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I've shown multiple times that logical thinking is *a bit* in short supply when it comes to military affairs and military policy.
So first, the background to what I'll write about this time: Warfare is destructive, not productive. It could only be profitable if you take much away from others, which de facto requires a war of aggression. Hardly any war of aggression is profitable, though - the annexation of the Crimea a few years ago is an extremely expensive affair for Russia (a loss, not profit), as the region requires many subsidies, for example.
It thus follows that the main (and noble) purpose of a military shall be deterrence & defence; keep the peace, and if that fails protect from avoidable damage. This applies to the own country and to allied countries (defensive alliance, "collective security"). I accept intervention in genocides (a very tricky affair, as it can be misused to lie a country into war), intervention to liberate a recently invaded country and interventions to stop an aggressor in a non-allied country as acceptable motives as well.
This background clearly justifies some military spending inside NATO, primarily for deterrence. That worked just splendidly for NATO so far, albeit at high and certainly higher than necessary costs.
We had post-1992 very little outside threat to deter, mostly it was Russia once NATO accepted the Baltic countries as new members.
So the status quo as of late 2021 was a certain amount of military spending, a certain amount of planned military spending, a successful deterrence so far and a threat country Russia (Belarus is negligible) that had known conventional military weaknesses and its military power was somewhere on a spectrum ranging from "dysfunctional 2nd to 3rd rate military" to "the military reforms worked, they could overrun the Baltics + Poland + Iceland before NATO could counter-concentrate".
Again; our deterrence worked, there's no new evidence to suggest otherwise.
Now Russia attacked Ukraine and is obviously embarrassing itself. They may eventually "win" conventionally, but a long list of embarrassing details has surfaced that showed that the Russian Army and the Russian Tactical aviation are rather on the lower end of the aforementioned spectrum.
The rational conclusion is thus that Russia is much less scary to us in the short and medium term at least than was previously thought possible.
The rational consequence should thus be to re-evaluate our military spending. We obviously intended spent more (believing in a potentially more scary threat) than what a rational spending decision should look like now.
Instead, panicky spending increases (especially in Germany) can be expected.
This panicky reaction can fairly easily be explained by surprised politicians waking up from slumber and finally paying attention to the deterrence topic, which reflects terribly on their competence. It also reflects terribly on their competence that they don't seem to be able to make the rational call. Moreover, the media is primitive and irrational as usual and totally goes along with that nonsense.
No, having personally neglected the topic does not mean that the nation spent too little on the topic in the past.
For clarification; I am not against military spending increases in all cases. It might make sense to temporarily (for about five years) increase military spending to enact some reform. The sad reality is that the military bureaucracies don't use budget increases like that due to incompetent and/or ineffective political oversight. The first (and powerful) instinct of these bureaucracies is to grow instead. Hardly ever does a military bureaucracy disband some irrelevant unit without replacement while the budget is big. We could spend A LOT less on the military in Europe and still be extremely good at deterring aggression against the alliance. Germany wastes much money on a useless navy, on small/occupation wars nonsense, on excessive staffs, on predictably irrelevant procurement programs and on a ridiculously inflated medical branch. We could cut that nonsense to reduce our military spending without the slightest bit of net disadvantage and could at the same time afford more effective land forces and more survivable air power.
related:
/2019/04/fair-burden-sharing-in-nato.html
/2018/04/narratives-as-sustainers-of-excessive.html
/2018/04/patterns-of-propaganda-for-higher.html
/2017/02/stephen-m-walt-on-2-debate.html
/2017/01/human-sacrifice-and-military-spending.html
/2016/07/deterrence-and-defence-efficiency-in.html
/2016/07/warsaw-summit-communique.html
/2015/07/why-military-budgets-are-as-big-as-they.html
/2015/02/the-stupid-is-strong-in-german-navies.html
/2015/02/the-miracle-of-greeces-defence-spending.html
/2014/12/conquest-is-for-losers.html
/2014/07/a-guide-for-demanding-higher-military.html
/2014/03/appropriate-military-strength.html
/2013/08/niskanens-bureaucrats.html
/2013/05/what-does-this-tell-about-west.html
/2011/11/quick-lecture-on-military-budgeting-in.html
/2011/10/national-security-policy-rational-way.html
/2011/07/about-crazily-warped-interpretations-of.html
/2011/05/military-budgets-attempt-to-create-sane.html
/2011/01/bacevichs-takedown-of-military-spending.html
/2009/06/marathon-is-over.html
S O
defence_and_freedom@gmx.de
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