A rumour says that NATO, the United States, the Western Great Powers or the European Union promised to Gorbachev / the Soviet Union and thus its successor state Russia that the Western alliance would not expand eastward beyond East Germany - sometime back in about 1990.
Individuals - even a foreign minister, head of government or head of state - cannot impose such a restriction on his own country in a democracy. This requires a treaty - signed and ratified.
The Russian (or pro-Russian) side argues that the West broke promises, but spoken promises are meaningless in foreign policy, and Russia knows this. They had ample time to cast these promises into a treaty and thus make them part of a deal.
There are sources indicating that during the course of negotiations the German and American foreign ministers said that NATO wouldn't expand beyond East Germany. Yet where's a binding treaty?*
I looked into the original document (scan thereof) of the 4+2 Treaty (English text page 13), and there's nothing in this regard in there. The restrictions only apply to military forces in East Germany. The assertions about Western promises centre on this one treaty, though.
Moreover, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact were still largely intact in 1990. The European Union didn't exist yet; there were European communities instead. The whole idea of NATO or EU expanding beyond the Oder river was still unrealistic back in 1990 (save for maybe parts of Yugoslavia, as it was entering civil war).
Russia has no claim to NATO staying out of Eastern Europe (and NATO did no wrong legally by expanding) unless they produce a signed and ratified treaty with that exact promise.
__________
The promise may be a myth in regard to International Law, but it's an effective myth.** It's shaping opinions in East and West and I suppose that's in part so because Russia was the underdog for years and even Westerners are sympathetic to its plight.
This omits that the eastward expansion of NATO is only a problem if one looks at Russia and NATO as rivals, instead of as partners. Cold War habits and great power attitudes have won in East and West over the many attempts to build a cooperative relationship.
This resembles slightly (not necessarily meaningfully) the failed Franco-German reconciliation efforts of the late 20's which failed in light of French interest in keeping the reparations flowing and German change of government away from socialists to conservatives.
S O
*: And I suppose we know even signed, ratified and thus binding treaties are being violated at times, and Russia itself is no exception.
**: I think I have mentioned it, possibly even assumed it to be correct, in some earlier blog post.
edit 2015: I changed the bold part because I learned that other forms of agreements carry much weight as well. The Russians did so far not point at any such published or at least documented agreement, though.
edit 2015-12: FM about the same topic.
edit 2015-12: FM about the same topic.
Treaties are not relevant. It is about spheres of influence.
ReplyDeleteRussia appears willing to go to war to keep Ukraine (at least partially) in their sphere of influence. Is Germany/USA/NATO willing to go to war to move Ukraine into their sphere?
After all, that is the traditional way spheres are redrawn.
45 million Ukrainians - that's way too many Europeans for such a view. Traditional great power politics including war of conquest are rather underwhelming in face of a country of this size.
DeleteThe most important 'player' in this 'game' are the Ukrainians themselves and thus it's not all about spheres of influence.
Besides; the topic was whether the Russians have a legit claim or not, and the text wasn't even about the Ukraine specifically.
Where is your evidence that this is too big for traditional great power politics? India and China were pawns in the great power game and had relatively large populations.
DeleteThe Ukrainians themselves seem to be divided about leaning East / West / both / neither.
The Ukraine is in the same culture and technology group as the great power in question.
DeleteThe closest analogy would thus be Poland(-Lithuania), which happened to be a thinly populated country stuck between five great powers, three of which participated in three and two of which participated in a 4th partition of it.
That was considered immoral and difficult to accept even by 18th century standards. Now is the 21st century and the rules have become much more strict.
SO wrote:"I looked into the original document (scan thereof) of the 4+2 Treaty (English text page 13), and there's nothing in this regard in there. The restrictions only apply to military in East Germany. The assertions about Western promises centre on this one treaty, though."
ReplyDeleteIn real life you have written contracts and you have situations were a mutual understanding creates a space both sides operate in. The latter was the case after 1990 and is in my book still a deal.
The second more important aspect is, that in the realm of realpolitik doing stupid but legal things is often more demaging than doing intelligent but "illegal" things.
