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I mentioned in my previous post that I didn't cover the the Schwerpunkt topic comprehensively, especially not in light of what I wrote about modern low force density campaign theory. This post shall change this.
First, about
Schwerpunkt. The German
Schwerpunkt concept goes back to Carl von Clausewitz who used his misunderstanding of Newtonian physics as an analogy. The Prussians of his time had been defeated in 1806 in the parallel
twin battles of Jena and Auerstedt by Napoleon's army. They couldn't stop wondering if they had won the war if they had combined both armies on the army led by Napoleon personally and kept the other one busy with weak forces.
CvC did cast this idea into the Schwerpunkt concept: You better combine as many forces for a war-deciding battle as possible while having elsewhere only enough strength left to avert disasters.
This German concept was later adapted by the German (post-1871) armies as a guidance for military leaders from squad (machinegun as Schwerpunkt weapon of the squad) to high command. It's also common language in the civilian world, always with the same meaning of having a focus of resources and highest priority on what's deemed to be most important.
The American concept of a "center of gravity" (translated:
Schwerpunkt) did lend the same word for fashion reasons, but grew actually into describing the part of the enemy which if you break it means his defeat.
They think about a critical vulnerability. They describe the massing of forces for decisive actions with the terms "main effort", "economy of force" and "mass" instead. And that's why I keep writing "
Schwerpunkt" in English blog posts when I mean CvC's
Schwerpunkt instead of translating it to "centre of gravity".
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Schwerpunkt is a valid and widely applicable concept, but it's
not an "I win" button. It's more like a spice; there are times when to
apply it and times when you shouldn't.
It is most applicable in its original form (instead of merely as a philosophy to explain the need for prioritization) as a battle-winner. The 'bigger battalions win battles'. I disagree in the context of modern technology AND low force density campaigning, though. Some previous thoughts about this were in the
post about shaping operations.
We shouldn't expect World War-esque front lines in future warfare, except maybe when low-skill armies face off as in the Iraq-Iran war. A conflict between India and China could have a "front line" of mountain outposts, but in Europe we should expect at most militias or infantry units holding settlements in a kind of hedgehog positions zig-zag line, if not mosaic. This is also what we see in Syria.
A mechanised brigade or armoured recce platoon could easily penetrate or infiltrate through the gaps between such positions forth and back. It would take very mobility-degrading terrain (hilly woodland, mountains, swamps, rivers) to prevent this.
This offers opportunities for small, highly mobile and
agile units (akin to armoured recce companies) which are in radio contact (listening 24/7, emitting sporadically) with friendly forces if not their area command (corps HQ) (
2009-09 The square trick). These could be most important as an shaping effort in what was known as
Kleiner Krieg at CvC's time; raids, sabotage and ambushes in the 'rear' area mostly. They could also provide the answer to
organic armoured recce's resource problem.
The supply dependency and huge share of non-combat forces in modern high-end land warfare elevate this potential beyond anything ever seen in my opinion. Decisions could be sought and achieved by this kind of campaigning while few brigades maintain a deterrence against an hostile all-out advance.
Such a theory for land warfare campaigns with regular forces would have little use for a massing of forces for a decisive battle. Instead, the priority would be on the shaping efforts of the many dispersed small units. CvC's self-evident assumption that massing of forces would maximise the odds for "
victory" would be turned upside down due to radio communications, large share of support troops (including air war assets such as SAM batteries and airfield crews) and absence of front lines' functions and low force(s) density (troops per sq km or frontage km in the theatre).*
Another, conflicting, approach might maximise the odds for "victory" instead. The independent and in themselves weak and dispersed forces were understood by CvC as being not helpful for winning a decisive battle and merely the price to be paid for averting disasters far from the main force. Nowadays they could instead ensure the opponent's defeat without a decisive battle happening at all.**
The (small) manoeuvre units described previously could still apply massing and
Schwerpunkt at times, combining for battalion-sized raids in
what RAND called "swarming". This would be an application on the tactical level, and there are many other valid uses for it. I'm merely pointing out that under some circumstances even an upside-down approach might make more sense than an application of the classic CvC
Schwerpunkt.
Schwerpunkt is a valid and widely applicable concept, but it's
not an "I win" button. It's more like a spice; there are times when to
apply it and times when you shouldn't.
S O
related:
(other related posts were linked elsewhere in this post)
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