall. Balancing risk positivity and risk avoidance is very difficult, but excessive risk aversion is extremely disadvantageous in military terms.

    The top performers you mentioned, high-grade individualists, were on average not cowards and also died much more often and earlier on average.

    Despite this, i can agree with you and want to add, that the typical US Forces military culture which shines here through this article is militarily very disadvantagous overall, especially in modern warfare. So the article is for me an example about the high importance of (social) culture for the question of military power.

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  4. S.O:

    >>I brought a decisive argument by pointing at the attrition rate. Combat aircraft and artillery cannot expend much munition if they don't survive for long. Resisting math is futile.>>

    Neither was your argument decisive nor was it math. You simply claimed only one number, the attrition rate. That is not math at all. You did not mentioned the number of plattforms, not how much munition is used on average per sortie / mission, not how much ammunition is needed / or the optimum ammount of ammunition if the attrition rate is x % and we have an number of Y plattform which shrinks with the sad attrition rate.

    Your argument is therefore here as valid as mines: it is only an thesis. You have written correctly, that the public do not have the exact numbers of ammunition, but one could for example like i explained it calculate the number needed. You did not do that. Moreover: i have some numbers here, i cannot write them down as they are vsnfd, but i can assure you, that in the bundeswehr the ammunition would runt out before the plattforms would run out. Before the attrition rate of 5% reduces the plattforms to zero, we would not have any ammunition left fort he remaining plattforms. That ist he simple problem here.

    >>It shows that we spend enough, any remaining shortcomings are about the quality of spending.>>

    I can absolutly agree with that. The lack of efficency in the bundeswehr is breathtaking.

    >>Transitory effects aside, Germany could simply scrap the useless Patriot SAMs and the useless navy and the for alliance defence useless KSK to free the funds needed to have the best mechanised brigades in the world.>>

    For sure we need an schwerpunkt and i can agree with you completly, that for example we could give up the navy etc, although the maritime power in europe overall is weaker than many think, especially in ASW and AAW. But that does not weaken the argument of cause.

    My problem here is, that you want to invest the funds which become free into mechanised brigades. Which is exactly not what is the most important area. This brigades are useless if we loose the artillery duell - which would happen against the russian artillery with your force structure and especially if the airspace is contested. This brigades would not survive. Moreover for mechanised forces in truth the same logic applies as for navies: europa has many mechanised brigades, but lacks other abbilities. With our geographic position and our industrial and technological adavantage we could provide quite different systems and abbilities, which wold prove much more useful than four mechanised brigades.

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    Replies
    1. >>No, a German battlegroup done right can easily be superior to Russian forces twice its size. This isn't all about numbers.>>

      And this is again only an thesis. If done right of cause an western mechanised brigade could even defeat an russian mechanised division imo, but only if several other circumstances are present. Only for itself it is simply not done right. I assume you mean that implicit too. That doing that right needs many other abbilities, assets etc to make the mechanised battlegroup function. But this absolutly necessary additional assets cost money and not too few.

      >>You should read more about military history. That's where I got the idea from that forces can be extremely superior in quality if done right.>>

      To achieve an extreme advantage through quality was much easier in earlier times as armed forces were not the same as today. The problem in reading to much military history is, that you become trapped in analogies and comparisons which are not valid, as the circumstances are in reality too different. You can't simply transfer the past to the present as it was the case in earlier centuries. The changes are to great, the dynamic, the complexity and the costs of war are so completly different, that the attempt to create theories out of military history can become even an military disadvantage.

      >>About air mechanisation; this charade was continued for two decades. The professional officer corps had plenty time to mitigate whatever mistake was done early on. Instead, I saw much cheerleading around it.>>

      From how many officers exactly? From whom exactly? And i do not mean the usual industrial advertising magazines such as esut etc. As this charade was a main theme in my active time i can assure you, that the majority of officers did not regarded this abbilities as an real asset / advantage and did not believe in it or that it would have any practical value. Despite this convicition this wrong developement went on and on. Because some (a few) high ranking officers and especially high ranking civilian officers (!) wanted it and worked hand in hand with industry and civilian politicans to make it happen.
      The mere personal opinion of a few can prevail, if this is desired from above, even over the majority. The military in particular is full of such processes. Individuals determine what happens against the will of the majority because they determine the discourse and because they have actual power over the decision. That is in fact the problem.

