My bad

Introspection makes sense, so I'll try to compile a list of my errors (or rather of errors which I recognised):

* did not expect the French to become involved in Mali this much, particularly not in the north
* badly underestimated world trade's sustainment of monotonous trade imbalances
* didn't think Stuxnet was a U.S./Israeli government product
* overrated Karzai's behaviour
* underestimated the political longevity of the anti-piracy patrols
* probably underrated 5.56NATO calibre
* didn't believe Putin would think the Eastern Ukraine was a worthwhile grab after the Crimea
* expected more advance of small aerial drone technology 2008-2014
* mixed stance on battlefield radio comm (enticed by potential of datalinks, aware of need to be able to make do without)
* mixed stance on NATO
* mixed stance on navies
* I once retracted a naval-themed blog post because my source had apparently some wrong specifications about a ship
* the piece on divisions was probably not all that great
* overestimated India's soft power
* pretended that politicians guide the military to at least some substantial extent
* underestimated the principal-agent problem in domestic reform topics
* I may also overrate improvisation, since I tend to improvise a lot and know others don't feel that comfortable with improvisations

Things I didn't conclusively wrote about so far:

* never fully sorted out the conflict between rejection of interventions and the problem of (rare, actual and stoppable) genocides
* never really comprehensively covered the suitability of the Schwerpunkt concept (when, where, how - or not) in modern land warfare (in conflict with the dispersion concept)



  1. I'm glad you came clean on some of these!

    In my limited personal experience, battlefield radio has always been a great disappointment if anything, but I imagine 'state of the art' in the US/NATO nations is probably a lot better.