At the moment you provide no evidence the the western actions, which (very likely deliberately) destabilize Ukraine, were or are intelligent.
I you want good information on the situation in Ukraine I would read stuff by David Habakkuk,
he posts regularily on SicSemperTyrannis, in addition, the host Col Patrick Lang provides very good technical
background when it comes to interpretation of the actions of US intelligence agencies.
SO wrote:"Russia has no claim to NATO staying out of Eastern Europe (and NATO did no wrong legally by expanding) unless they produce a signed and ratified treaty with that exact promise."
Again, legal stupidity is still stupidity. As Germans we should acknowledge that we gained a lot in 1990 from the temporary weakness of Russian leaders and as part of the stronger side we should show clear restraint and some kind of political gratefulness.
SO wrote:"This omits that the eastward expansion of NATO is only a problem if one looks at Russia and NATO as rivals, instead of as partners. Cold War habits and great power attitudes have won in East and West over the many attempts to build a cooperative relationship."
Here you contradict yourself. The problem is of course that Russia and the NATO never have been partners. Sequence of actions matters: First make Russia to a partner then incorporate buffer states into NATO and EU. To use NATO or EU membership of West-Ukraine as bargain chip is contra-productive.
Ulenspiegel
I don't see a contradiction there.
DeleteAnd in fact, I would have liked to see that Russia be included in NATO with its European part (with treaty amendment) and NATO transformed into a treaty which first and foremost protects members against members by promising the conventional warfare support of all third party members in the event of aggression between members. A pact against aggression among members.
It should also have required that members enter no new alliances without approval by NATO country leaders' assembly majority.
There were many options available for handling East Europe's security issues better than was done. What was done was primitive, and feels like as if done on autopilot.
"There were many options available for handling East Europe's security issues better than was done. What was done was primitive, and feels like as if done on autopilot."
DeleteIndeed.
SO: Thanks for stating your opinions on 4+2 and NATO expansion (again).
Just to put it here (again), I really think the Soviets/Russians believed very strongely in the (most likely existing) inofficial promises of holding NATO expansion. For them it was like the Jupiter Missiles in Turkey part of the Cuban Crisis' solution. They assumed both sides understood that it was impossible to publicly include such passages in the treaty. Also they assumed that sooner or later it wouldn't matter anyways, after all such "mutual understandings" are a core staple of international political bartering. But I do believe the Russian Leadership was shocked to see Poland and Hungary becoming NATO members in 1999, and the Baltics five years later. The "gentlemens agreement" was "broken" not because both sides agreed on it being no longer neccessary/gaining some advantages out of it, but because of a (percieved) weakness of the Russian party.
The idea of such a NATO expansion was outlandish in early 1990 and that was what I think drove the verbal statements. They stated the obvious.
DeleteThe 'outlandish-ness' and 'obviousness' explains why the Soviets never included such a guarantee in the 2+4 treaty.
Their relative weakness and the fact that they were very busy domestically did likely cause the lack of a guarantee treaty after the Warsaw Pact's disintegration in mid-'91.
Sept '90 - 2+4 Treaty
April '91 - independence of Georgia
July '91 - end of WP
August '91 - coup attempt in Moscow
August-December '91 - USSR falling apart
I don't think the very idea of a NATO expansion was so outlandish when the 2+4 was signed. I believe Gorbachev was very aware that he had virtually no chance of keeping "his" ring of "socialist allies" intact. The Czechs and Hungarians especially were rapidly spinning out of Soviet influence, it was only a question of time until the unrest in Poland couldn't be ignored anymore... Of course neither "Gorbi" nor the hardliners had any idea that the August Putsch would virtually spell the end of the Soviet Union. Afterall the New Union Treaty had virtually gone through, and nobody seriously cared about the (economicly, if not militarily/strategical) uninteresting Baltic Republics and Georgia...
DeletePlot twist: The Soviet foreign minister of 1990, Shevardnadze, was a Georgian.
DeleteShevardnadze was a career politician all his life. A perfect example of a post "great patriotic war" Soviet Career Politician, IMHO.
DeleteHe wouldn't have had less power on another stint as Georgian SSR's CP General Secratary, then he actually had in the following years as Georgias second "President".