      Best regards

      Ulrich Reinhardt

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    2. "My problem here is, that you want to invest the funds which become free into mechanised brigades"

      Such forces are the instruments of decisive manoeuvre. A slower attrition campaign would be too slow for the needs IMO, see my reference scenario:
      https://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2016/07/how-to-invade-baltic-countries-and-get.html
      I don't consider PzH2000 as technically inferior to Russian arty. The ridiculously small quantities of COBRA and the material/personnel/org situation of the arty arm are more of an issue.
      Air defence is necessary, and I wrote much about it. it's technically demanding and could very well take a long time till sufficient operational capability. Until then we need to keep our Eurofighters safe from a surprise attack and focused on A2A.
      Regarding the many European mech brigades; too many of those have crappy TO&E; to few SPGs, unreliable ATGMs, no useful battlefield air defence and no concept for what to do if the few dozen MBTs are down to a dozen without any strategic reserve. Moreover, those brigades would take weeks or months to arrive in face of rail traffic blocks.
      We need a couple good mech Bdes that are where we need them when we need them and we don't have those.

      @Reinhardt: The possibility to force change against the majority of a bureaucracy is necessary for many improvements in less than a 20-year horizon. I don't oppose that at all.
      The real questions about "air mechanisation" are IMO why the obvious costs and logistics issues weren't convincing enough.
      Personally, I suspect that the army exploited the air mechasnisation nonsense to get a proper anti-tank helicopter (UHU Tiger was much more anti-tank oriented than the French one despite the air mechanisation nonsense) and a new utility helicopter. The army thus became guilty of the B.S. because it embraced it regardless of how nonsensical the cover story was.

      Meanwhile, we lost the AT branch and de facto the AD branch. Basically everything in the Bw except the medical sector is in poor shape in one way or another.

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    3. S.O.

      >>Such forces are the instruments of decisive manoeuvre.>>

      My point is: But not for them alone. Such forces are not able to deliver decisive manoeuvre without the assistance of other forces and systems outside of the sad mech-brigades. And this are even in a more worse state than the mech-brigades, especially the airforce. Forget any mech-brigades if you do not have enough airpower - because without they are not able to deliver decisive manoeuver.

      One can now argue, that the us will bring that airpower to the theater, but that will need time. Time that we would not have in a fight for the baltics.

      So IMO we should invest free funds first in the Luftwaffe and only after we have a strong airpower we should invest in mech-brigades. This would imo also strengthen and help our allies in europe more than any other schwerpunkt.

      Best Regards

      Ulrich Reinhardt

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    4. Manoeuvre brigades (operating with smaller manoeuvre teams, of course) can force decisive manoeuvre if there's no enemy air supremacy.
      There's not necessarily much need for separate recce forces if enemy recce gets impaired by defending militia and the brigades operate with dispersed mixed company-sized teams much of the time (re-uniting for brief Schwerpunkt actions).

      The Luftwaffe rests all its utility on relatively few high value targets, so it might be devastated by a strategic surprise missile attack.

      Even American air power can be deployed to Central and Southeast Europe by the hundreds of combat aircraft in a few days (not including many A/G munitions). Meanwhile, deploying army brigades -particularly ones with tracked vehicles - is slow. Germany is in position to respond with significant land forces early, so I suppose that's our unique and critical ability to contribute to the alliance's deterrence.

      And then there's the issue of investing in what for the Luftwaffe?

      F-35s, an aircraft type so disappointing (low readiness, poor sortie rate, DAS disappointed to the point of getting replaced soon) that the Americans curtail its production run? Gripen E/Super Hornet/Growler/additional Typhoon are obsolete in face of Su-57 and would not arrive sooner.

      There's no really up-to-date area air defence that we could invest in that could not be part of brigade-level air defences as well.
      AMRAAM-ER and ESSM Blk II are not yet ready for NASAMS, CAMM-ER is not yet ready, MICA VL NG is not ready yet, Meteor is rather unsuitable for SAM purposes due to its engine concept and needs seeker upgrade, SAMP/T is old, Patriot missiles are unsuitable bordering on useless for most tasks and Patriot's radar concept has always been a mistake.

      So frankly, you sound like a biased Luftwaffe partisan.

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